The effects of taxation on the financial behaviour of the firm by Lasfer, Mohammed Ameziane
        
University of Bath
PHD








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON THE FINANCIAL 
BEHAVIOUR OF THE FIRM
S u b m itte d  by
MOHAMMHD AMHXIANH LASFHR
f o r  th e  degree o f  
PhD.
o f  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f  B a th  
1987
"A t te n t io n  is  d ra w n  to  the  fa c t th a t c o p y r ig h t o f  th is  thes is  re s ts  w ith  its  a u th o r. 
T h is  copy o f  th e  th e s is  has been supp lied  on c o n d it io n  th a t anyone w ho consu lts  i t  is  
un d e rs to o d  to  recogn ise  th a t i ts  c o p y r ig h t re s ts  w ith  its  a u th o r a n d  th a t no q u o ta tio n  
f r o m  the  thes is  a n d  rut in fo rm a tio n  d e r iv e d  fro m  i t  m a y  be p u b lish e d  w ith o u t th e  p r io r  
w r it te n  consent o f th e  a u th o r ”
”T h is  thes is  m ay be m ade a va ila b le  f o r  c o n s u lta tio n  w ith in  the  U n iv e rs ity  L ib ra ry  a n d  





INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U368863
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
UNIVEHSITV OF BATH
LIBHAHY




I w ish to express m y  sincere thanks and deepest g ra titude  to m y 
supervisor, Dr. M .M . Levis fo r  his advice, guidance, continua l 
encouragement du rin g  the period necessary to prepare th is  research 
and fo r  the numerous com m ents on the en tire  thesis.
I have benefited fro m  com m ents made by Prof. C. T hom kins  and 
pa rtic ipan ts  at the B A A  A nnua l Conference, Glasgow (13 -15  A p r il 
1987) on a paper based on chapter 3 o f th is  thesis. Com m ents made 
on the methodology paper presented in  a sem inar at Bath U n ive rs ity  
were g rea tly  appreciated.
M y  thanks are also due to D r. G. Diacogiannis, Dr. M.S. S ilve r, Dr. J. 
Hudson, D r. M . Snell, Messrs. C. Massey, D. C la rk , A . Powell and M . 
G ill fo r  th e ir help in econometrics and com puting. 1 have also 
benefited fro m  some unpublished papers sent to me by D r. C. M ayer, 
D r. J. Edwards, Prof. M .A . K ing, Prof. L. Foldes, P ro f. M . Sumner, 
and fro m  several discussions on the topic w ith  m y  colleagues F. 
O nyencm clu and O. M o rrissy .
1 am g ra te fu l to the F a m ily  Eastham fo r  th e ir m oral support, fo r  
m aking m y stay in England most enjoyable and fo r  o u r long lasting  
re la tionsh ip .
F in a lly , 1 w ish to thank m y parents, D jam ila  and Said fo r  th e ir 
sym pathetic  understanding, m oral encouragement and financial 
support, w ith o u t whom  th is  thesis w ou ld  never be completed.
A B S T R A C T
Taxation  has been im p lied  by econom etric models in finance as being 
an im p o rta n t de te rm inan t o f the financia l behaviour o f the firm , yet 
not m any studies have a ttem pted to  p rov ide  a d irect em pirica l 
evidence on such im pact. The m acro-economics studies have assumed 
lh a l a ll the firm s in the economy pay the standard corpora tion tax. 
However, in re a lity , m any firm s  face a m uch low e r effective 
corporate tax, and, sometimes, even do not pay tax at a ll.
The ob jective  o f th is  s tu d y  is fo u r fo ld :
First, to  evaluate the im p lica tio n s  o f the d iffe re n t allowances 
prov ided  by  the U K  corpora tion tax system d u rin g  the period 1972- 
1983 on the effective  corpora tion  tax rates using a sample o f 109 
dom estic non-financia l companies. The resu lts  are based on a 
com puter model using p u b lic ly  ava ilab le  data extracted fro m  the 
Extat data bank.
Second, to assess the im pact o f th is  corpora tion  tax system on the 
financing decisions o f the firm s in  the sample. M ore specifica lly, the 
hypothesis that tax exhaustion makes debts a less a ttra c tive  method 
o f finance is tested.
Third, to  analyse the effects o f personal income taxation  on d iv idend  
d is tr ib u tio n . The decision on w he the r to d is tr ib u te  o r to  re ta in  a fte r 
tax p ro fits  is viewed as being a func tion  o f the m arginal personal 
income tax rates o f the f irm ’s shareholders.
Fourth, to test fo r  the effects o f taxation  on investm ent behaviour o f
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the sample o f firm s  using both the neoclassical and the va luation 
models. The im pact o f the tax exhaustion position is also tested.
The research find ings ind ica te  that capital allowances and stock re lie f 
have con tribu te d  s ig n ifica n tly  to the low  levels o f the effective 
corporate taxes as paid by the firm s in the sample. A lthough  the 
m agnitude o f the im portance o f these tw o  provis ions has changed 
d u rin g  the sample period, stock re lie f is found, on average, to be the 
most s ign ificant de te rm in an t o f the high num ber o f tax exhausted 
companies.
Tax exhaustion is fo u n d  to  be one o f the de te rm inan t o f the observed 
low  levels o f deb t-cap ita l ra tios  o f the lirm s in the sample. I f  a 
com pany cannot take advantage o f tax shields on interest payments, 
then the cost o f debts is h igher and a rise in the level o f debts w il l  
o n ly  resu lt in an increase in  the b ankru p tcy  costs, as measured by the 
required re tu rn  on e q u ity  a n d /o r debts. However, due, p robab ly, to 
the ad jus tm en t costs lirm s  are not changing sub s ta n tia lly  th e ir debt- 
capita l ra tios fro m  one period to  another. Furtherm ore, because o f 
the low  levels o f e ffective  corporate tax rates and capita l gains tax 
rates, the a fte r tax re tu rn  on e q u ity  is found to be higher than tha t on 
debts and, as a consequence, firm s  may. have opted fo r  eq u ity  ra ther 
than debts in financing th e ir  investm ent projects.
F irm s seem to take in to  account the re la tive  personal income tax 
position o f th e ir  shareholders in deciding on th e ir d iv idend  po licy . 
As opposed to  the classical system  o f corporation tax, the im pu ta tion  
system encourages lirm s  to d is tr ib u te  more o f th e ir earnings as 
d iv idends. On the o the r hand the p o ss ib ility  tha t the firm  may not be
- 4 -
able to recover the advanced corporation tax exerts a negative effect 
on the decision to d is tr ib u te  d iv idends. However, because o f the 
m ajor changes in the tax system, the cross-sectional resu lts  do not 
support a lw ays these findings.
In o rder to determ ine w hether taxation exerts any im pact on 
investm ent expenditure, a num ber o f econometric specifications have 
been tested. The o rig ina l neoclassical model do not seem to  expla in 
the investm ent behaviour o f o u r sample o f companies. Therefore, 
under the basic assum ptions o f th is  model we conclude tha t taxation  
does not have any influence on investm ent. Some econometric 
problem s d id  not a llo w  us to reach a d irec t conclusion on the im pact 
o f taxation on investm ent when some assumptions o f the neoclassical 
model were relaxed. Nevertheless, tax exhaustion d id  not seem to 
affect investm ent. A lthough  the va lua tion  model p rov ided  much 
better resu lts than the neoclassical, i t  was found  tha t the re la t iv e ly  
good perform ance o f the tax adjusted Q is due to the ra tio  o f m arke t 
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CHAPTER 1
IN TR O D U C TIO N
The m odern financial theory has argued fo r  a s ign ificant im pact o f 
taxa tion  on the behaviour o f the firm . In p a rticu la r, some models 
have been developed, in w h ich  i t  was found  th a t i t  is o n ly  in  the 
absence o f taxation tha t the firm  is in d iffe re n t as to the appropriate 
methods o f finance , d iv id e n d  po licy  and investm ent decisions. 
Therefore, we w ou ld  expect th a t the in tro d u c tio n  o f taxation is lik e ly  
to have s ign ificant im pact on the behaviour o f the firm . Yet, there is 
not suffic ient em pirica l evidence on such effects.
As fa r  as the financing m ethods are concerned, corporation tax 
d iscrim ina tes between debts, retained earnings and new issues. Since 
interests are tax deductib le , firm s  are expected to  use the highest level 
o f debts, as th e ir m arket va lue  w o u ld  increase by an am ount equal to 
the tax shield. However, the p o ss ib ility  o f tax exhaustion and 
b ankrup tcy  costs may reduce the tax advantages o f debts. Moreover, 
i f  personal income tax rates o f shareholders and bondholders are 
taken in to  account the a fte r  tax re tu rn  to shareholder m ay be higher 
than tha t o f bondholder (because the income o f the fo rm e r is taxed 
p a rtly  at personal income tax rate and p a rtly  at capita l gains tax 
rate). Th is  p o ss ib ility  m ay reduce the advantages offered by 
corporation tax to  debt finance.
F irm s w ou ld  also be in d iffe re n t between d is tr ib u tin g  d iv idends or 
re ta in ing earnings i f  the co rpora tion  tax system does not d iscrim ina te  
against d iv idends. Since shareholders are the owners o f the company, 
corporation tax should, according to the theory, be based on the
- 13 -
m argina l income lax ra le o f shareholders. In m any syslems, 
however, d iv idends are taxed tw ice, al corporation tax rate and then 
at personal income tax rate. F irm s are thus, inclined to  reduce th e ir 
d iv id e n d  pay-out ra tios to  m axim ise the a fte r tax re tu rn  to  
shareholders through capita l gains w hich , because o f the allowances 
and de fe rm en t, are taxed at much low er effective capita l gains tax 
rate than d iv idends. Therefore, because o f the re la tive  tax treatm ent 
o f d iv idends  and retained pro fits , firm s  are expected to  reduce th e ir 
d iv id e nd  paym ents and to  finance th e ir  investm ent projects w ith  
retained earnings in o rder to  reduce the ove ra ll tax b il l .
A no the r m a jo r d is to rtio n  o f the corporation tax on f irm ’s behaviour is 
th rough  its  effects on investm en t expenditure. C orporation tax rate 
m ay increase the cost o f capita l o f the firm , thus m aking some 
projects not p ro fitab le  when discounted at the a fte r tax rate o f re tu rn . 
In  o rder to  s tim u la te  cap ita l g ro w th  some corporation tax systems 
a llo w  firm s  to  deduct a p roportion  o f the to ta l cost o f th e ir 
investm ent from  taxable p ro fits  or, a lte rn a tive ly , provide some 
favou rab le  trea tm ent o f depreciation o f assets. However, in order to 
take advantage o f these allowances, firm s should have positive 
taxable p ro fits  against w h ich  cla im s may be made. I f  th is  is not the 
case, then a reduction in investm ent m ay be due to tax exhaustion.
A lthough  the theory predicts the above lik e ly  d is to rtion  effects o f 
taxa tion , ve ry  l i t t le  em p irica l evidence is available. Previous studies 
have carried such tests using aggregate data. They have, however, 
resu lted in a num erous in te lle c tua l disputes and disagreement about 
the extent to w h ich  corporate tax alfects com pany’s decisions. Tax 
incentives are, in general, considered to encourage investm ent
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expenditures but there was a lack o f consensus amongst economists 
about the measurement and the incidence o f such effects. 
F u rthe rm ore , since at the aggregate level, a ll lirm s  are assumed to 
face the same standard rate o f corporation tax, such measures, even i f  
they are correct are lik e ly  to be biased, as they ignore the fa c t tha t 
the e ffective  corpora tion tax applicable to each in d iv id u a l company is 
s ig n ifica n tly  d iffe re n t fro m  the standard rate. S im ila r ly , the cost o f 
capita], depreciation rate, price o f capita l, gearing ra tio  and d iv idend  
po licy  are a ll s itua tion  'specific characteristics o f each firm  and may 
not be treated as being the same.
Therefore, there is a need to  undertake  such analysis using company 
data to investigate  the extent to  w hich  corporation tax may create 
some d is to rtio n  in  the f irm ’s financing decision, d iv idend  po licy, and 
investm ent behaviour.
1. The O bjective o f the Study
Taxation is, in  theo ry , an im p o rta n t fac to r the firm s have to  consider 
in th e ir financial po licy  as i t  reduces the cost o f debt finance and, as a 
consequence, the cost o f financing a p a rticu la r project. I t  also reduces 
the cost o f acqu iring  assets through capita l allowances. Using 
aggregate data, a num ber o f econom etric studies have found  strong 
influence o f taxa tion  on the financial behaviour o f a ll the firm s. 
However, such analys is is not undertaken at firm  level. The objective 
o f th is  s tudy  is, thus, to p rov ide  a d irec t evidence on the effects o f 
taxa tion  on the m ain financia l decisions o f a sample o f in d iv id u a l 
companies. The general aim  o f th is  research is fo u rfo ld  :
First, to analyse the d iffe re n t components o f the corporation tax
- 15 -
system tha t prevailed d u rin g  the sample period 1972-1983 in the UK 
and to evaluate the im p lica tions  o f the d iffe re n t allowances on the 
e lfectivc corpora tion tax rates o f a sample o f dom estic non-linancial 
firm s. The resu lts  are based on com puter model using company 
accounts.
Second, to  assess the im pact o f th is  corpora tion tax system on the 
financing decision o f the firm . M ore specifica lly, the hypothesis that 
tax exhaustion makes debts a less a ttra c tive  m ethod o f finance is 
tested.
Third , to  analyse the effects o f personal income tax o f shareholders 
and corporate tax on d iv id e nd . The decision on w hether to  d is tr ib u te  
o r to re ta in  a fte r  tax p ro fits  is viewed as being a fu n c tio n  o f the 
m arginal personal income tax rates o f shareholders and the a b il ity  o f 
the firm  to recover the advanced corporation  tax.
Fourth, to test fo r  the im pact o f taxa tion  on investm en t behaviour o f 
a sample o f firm s  using both the neoclassical and the va lua tion  
models. M oreover, the im pact o f tax exhaustion position is also 
analysed th rough the accelerator model.
A  sample o f dom estic non-linanc ia l firm s is selected fro m  the Extat 
data bank to undertake  such analysis, over the period 1972 through 
to 1983.
2. L im itations o f  the study
A num ber o f lim ita tio n s  m ay be identified  in th is  em p irica l w o rk  :
1) There is no a ttem p t to supplem ent th is  em p irica l investigations by 
in te rv iew s  o r questionnaires;
2) No a ttem pt is made to eva luate  tim e  series observations fo r each
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in d iv id u a l company because o f the re la tiv e ly  short tim e period o f 
data ava ilab le ;
3) Th is  analys is does no t deal w ith  o ther tax system apart from  the 
one analysed here.
4 ) Data u n a v a ila b ility  has been one o f the m a jo r problem s found 
d u rin g  the process o f th is  research. Accounting  data was, fo r  most o f 
the cases, not su itable  fo r  th is  analysis. It was, therefore, necessary 
to ad just th is  data and to  set a num ber o f assum ptions re la ting  to  the 
a c tiv it ie s  o f the firm , na tu re  o f cap ita l stock and to  the composition 
o f each firm 's  shareholders. T h is  has also lim ite d  the sample period 
and the sample size used in  th is  s tu d y .
3. O verview  o f  the Study
C hapter 2 o f the thesis deals w ith  the theoretica l d ifficu ltie s  invo lved  
in g iv in g  some reasons to  the existence o f corporation  tax, together 
w ith  the problem s o f defin ing the basis fo r  the tax rate. The 
u n d e rly in g  system is then analysed and the effective corporation tax 
rate is computed fo r  each com pany. A s ta tic  s im u la tion  exercise is 
undertaken to  determ ine w hat w o u ld  have been the effective 
corpora tion tax rate as w e ll as the num ber o f tax exhausted 
companies, i f  p a rtic u la r ex is ting  p rov is ion  is not made available.
In chapter 3 the effects o f taxa tion  on the financing decision o f the 
firm  are tested. The a fte r  corporate and personal tax cost o f debts is 
compared to that o f e q u ity . M oreover, it  is hypothesized tha t the 
level o f gearing ra tio  o f the firm  is determ ined by a com bination of* 
tw o  factors : tax advantages o f debts and the degree o f r isk  the firm  is 
in . However, i f  the com pany is tax exhausted, then the cost o f debts
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w il l  be h igher as no tax shields are gained. The model used is 
fo rm u la te d  in sueh a way as it  cou ld provide a possible answer to the 
leverage puzzle in the sense that the optimum level o f corporate debts 
w o u ld  be a fu nc tio n  o f both b a nkrup tcy  risks, as measured by the 
requ ired  re tu rn  by shareholders and bondholders/banks, and the tax 
position the firm  is in.
E m p irica l evidence fo r  the re la tionsh ip  between the d iv idend  po licy , 
personal income taxation o f shareholders and corpora tion  tax is 
p rov ided in chapter 4. The theoretica l rev iew  o f the lite ra tu re  asserts 
th a t the h igher the d iv idend  tax d isc rim ina tio n  va riab le  the h igher the 
d iv id e nd  pay-ou t ra tio . The tax d isc rim ina tio n  va riab le  measures the 
p ropo rtion  o f a fte r  tax d iv idends w hich  an average shareholder 
wrou ld  receive fo r  each u n it o f p ro fit d is tr ib u te d . M oreover, i f  the 
f irm  cannot recover the advanced corpora tion tax then it  may re fra in  
fro m  supp ly ing  d iv idends. C u rre n t d iv idends are assumed to be 
lin e a r ly  re lated to the earnings and to  the lagged level o f d iv idends.
C hapter 5 is devoted to the rev iew  o f the existing  lite ra tu re  on the 
effects o f taxa tion  on investm ent. Previous studies have analysed 
such effects fro m  a p u b lic  economics po in t o f v iew  by using aggregate 
data to  test the above models. On the o ther hand, models that have 
been applied at company level do not genera lly specify the 
im portance o f taxation on investm ent. I t  is, therefore, necessary to 
rev iew  both approaches in order to fo rm u la te  hypotheses to be tested.
C hapter 6 describes a model based on the neoclassical fram ew ork  
w h ich  provides the basis fo r  analysing the im pact o f taxation on 
investm ent behaviour. The im p o rta n t issues d raw n  fro m  the review
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o f the lite ra tu re  are stated e x p lic it ly  and the variables used to test 
the hypotheses are delined and estimated. The models are form ula ted 
in such a w ay as the elfects o f corporation tax m ay be analysed 
e x p lic it ly  by re laxing the assum ption o f u n ita ry  e la s tic ity  between 
the d iffe re n t components o f the desired capita l stock. M oreover, the 
hypothesis tha t tax exhaustion exerts a negative influence on 
investm ent expenditure  is tested using the accelerator m odel.
In chapter 7 an a lte rna tive  model o f investm ent behaviour is tested to 
determ ine w hether corporation tax affects the investm ent rate. This 
specification a ttem pts to  exp la in  investm ent expend itu re  through the 
ra tio  o f the m arke t value o f the firm  to  its  capita l stock, adjusted fo r  
taxation . I f  investm ent is p o s itive ly  correlated to  the va lua tion  ratio, 
then an increase in  capital allowances a n d /o r a reduction  in the 
corpora tion tax rate w ou ld  lead to  a rise in investm ent.
The final chapter presents the main conclusions derived fro m  the 
previous analysis and specif}' d irections fo r  fu r th e r  research on the 
effects o f taxa tion  in the f irm ’s behaviour.
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CHAPTER II
ISSUES IN T A X IN G  CORPORATIONS
In m any countries taxes are intended to serve a num ber o f functions. 
I f  the economy is in a stage o f rap id  and unsustained g row th  w ith  
in fla tio n a ry  consequences, the governm ent, by  increasing tax rates, 
m ay dampen the level o f economic a c tiv ity , because, when tax rates 
are increased both personal disposable income and A rm s ’ p ro fits  are 
reduced. As a consequence both demand and investm en t are reduced. 
On the o the r hand, by reducing taxes, governm ent m ay provide  both 
consumers and companies w ith  greater purchasing power and 
there fore , increase the incentive  fo r  firm s  to  invest.
As fa r  as the corporation tax is concerned, there are tw o  main 
elements tha t are invo lved  : the corporate tax ra te  and capital 
allowances. Taken in d iv id u a lly , they are con flic ting  in  th e ir 
objectives. W h ile  the fo rm e r increases the cost o f  capita l, thus 
discourages investm ent, the la tte r, on the hand, a im s at s tim u la tin g  
cap ita l expend iture. Furtherm ore, personal income taxation o f 
investo rs  depends p a r t ly  on the d iv idends and financia l decision o f 
the f irm . Therefore, the s tudy  o f the effects o f taxa tion  on financial 
po licy  has to  deal w ith  a ll these elements in d iv id u a lly  and possibly 
find th e ir  com bined eff ects. Before undertak ing  such an exercise, it  is 
perhaps w o rth  look ing  firs t a t a num ber o f issues th a t su rround  
tax ing  corporations in  general. T h is  rev iew  m ay h ig h lig h t the 
d ifficu ltie s  dealt w ith  in  the next chapters. The com plica tion  is in  
de fin ing the aim s o f taxing firm s  as opposed to  tax ing  d ire c tly  the 
shareholders and on how  to  set up an appropria te  corporation tax
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system to achieve e ffic ien tly  the above objectives and in the same tim e 
reduce the efficiency loss.
The present chapter deals w ith  a b r ie f analysis o f the d iffe re n t issues 
tha t arise fro m  tax ing  corporations and describes the type  o f 
corpora tion  tax system on w h ich  th is  s tudy is based. I t  s ta rts  by 
p ro v id in g  some reasons behind taxing  corporations, discusses the 
problem s invo lved  in de te rm in ing  the accounting p ro fit and then the 
d ilfe re n t systems o f corpora tion  tax that are advocated are compared. 
Section 3 presents the u n d e rly in g  tax system fo r  th is  analysis by 
look ing  at the d iffe re n t tax prov is ions ava ilab le  du ring  the period 
1973-1983 using a sample o f 109 firm s. The effective corporation tax 
rates under d iffe re n t a lte rn a tive  policies are computed then compared 
to  observe the im pact o f each p rov is ion .
1, Problems w ith  Taxing Corporations :
The in tro d u c tio n  o f co rpora tion  tax w h ich  is levied on the p ro fits  o f 
incorporated bu t not un incorpora ted  businesses has resulted in a 
num ber o f controversies. The issues f irs t relate to w h y  companies are 
taxed d if fe re n t ly  fro m  th e ir  owners, and secondly to  the de fin ition  o f 
p ro fits  on w h ich  the corpora tion  tax is based. These tw o  issues are 
analysed in the fo llo w in g  section.
1.1 Reasons for  taxing corporations :
In  general the m ain  reason fo r  tax ing  corporations arises fro m  the fac t 
th a t companies are considered to  be separate entities fro m  th e ir  
shareholders.A common ju s tif ica tio n  given fo r  the in tro du c tio n  o f 
corporate tax is th a t companies should pay fo r  the p riv ileges 
conveyed by corporate status. Incorpora tion  im p lies a lim ite d  legal
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l ia b i l i ty  o f the ow ners o f the company and as a consequence 
shareholders are protected in the event o f bankrup tcy . T h is  lim ite d  
l ia b i l i ty  m ay create taxable capacity. However such priv ileges are 
somehow reduced by the ob liga tion  o f companies to  obey some ru les 
la id  dow n by company law . For instance d iv idends cannot be paid 
fro m  capita] so tha t shareholders are not a llow ed to  w ith d ra w  th e ir 
c o n tr ib u tio n  to the firm  o therw ise cred itors  w ou ld  not be 
compensated in the event o f b a nkrup tcy . Furtherm ore, the costs o f 
these priv ileges are no t easily measurable. Even i f  they are, one 
cannot say that they are proportionate  to p ro fits  and thus su ita b ly  
paid fo r  by a tax on p ro fits .
A n o th e r argum ent fo r  separate tax on corporate income relates to  the 
fac t tha t corporations re ta in  part o f the p ro fit in the business. I f  a ll 
p ro fits  are d is tr ib u te d  as d iv idends then they could be taxed d ire c t ly  
at shareholders personal income tax rates. However, since pay-ou t 
ra tio  is u su a lly  less than u n ity , retained earnings are l ik e ly  to  
increase the m arke t va lue  o f the f irm , thus resu lting  in  capita] gains 
w h ich  are taxed at lo w e r e ffective rates (because o f the de ferm ent and 
the allowances). M oreover, because shareholders are taxed at d iffe re n t 
rates, taxing companies at shareholders income tax ra te  w ou ld  create 
a problem  o f horizon ta l e q u ity  between shareholders and w ou ld  be in  
con flic t w ith  the equity c r ite r ia  o f the corporation tax sys tem 1.
1. The Green Paper on Corporation Tax (1982) defined six criteria against which a 
corporation tax system may be assessed :
a) Equity : The possibility of charging a like amount of tax on those who enjoy 
a like amount of income;
b) Certainty : Tax system should be set in such a way as the authorities know  
who is liable and that taxpayers are aware of their liability;
c) Simplicity : This maxim refers to both the administrative work involved and 
the comprehension by the users;
d ) Cost of collection ; it concerns the elimination of unnecessarily
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An alternative* explanation fo r tax ing  companies at a dilVcrcnl rate is 
fo r  the governments to regulate the a ffa irs  o f companies. The 
corpora tion tax may encourage or discourage the re ten tion  o f profits 
in the company, inlluenee the am ount o f capita l investm ent 
undertaken, may d icta te  d iv idend  po licy  o f the lin n  and may affect 
the a llocation  o f real capita l between equipm ent, s tructures, 
inventories and land.
There is no d irect evidence fo r  tax ing  corpora tions separately. M any 
systems are a ttem pting  to  reduce the discrepancy between corporation 
tax and personal income tax. A lth o u g h  the tax system has the 
advantage o f a llo w in g  firm s  to  establish a corporate pension scheme at 
a much h igher rate than se lf em ployed o r partnersh ip , the gains o f 
such a llow ance m ay not compensate fo r  the corporate tax payments. 
Furtherm ore , the im pu ta tio n  system tends to  a certa in  extent, as w i l l  
be seen below, tow ards in tegra ting  corpora tion  tax and personal 
income tax.
There is, however, a debate on w ho  bears the tax burden. Harberger 
(1962 ) and Shoven and W h a lle y  (1972 ) using a general e q u ilib r iu m  
model, found  th a t the tax on corpora tions rests upon the owners o f 
the firm . As a consequence, the re tu rn  on capita l is reduced and th is  
has a negative effects on capita l fo rm a tio n . On the other hand,
administrative costs for the taxpayer and the tax collector;
e) Economic criteria : Tax system performs a number of economic objectives. In 
particular tax system should be constructed after taking into account its effects 
on income distribution, macro-economic stability and resource allocation;
f )  International considerations ; Most companies have international activities. In 
setting up a corporation tax these international elements should be taken into 
account-
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K r/.y /a n ia k  and Musgrave (1963 ) hold the v iew  that corporation  tax 
is passed on to the consumers through a rise in prices or increases 
unem ploym ent. In th is  s tu dy , however, we assume tha t the lirm  
bears tax and leave aside the question o f the s h ift in g  o f the 
corporation tax.
1.2 Bases f o r  th e  C o rp o ra te  Incom e  T a x  :
The ex is ting  corporate tax systems are based on the p ro lit o f the 
company a lte r  deducting in te rest paym ents, depreciation and other 
expenses. There arc however, a num ber o f controversies that m ay 
d is to rt such de fin ition  o f income: the measurement o f depreciation o f 
fixed assets, the measurement o f in ve n to ry  p ro fits  and the treatm ent 
o f capita l gains and losses. These areas arc im portan t in  deciding on 
the appropria te  base fo r  taxa tion  o f corporate income, because an over 
o r underestim ation  o f any o f these elements w i l l  lead to  the company 
being inap p rop ria te ly  taxed. The Green Paper on C orpora tion  Tax 
(1982 ) found  tha t on h is to rica l cost basis the effective rate amounts, 
on average (i.e. inc lu d in g  loss m aking  companies), to  25% bu t once 
allowances have been made fo r  in fla tio n  (using SSAP16) th is  rate 
jum ps to  65%. Thus, since the corpora tion  tax is not a lu m p  sum, but 
ra the r a percentage applied to  taxable p ro fits , some companies may be 
taxed at more than 100% o f th e ir  real p ro fits . M ost corporate tax 
systems a llo w  some im p o rta n t p rov is ions fo r  these elements in  
defining the corporate tax base. I t  is thus necessary to  analyse each o f 
these constituents fu r th e r .
1.2.1 T he  d e p re c ia tio n  o f  fix e d  assets : Depreciation is tax
deductib le  because i t  is considered to  be an expense in the process o f
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production , such as labour cost. However, as opposed to  the la tte r, the 
actual cost o f using the equipm ent is ve ry  d if f ic u lt to measure because 
such equipm ent could have been bought a lon g -tim e  before and thus 
its  book value is l ik e ly  to  be com ple te ly  d iffe re n t fro m  its  
replacement value. Therefore, the depreciation deducted fo r  tax 
purposes is underestim ated, and a com pany using such a method w i l l  
end up paying more tax than otherw ise.
There are a num ber o f poss ib ilities to  com pute the depreciation rate. 
Under the s tra ig h t- lin e  method an equal am ount, being a fixed 
percentage o f the o rig ina l va lue  o f the cap ita l, is w ritte n -o fl' each 
year. The double dec lin ing  balance m ethod, on the o ther hand, a llow s  
double percentage rate o f w r ite -o ff  each year bu t applies it  to a 
d im in ish ing  balance. The firs t method assumes tha t the value o f the 
equipm ent does not change su b s ta n tia lly  over tim e, w h ile  the la tte r 
hedges against in fla tion  as a large pa rt o f the depreciation is deducted 
in the firs t years. In some cases the depreciation fo rm u la  is computed 
on the basis o f sum o f the d ig its  where a fra c tio n  o f the expenditure 
w hich  declines lin e a rly  over the life t im e  is a llo w ed 2. A lte rn a tiv e ly , 
the tax system m ay a llo w  the w ho le  o r pa rt o f the value o f the 
cap ita l to be w r it te n  o ff as they incu r. T h is  free depreciation system
2. The straight line depreciation is obtained by dividing the total cost of the asset 
less the estimated salvage value by its economic life. The double declining 
balance applies the double depreciation rate to the total cost of the asset in the 
first year. In the second year this rate is applied to the difference between the 
total cost and to the amount of depreciation of the first year (i.e. net cost of 
assets) and so on. Under the sum of years digits, the yearly depreciation 
allowance is determined by first calculating the sum of the years digits 
(1+2+3+....n w ith n being the economic life), dividing the number of remaining 
years by the sum of the years’ digits and then by multiplying this fraction by 
the depreciation cost (total cost less salvage value) of the asset.
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a llow s companies to  w r ite  oil' Ihe o rig ina l costs as they w ish , e ither 
by deducting  the to ta l cost im m ed ia te ly , or by deducting a certain 
p roportion  in the year o f the purchase and then lake advantage o f the 
w r it in g -d o w n  allowance in subsequent years. A lthough  the m otive  
behind such provis ion appears to be an incentive to  increase 
investm ent, i t  m ay be seen as an approx im ation  to  in fla tion  
accounting because i t  reduces nom ina l p ro fits .
Id e a lly , the depreciation should be com puted on the basis o f the 
replacement cost o f the cap ita l. In such a case the economic 
depreciation w ou ld  reflect the actual cost o f using the equipm ent. 
However, there are a num ber o f d ifficu ltie s  in com puting the 
replacement cost o f capita l and thus the economic depreciation, 
because there are no perfect m arkets fo r  used assets. The above 
depreciation fo rm u la s  are a ll based on a k in d  o f ru le  o f th um b . W ith  
the exception o f the free depreciation, a ll the o ther methods may be 
less advantageous to the firm  in cases where the economic depreciation 
is h igher than the depreciation used fo r  tax purposes (A tk in so n  and 
S tig litz  (1980), lecture  5). A n  a lte rn a tive  w ay o f dealing w ith  the 
problem  has been p u t fo rw a rd  by  Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980) 
w hereby allowance is g iven a once and fo r  a ll when capital 
expend itu re  is incurred . The sum a llow ed is equal to the present 
va lue  o f economic depreciation over the l i fe  o f the asset. However, 
th is  firs t year capita l recovery system m ay be d iff ic u lt to  app ly  as i t  
m ay invo lve  some controversies as to  the appropria te  real rate o f 
in te rest to use and the rate o f depreciation over tim e.
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1.2.2 T h e  v a lu a t io n  o f  s tocks : S im ila r U> the* cost o f using the 
equipm ent, the cost o f sales also may lead to a m ismeasurement o f 
the corporate tax base. The value o f the stock bought some tim e ago 
may not re llect the cost o f buy ing  it when it is about to  be used. 
Thus com puting  taxable p ro fit on the basis o f p re v ious ly  bought stock 
may lead to  an overestim ation  o f the am ount o f tax paid.
There are tw o  methods fo r  eva lua ting  the stocks : FIFO (F irs t- In -  
F irs t-O u t)  and LIFO  (L a s t- In -F irs t-O u t) . U nder the fo rm e r system, 
a llow ed in the U .K ., the increase in the value o f stock over the 
accounting period is counted as an element o f taxable p ro fit, 
irrespective  o f w hether th is  increase is due to a rise in  the price level 
or a vo lum e increase. I f  a company uses the L IFO  m ethod, i t  has to 
use up its  stocks in  the reverse order in w hich  it  has bought them. In 
th is  case there w i l l  not be any in ve n to ry  p ro fit o r loss i f  the vo lum e 
o f stock and the prices rem ain the same. H ow ever, in  cases where 
there is an increase in  the vo lum e o f inventories o r a rise in the price 
o f inventories the in fla tio n a ry  gains are taxed as cu rre n t p ro fits  under 
h is to rica l cost accounting. The tim in g  o f the rea lisation o f these gains 
depends on the accounting m ethod used. FIFO a llo w s  these gains to 
appear fa ir ly  soon w h ile  L IF O  m ay postpone them in d e fin ite ly . There 
are some p rovis ions, such as stock re lie f /w h ic h  a llo w  companies to 
deduct fro m  taxable income a certa in p roportion  o f the in fla tion  effect 
against tax.
1.2.3 N e t m o n e ta ry  assets and  l ia b i l i t ie s  : In  o rder to ad just 
p ro fits  fo r  in fla tio n a ry  effects, companies have to  take account o f the 
changes in the real va lue o f net m onetary assets and lia b ilit ie s . The 
reason fo r  ad jus ting  p ro fits  fo r  these elements is th a t real capital
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gains m ay be made by lin n s  w hich  are nel debtors and real capital 
losses by those that are nel cred ito rs  even iT  nom inal values o f assets 
and lia b ilit ie s  remain unchanged. A lthough  the idea behind th is  
ad justm ent is sim ple, its  app lica tion  may create some com plications 
because then even personal income tax has to  be indexed3. The 
in fla tion  cm lia b ilit ie s  is how ever reduced through the re lie f fo r  the 
w hole o f nom inal in terests paym ents.
2. Corporation Tax System s :
There are a num ber o f d iffe re n t w ays o f c lass ify in g  systems o f 
corporate tax. I f  one is interested ch ie fly  on the effects o f taxation on 
the incentives to  invest, then the convenient w ay o f categorising 
corpora tion  tax systems is by com puting  the m in im u m  pre-tax rate o f 
re tu rn  necessary to  induce the ow ners o f the firm  to invest. K ing  and 
F u lle rto n  (1 984 ) based th e ir c lassification on the tax wedge, defined 
as the difference between the p re -tax real rate o f re tu rn  on a m argina l 
investm ent p ro ject and the post-tax real rate o f re tu rn  to the saver 
w ho  supplied the finance. T h is  approach ca lls fo r  a deep analysis o f 
each tax system. It  is ve ry  com plicated as i t  is based on a num ber o f 
assum ptions nam ely, the w ays in w h ich  the project is financed, the 
id e n tity  and the tax bracket o f each supp lie r o f finance, the level o f 
in fla tio n  rate, the m argina l cost o f cap ita l and the type  o f assets.
A n  a lte rna tive  c lassification is to  take the v iew  tha t corporation tax
3. Since 1982 capital gains are indexed by allowing the acquisition cost of a share 
to be adjusted by the increase in the retail price index that occurred after the 
asset has been held for one year. However, neither dividends nor interest 
income on debts are taxed on an indexed basis.
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systems are d iffe ren t m a in ly  in th e ir trea tm ent o f the taxation  on 
d iv idends as compared to the taxation o f the' un d is tr ib u te d  profits. 
U nder th is  method, the o n ly  variables that are compared are the 
corporation tax rate and the tax d isc rim in a tio n  variab le , 0, defined as 
the o p p o rtu n ity  cost o f retained earnings in term s o f d iv idends 
foregone. The fo rm e r tax va riab le  is the tax levied on the p ro fits  o f 
the company, w h ile  the la tte r  a ttem pts to  find w he the r d iv idends are 
taxed more heav ily  than re tentions, thus creating a d is to rtion  effects 
on the methods o f finance.
The sim plest corporation tax system is perhaps the classical system 
where the tax l ia b i l i ty  o f the firm s is independent o f the 
shareholders’ personal income tax l ia b i l i ty .  T h is  practice, firs t 
in troduced when corpora tion lax  was advocated in  1904 in  the US, 
stems from  the fact tha t companies are seen as being d iffe ren t 
in s titu tio n s  from  th e ir  shareholders. U nder th is  system the firm  pays 
a fla t ra le o f corpora tion  tax on a ll its  taxable p ro fits  and 
shareholders, in tu rn , are lia b le  to personal income tax on th e ir 
receipts o f d iv idends. D iv idends are thus taxed tw ice  as shareholders 
are not a llow ed any c red it fo r  the tax paid by the firm .
In cases where the corporation  tax rate is equal to  the marginal 
shareholders’ personal income tax ra le  and the tax d iscrim ina tion  
variab le  is equal to  u n ity , the corporation  tax system is integrated 
w ith  the personal income tax system and the am ount o f tax 
corporations w i l l  have to bear w i l l  be so le ly  dependent on the 
taxa tion  o f its  shareholders. One w ay  o f im p lem enting  th is  system is 
by  im pu tin g  und is tr ib u te d  p ro fits  to  shareholders in  p roportion  o f 
th e ir  share in to ta l eq u ity  cap ita l, and then tax d iv idends and the
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im puted d iv idends incomes at the appropria te  personal m argina l rate 
(C arte r Commission (1 9 66 )). U nder th is  system there is no tax 
d isc rim ina tion  between retentions and d is tr ib u tio n s  o r between 
incorporated or un incorporated businesses, nor is debt finance treated 
d iffe re n tly  from  equ ity  finance. H ow ever th is  system m ay not be 
p ra c tica lly  im plem ented because o f the problem s tha t m ay arise in 
cases where the company makes a loss, where some shareholders hold 
shares fo r  periods less than the re levant accounting period, where 
p ro fits  fluctuate  fro m  year to  year and where firm s operate in 
in te rna tiona l m arkets.
U nder the im pu ta tio n  system the tax d isc rim ina tio n  va riab le  is equal 
to, 0= ^  771 ^  where s is the im p u ta tio n  rate w h ile  m is the m arginal
personal income tax rate. The im p u ta tio n  system a ttem pts to  reduce 
the double taxation o f d iv idends by a llo w in g  a p roportion  equal to  
the standard rate o f income tax, o f the tax on d iv idends to  be 
deducted at company leve l. T h is  advance corporation tax is then 
deducted fro m  the to ta l corpora tion tax to  obta in  the m ainstream  
corporation tax. T h is  system however, does not, as the previous one, 
e lim ina te  com ple te ly the d isc rim in a tio n  against d iv idends, because 
not a ll shareholders are taxed at standard ra te o f corpora tion tax.
A tw o  rate system is an a lte rn a tive  w a y  o f reducing the double 
taxation  o f d iv idends. I t  a im s at tax ing  d is tr ib u te d  p ro fits  at a low e r 
ra te  than u n d is tr ib u te d  p ro fits . U nder th is  system the to ta l tax 
l ia b i l i ty  includes a rate o f corpora tion tax on u n d is tr ib u te d  pro fits , a 
d iffe ren t rate on corpora tion  tax on d is tr ib u te d  p ro fits  and the 
shareholders’ rate on income tax on d iv idends. Shareholders can set
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both the w ith h o ld in g  tax and the* tax cred it against th e ir personal lax 
l ia b il i ty .  Th is  system does not d isc rim ina te  between d iv idends and 
interests. However, it makes d is tr ib u te d  p ro fits  subject to low e r tax 
burden than retained p ro fits  i f  a ll shareholders are basic tax payers. 
Furtherm ore, i f  a company is tax exhausted then shareholders w i l l  be 
given a tax cred it fo r  tax w hich the firm  has not a c tu a lly  paid. Also, 
i f  the com pany is w h o lly  owned by tax exempt in s titu tio n s , then the 
tax revenue w ou ld  be zero i f  a ll the p ro fit is d is tr ib u te d  (w h ich  w il l  
be the case in  order to  m axim ise shareholders’ w ea lth ). O ther 
problem s w ith  th is  system relate to in te rna tiona l considerations and 
a d m in is tra tive  costs (see Green Paper on C orpora tion  Tax (1982 ) p.42 
fo r  these issues).
The corpora tion tax and the tax d isc rim ina tio n  va riab le , 0, can be 
combined to  measure the overa ll effects o f a p a rtic u la r tax system. 
K in g  (1977 ) defined the A C ID  (A ttem p ted  Corporate In tegra tion  o f 
D iv idends) test s ta tis tics  as the ra tio  o f the m axim um  net d iv idends 
tha t the shareholder could receive ou t o f one u n it o f p re -tax  p ro fits  to 
the m axim um  net d iv idends tha t w ou ld  be received i f  the business 
were unincorporated. The aim  o f th is  test is to  measure the extent to 
w h ich  the corporate tax and the personal income tax are integrated. 
I f  th is  ra tio  is u n ity  then corporate tax system does not impose any 
extra  tax on d iv idends over o r above the level o f personal taxation. 
T h is  is achieved when the corporation tax is zero in  the classical 
system or when the corpora tion  tax is equal to  the im p u ta tio n  rate in 
the im pu ta tio n  system 4
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The above comparison is based on tw o  tax variab les that m ust sa tis fy  
some conditions. It is necessary fo r  the corporation  tax rate to be 
non-negative because i f  it  is then it  becomes a subsidy. It is also 
im p o rta n t not to be confiscatory o therw ise no d iv idends w il l  be 
d is tr ib u te d . The o ther cond ition  is fo r  the lax  d isc rim ina tion  
variab le , 0 not to be negative and to be able to  compare it  to  the 
personal income tax rate, i t  has to  be less o r equal to  the shareholders’ 
rate o f income tax.
W h ile  the last cond ition  m ay be satisfied in th is  analysis, the first 
ernes are d iff ic u lt to app ly , because m any companies have negative 
e ffective tax rales as a resu lt o f capita l allowances, stock re lie f and 
o ther deductions. T h is  analysis becomes more com plicated when 
cap ita l gains are accounted fo r. K ing  argued tha t capita l gains tax 
rates are not incorporated in  the above analysis because th is  tax is 
charged o n ly  when gains are realised and also gains in  a p a rticu la r 
year cannot be* d ire c t ly  iden tified  w ith  retained p ro fits  o f tha t year. 
H ow ever, th is  depends on the assum ption as to  the m argina l increase 
in  the m arket value o f the lirm  fo r  a u n it increase in the retained 
earnings (T ob in  q ). Neglecting these facts m ay lead to  m isleading 
comparison between d iffe re n t systems.
A  system tha t m ay avo id  the in fla tio n a ry  problem s, dealt w ith  in the
( j  — 7)
4. The ratio is computed as : A C 1D  =  Oy------------r- I f  0 = 1 - m then ACID = 1
(1 —  m  )
-  J
while if  0 =  - 7 7 —~ T '  then A C ID  =  7 7 — -^2- 
(1 —5 ) ( 1 — s )
In the U.K.. for instance, at present when the corporation tax is 35% and the 
imputation rate is 29% the ACID  test is 0.915.
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l irs l section, and the* d is to rtion  effects o f taxation is based on the How 
o f funds ra ther than p ro fits  (Meade Comm it lee (1978 ) chapter 12 
and Edwards (1982a,b)). U nder th is  system in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  be 
taxed on the difference between th e ir  receipts d u rin g  the tax year 
(such as salaries, d iv idends, sales o f shares) and th e ir savings. 
S im ila r ly , firm s  are taxed on th e ir  savings being the use o f funds  
w ith in  the business (e.g. re tentions and re investm ent o f p ro fits ) and 
th e ir  expenses. There are tw o  related approaches w h ich  can be 
fo llo w e d  lo  im plem ent th is  system. Companies m ay be taxed on the 
difference between to ta l cash in flow s fro m  the sale o f goods and 
services and to ta l cash ou tflow s on the purchase o f goods and services, 
w ith o u t any d is tin c tio n  between services and capital transactions bu t 
no financial transaction. As a consequence, a ll expenditures on capital 
assets w ou ld  be deductib le  in  the year they are made b u t no interest 
paym ents w ou ld  be deductib le  and no tax w i l l  be due on in terest 
received.
A lte rn a t iv e ly , companies m ay be taxed on net financial ou tflow s being 
the net d iv idend  paid ou t p lus  the net acquisitions o f shares in o ther 
companies less net in flow s o f fun d s  fro m  shareholders. As long as 
fu n d s  are saved in  the business, they w ou ld  not be taxed. Thus 
reta ined earnings are not taxed, and the corporate tax w i l l  be based on 
the net take out fro m  the corporate sector ra the r than on profits.
The advantage o f th is  system is tha t depreciation and in fla tio n  w ou ld  
no t d is to rt the taxa tion  o f companies. There w o u ld  be no wedge 
between pre- and post-tax re tu rns  at the m arg in , no tax 
d isc rim ina tion  between retention  and d iv idends and no double 
deduction th rough  a llo w in g  both investm ent and interest
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d e d u c tib ility . H ow ever, i f  the firs t approach is adopted, many 
financia l companies w i l l  have a negative tax base w ith  interest 
receipts higher than interest paym ents. Therefore there w i l l  be a 
s h if t  in  the d is tr ib u tio n  o f the corporate tax burden. U nder the 
second proposal there is a need fo r  a higher tax rate (e.g. estimated at 
200% by Green Paper 1982) to raise the same am ount o f tax revenue. 
Thus, companies w ith  high re tentions w ou ld  be h ig h ly  favoured. 
M oreover, the d is tr ib u tio n  o f tax between sectors w ou ld  v a ry  from  
year to  year depending on th e ir  d is tr ib u tio n  or th e ir  cash flow. 
Furtherm ore, in te rna tiona l considerations may make th is  system not 
applicable.
3. Computation o f  the Effective Corporation Tax Rate :
The com putation o f the effective corporation tax rate m ay be ju s t an 
approx im ation  o f the actual tax paym ent as calculated by the tax 
officer because there are a num ber o f possible ways o f tak ing  account 
o f the allowances and d iffe re n t accounting m ethods. Such 
com plications arise in the trea tm en t o f the Advanced C orpora tion  Tax 
(A C T )  w hich in  fac t is a personal income tax l ia b i l i ty  deducted at 
source and in the t im in g  differences between accruals and paym ents 
o f taxa tion . Companies m ay be d iffe ren t in th e ir trea tm ent o f 
de fe rred  taxation. In  the case o f depreciation a llowances some 
companies may opt fo r  the w ho le  100% in it ia l a llowance in  the firs t 
year thus do not c la im  any w r it in g -d o w n  allowance in  subsequent 
years. Furtherm ore, a firm  m ay decide to cla im  the w ho le  o f the 
recoverable A C T  whenever possible, w h ile  others w o u ld  ra ther 
spread the cla im  th rough a num ber o f years. Nevertheless, an
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attempt is made here to estimate the effective corporation lax rales by 
using the reported accounting data coupled with the estimation of the 
different allowances for each year and for each company. This 
exercise is necessary to evaluate the effects of each allowance and to 
determine the extent of tax exhaustion of each firm in the sample.
3.1 Characteristics o f  the UK corporation tax :
The structure of the corporation tax system that prevailed during the 
sample period may be represented in the following graph.
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IN C O M E  TAX P A Y M E N T  CORF»ORATlON TAX PAYMENT
Figure 1. Simplified representation of the corporate tax model 
Source : Mayer ( 1982).
The central point in computing the effective corporation tax rate is the 
computation of the taxable profit. This is different from the 
published "profit before tax" because the latter does not take account 
of the allowances and includes such expenses as entertainment of UK 
customers, political donations and gilts which do not qualify as 
expenses for tax purposes. The objective of the corporation tax
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m odel5 is to  use p u b lic ly  ava ilab le  accounting in fo rm a tio n  together 
w ith  an approx im ation  o f the p rinc ipa l allowances w hich  arise from  
capita l expenditure and stock re lie f to a rr iv e  at the In land  Revenue’s 
assessment o f l in n ’s taxable p ro fits . Then ap p ly ing  the appropria te  
corpora tion tax rate adjusted fo r  sm all companies, the tax l ia b i l i ty  
m ay be obtained. By d iv id in g  th is  tax am ount by p ro fit before tax, 
the eff ective corporate tax rate w i l l  be obtained.
T h is  model is applied to  each o f the 109 non-financia l dom estic UK 
p u b lic  companies d u ring  the 1972-1983 period. T h is  sample o f firm s 
is a rrive d  at a fte r checking a ll the companies in the Extat data bank 
fo r  these tha t have not merged o r acquired other m a jo r companies, fo r  
those tha t operate o n ly  in the dom estic m arket and fo r  those tha t the 
m ax im um  data is ava ilab le  d u rin g  the sample period. It is assumed 
tha t i f  a company operates in  an in te rna tiona l m a rke t its  financial 
po licy  m ay be su b s ta n tia lly  influenced by the tax system in these 
o ther countries and, as a consequence, i t  m ay be d if f ic u lt  to  isolate the 
possible im pact o f the U K  tax system . The necessary cond ition  fo r  
inc lu d in g  a p a rtic u la r com pany in  o u r sample is fo r  the Double 
Taxation  R elie f (D T R ) to be zero fo r  any year in  the sample period, 
and fo r  the num ber o f employees abroad to  be less than 1 per cent o f 
the to ta l w o rk  force6. Using p u b lic ly  ava ilab le  data, th is  model 
calculates, fo r  each com pany, taxab le  p ro fit, m ainstream  tax l ia b i l i ty ,
5. I am very grateful to my supervisor. Dr. M . Levis for allowing me to use the 
original tax model.
6 . The DTR limitation is not enough for our selection because it depends on any 
agreements between the UK and the other country. One per cent is. however, an 
arbitrary figure, but it is supposed to represent agents of the firm abroad for 
selling not producing the output.
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advance corporation tax, capital allowances, pooled of depreciation 
allowances and the slock relief.
C apita l allowances are computed on the basis o f the reported net 
investm ent expenditure d u rin g  the period (i.e. add itions less 
disposals). There are tw o  main types o f investm ent expend itu re  : 
investm ent in  p lant and m achinery and investm ent in bu ild ings. 
Both are treated d iffe re n tly  as fa r  as allowances are concerned.
D uring  the sample period p lan t and m achinery cap ita l expenditures 
have benefited fro m  tw o  incentives, being the in it ia l a llowance and 
the w r it in g -d o w n  allowance. The fo rm e r is a tax deduction on a 
certa in  percentage o f the in it ia l cost o f the asset. The la tte r  on the 
other hand, is computed on the d ifference between the o rig ina l cost o f 
the asset and the in it ia l a llowance. Since 1972 the in it ia l a llowance 
has been set equal to  100% o f the to ta l cost o f the asset. However, 
companies may take the option o f reducing the am ount o f the firs t 
year allowance claimed to  any o ther low e r percentage and c la im  in 
subsequent years a w r it in g  dow n allow ance o f 25% on the w r it te n  
dow n value. Th is practice a llow s  firm s  to benefit fro m  taxa tion  o f 
p ro fits  at reduced rates over a num ber o f years, bu t th is  advantage 
m ay be weighed against the o p p o rtu n ity  cost o f the tax th a t could 
have been avoided in the f irs t year. I f  the com pany decides not to 
take a ll or part o f the firs t year a llow ance to  w h ich  i t  is e n title d  and 
i f  more than one item  o f p lan t and m achinery has been purchased, 
then tha t part o f the expenditure  on w h ich  no in it ia l a llow ance is 
taken goes in to  a "pool" o f una llow ed expenditure  q u a lify in g  fo r  
w rit in g -d o w n  allowance, ra the r than carried over to  the fo llo w in g  
year. I f  an asset is sold then a balancing charge is applied to the
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d ilfcrence  between the disposal value and the value o f the q u a lify in g  
expenditure. This balancing charge reduces the li n i l ’s in it ia l
a llow ance by the value o f the sale over the am ount carried fo rw a rd  
in  the pool. Th is w ou ld  come to the same results as i f  the disposals 
are deducted from  the purchases and set the net investm ent against 
the in it ia l allowance.
In it ia l a llowance fo r in d u s tr ia l bu ild ings has been low e r than tha t o f 
p lan t and m achinery (40%  up to  1974, 50% u n til 1981 and 75% 
the rea fte r). Depreciation allowance o f 4% is calculated on a s tra igh t 
line  basis over the l ife  o f the asset assumed fo r  tax purposes and 
com puted net o f in it ia l allowances. S im ila r to the p lan t and
m ach inery, investm ent in  in d u s tr ia l bu ild ings can be taken as nel 
because when the b u ild in g  is sold, the proceeds less the cost, in it ia l 
a llow ance and w rit in g -d o w n  allowance w i l l  be subject to  a balancing 
charge i f  there is a p ro fit o r to a balancing allowance i f  there is a loss.
A n o th e r m a jo r deduction fo r  tax purposes is the stock re lie f. I t  was 
in troduced  in 1973 to lessen the effects o f in fla tion  on stock 
replacement. The increase in  the value o f stock less a certa in
p ro po rtio n  o f the income fo r  the period may be treated as an
a llow ab le  expense. For the firs t 2 years, th is  p roportion  was set at 
10% and the income is defined gross o f capita l allowances, w h ile  up to 
1980 th is  p ropo rtion  was increased to 15% and is ca lculated on 
income net o f allowances. A f te r  1980 the deduction is no longer on 
the increase in  both price and vo lum e o f stock, bu t ra th e r on 
cond ition  tha t there is an increase in the A l l  Stock Index over the 
period and that the value o f the stock at the end o f the preceding 
period o f accounts exceeds some fixed sum. The A ll  Stock Index is a
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m o n th ly  index w hich rcllccts the m ovements in the average price 
level o f stocks held by companies7. The 1981 stock re lie f re fo rm  
thus res tric ts  re lie f to  stock appreciation w h ich  is due o n ly  to  price 
changes. On the other hand, i f  the value o f stock has decreased then 
the l in n  is liab le  to a c law -back on its  previous re lie f. For the period 
before 1979 the claw -back is lim ite d  to the lesser o f the previous 
re lie f unrecovered and the fa ll in the va lue  o f stock. Thereafter, 
recoverable re lie f is restricted to  six year period preceding the 
accounting year.
There are o ther deductions before a rr iv in g  at the taxable p ro fits . Net 
in terest paym ents are not taxed. C apita l gains are taxed at low e r rate 
(d iffe re n t fro m  capital gains tax rate fo r  in d iv id u a ls ), bu t capital 
losses are o n ly  carried fo rw a rd  to  be set against fu tu re  capita l gains 
and not against cu rren t trad ing  income. On the other hand, trad ing  
losses can be set against capital gains.
Franked investm ent income arises in  cases w here the company is a net 
recip ient o f d iv idends. They m ay be set against trad ing  losses. The 
tax cred it associated w ith  net d iv idend  receipts can be realised. The 
im p u ta tio n  system a llow s  companies to  deduct income tax at an 
im p u ta tio n  rate, equal to  a standard ra te o f income tax, on gross 
d iv idends paid. The paym ents o f the advanced corpora tion lax 
(A C T ) are set against m ainstream  corporation  tax, on the cond ition  
tha t the gross d is tr ib u tio n  th a t fo rm s  the basis o f the A C T  deduction
7. The formula for computing the stock relief is as fo llc^ ^ :
Opening value o f stock — 2000 Pounds * ------------------ -—-
o / Y , _  i
Where SPI is the A ll Stock Price Index.
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should nol bo more than the taxable p ro fits  against w hich they are 
being set, in any o f the preceding years and cu rren t year. II' th is  
cond ition  does not app ly  then the su rp lus  A C T  m ay be carried back 
and set against mainstream lia b ilit ie s  o f any o f the tw o  preceding 
years as w e ll as the cu rren t year, o r a lte rn a tiv e ly , i t  can be carried 
fo rw a rd  and set against fu tu re  pro fits . In cases where the com pany is 
receiving d iv idends from  other UK companies i t  can set the income 
tax tha t is w ith  d iv idend  receipts against the am ount due on its  
paym ents.
T h is  b r ie f review  o f the corporation tax system studied fo rm s the 
basis fo r  com puting the effective corpora tion  tax rates fo r  each 
com pany and in  each year d u rin g  the sample period8. H ow ever, 
before presenting the resu lts  o f the com putation  o f the effective 
corpora tion tax under d iff erent assum ptions, i t  is w o rth  assessing the 
re lia b il i ty  o f such ca lcu la tion. One w ay o f measuring th is  accuracy is 
by com paring the recorded against the com puted corpora tion  tax. 
G iven the large num ber o f firm s in  the sample com paring one 
observation against another is im possible. Instead recorded lax is 
regressed against the computed tax. Data is obtained fro m  the Ex ta t 
data bank. The recorded tax is the actua l tax paid by the companies in  
the sample d u rin g  the sample period. T h is  is the d ifference between 
the p ro fit before tax and the p ro fit a fte r  tax. To obta in  the com puted 
tax we app ly  the effective corporation tax rates as obtained fro m  the 
tax model, fo r  each company and fo r  each year in  the sample period,
8 . See Mayer and Morris (1982a) for the necessary equations to formulate the 
computer model.
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lo  the p ro fit before tax. lit th is way the computed effective tax paid 
by the company is obtained. The fo llo w in g  cocllicicnts are obtained 
fro m  the regression:
1 AH I .K 2.1. \C C IR ACY o r COMPt TED TAX
Ret ordedTax -= a+fiCom  ]jjI ecITax
Cod Pooled 7.1 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
o 293 73 188 130 351 258 443 468 129 261 47 292
(5.X) (.5) (1.3) (1.4) (3.1) (1.3) (4.3) (2.7) (.8) (1.3) (0.2) (1.3)
fi 1.11 1.55 2.5 1.37 1.22 1.49 0.87 0.9 1.12 0.84 1.3 1.16
<71.4) < 14.5) (16) (32) (34) (21) (30) (13) (26) (21 » ( 19) (30)
R 2 .80 .67 .71 .91 .92 .81 .90 .60 .87 .81 .78 .89
The recorded tax liability is the actual tax liability as reported by 
the companies in the sample, i.e. difference between profit before lax and 
profit after tax. The computed tax liability is obtained by applying 
the eff ective corporation tax calculated from the tax model 
to the reported profit before lax.
The above table shows tha t the t statistics o f the computed tax are 
h ig h ly  significant in a ll the years. Moreover, the high coefficient o f 
determ ination ( R 2) proves that, on average, about 80% o f the 
observed tax l ia b il i ty  is caught by the values obtained from  the tax 
model. One can thus say that the estimates on w hich the remaining 
analysis is based on are consistent.
3.2 Cross-sectional d istributions o f corporation tax rates :
In th is  section we undertake a static analysis by assuming that any 
change in the corporation tax system w ould  not affect the financial 
decision o f the firm s in the sample. Th is w il l  a llow  us to  estimate the 
importance o f each tax deduction before the 1984 re fo rm  in the 
corporation tax system. Th is  assumption is relaxed in the next
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chapters where the impact of taxation on the financial policy of the 
linn w ill be dealt w ith.
T w o  a lte rna tives are fo llow ed  to analyse the computed corporation 
tax rate as faced by the companies in the sample. In the firs t instance, 
the average effective tax is p lo tted  to see the changes tha t have 
occurred du ring  the sample period and also how  d is tan t the computed 
rates are from  the s ta tu to ry  rates. T h is  analysis is extented to 
s im u la te  the a lte rna tive  policies by asking w ha t w ou ld  happen to the 
effective corporate tax i f  p a rtic u la r deduction was not a llow ed. In 
such a w ay, the im portance o f each p rov is ion  in the corporate tax 
system is determ ined. A no the r w ay  o f undertak ing  such analysis is 
by com puting the num ber o f companies tha t have negative taxable 
p ro fit. The same s im u la tio n  exercise to  determ ine the im portance o f 
each provis ion in exp la in ing  the tax exhaustion s itua tion , is fo llow ed . 
A  subdiv is ion o f companies in the sample in to  d iffe re n t industries 
w o u ld  not be o f so m uch significance given the lo w  num ber o f 
companies (See Lev is  and M organ (1985 ) fo r  detailed analysis o f the 
d is tr ib u tio n  o f the tax amongst indus tries).
3.2.1 The  e ffe c t iv e  c o rp o ra te  ta x  ra te  : Figure 2 records the 
average effective corpora tion tax rate (com puted corporate tax 
l ia b i l i ty  over p re-tax p ro fits  w h ich  is trad ing  p ro fits  plus o ther 
income plus investm ent income minus depreciation minus interest 
pa id ) o f a ll the firm s  in the sample d u rin g  1973 th rough  to  1983, 
under d iffe ren t assum ptions, and the average s ta tu to ry  corporation 









Figure 2. Impact of capital allowances and stock relief
Notes :
—x— Slandard rate of corporate tax (adjusted for small firms);
 Effective Corporation l ax (ECT);
—+— ECT without stock relief;
— ECT without capital allowances.
W h ile  the s ta tu to ry  rate remained re la tive ly  stable, the computed
effective rates fluctuate s ign ifican tly  fa llin g  fro m  a peak o f 30% in
1980 to around 10% in 1974, bu t s t i l l  much low er than the s ta tu to ry
rate o f around 48%. There are a num ber o f factors that m ay have
con tribu ted  to these movements. The underly ing  p ro fita b ility  o f the
firm s in the sample is lik e ly  to  be1 an im portan t factor. It relates to
- 43 -
both real pro fits and in lla lio n a ry  impacts (M a ye r (1 9 82 ) analysed 
these effects). However, the main c o n tr ib u to r to these changes is 
p robab ly  the tax p rovis ions as analysed above. The low  level o f the 
effective corporate tax rate in 1974 is due to  the range o f measures 
in troduced w ith  effect fro m  1973 (stock re lie f, 100% firs t year 
allowance fo r  p lant and m ach inery and the im p u ta tio n  system ), thus 
leading m any firm s to  tax losses. The decrease in  the e ffective  rate in 
1978/79, on the other hand, m ay be due to  the sharp rise in  in fla tion , 
thus increasing the level o f stock re lie f deductions. I t  may also be 
due to an increase in investm ent expenditure, thus ris in g  the am ount 
o f allowances claim ed. In o rde r to d is tingu ish  between the effects o f 
each o f these allowances the effective corpora tion  tax rates were 
computed on the assum ption tha t the existing  deduction was not 
ava ilable .
I f  the tax system d id  not a llo w  fo r  the stock re lie f the effective 
corporation tax rate could have been more stable and m uch higher 
than the computed effective rate under the existing system , reaching a 
lo w  o f on ly  34%. I t  is s tr ik in g  to  see tha t a m a jo r exp lanation fo r  the 
low est level o f tax in  1974 is the in tro d u c tio n  o f the stock re lie f. 
P rio r to around 1977, most o f the heavy fa lls  in  the tax  rates can be 
explained by the stock re lie f p rov is ion . The change in  the system in 
1981 is w e ll portrayed by the decrease o f the im portance o f the stock 
re lie f as a m ajor de te rm inan t o f the effective rates.
The deductions o f capital allowances also p lay  an im p o rta n t ro le in 
exp la in ing the corporation tax rates, as portrayed  in  F igure 2. In 
p a rticu la r, a fte r 1977, most o f the movements in the tax rates were 
due to the in it ia l and depreciation allowances. I f  fo r  instance
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companies were not permitted to deduct such allowances in 1980, 
they would, on average be paying nearly the* statutory corporation 
tax. This importance of capital allowances after that date may be due 
to the increase in initial allowances for buildings from 50 to 75%, 
because if these allowances were not available, the effective corporate 
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Figure 3. Impacl of interest deductib ility and ACT 
Notes : —x— Standard rate of corporate tax (adjusted for small firms);
 Effective corporate tax (ECT):
ECT w ithout interesl deductibility;
ECT under classical corporation tax system.
As far as the magnitude of other deductions is concerned, the trend is
roughly the same as depicted in Figure 3. If  companies had not the
possibility of deducting interests from their taxable income, their
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effective corporate tax w ou ld  have been s lig h tly  higher. S im ila r ly , i f  
the classical system o f corpora tion tax was in operation, companies 
w ou ld  have paid more tax (however, th is  effect may be 
underestim ated because o f the condition  under w hich  companies may 
deduct the AC T). However, both these deductions do not seem to go 
fa r  aw ay from  the actual trend  o f the computed tax under the 
ex is ting  system. Th is  may expla in  the re la tive  s ta b ility  in  the level 
o f in terests and d iv idends paym ents.
3.2.2 T a x  e xh au s tio n  : A n  a lte rna tive  method o f analysing the 
above effects is to look at the num ber o f companies tha t are tax 
exhausted under the existing system and also at those tha t w ou ld  
have been in such position i f  p a rticu la r provis ion was not in operation 
d u rin g  the sample period. A s ’ seen above, the m a jor determ inants o f 
the effective tax rates are the deductions o f stock re lie f, capital 
allowances, interest and A C T . The im portance o f each prov is ion  is 
po rtrayed  in the fo llo w in g  table.
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TABLE 2.2. PROPORT ION OI I AX EXHAUST IX) COMPANIES
1
SIMULATION OF TAX EXHAUSTION
YEARS1 ECT ECTOSR ECTOCA EXT Oil) HCTOACT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1973 20.75 01.89 15.24 19.81 16.98
: 1974 41.51 02.83 19.05 33.02 32.07
1975 21.70 10.38 14.28 18.87 21.70
1976 25.47 02.83 19.42 22.86 20.70
1 1977 35.85 08.49 13.33 26.42 31.13
1978 35.85 07.55 13.33 22.64 28.30
1979 40.57 08.49 12.38 24.53 33.01
1980 32.38 11.43 14.56 18.87 28.57
1981 24.53 11.32 20.58 18.87 28.2')
1982 27.36 17.92 08.49 19.81 23.58
1983 25.47 18.87 16.19 16.04 21.69
average 30.00 09.00 15.00 22.00 26.00
ECT is the effective corporate 1ax (ECT ) under Ihe existing system;
ECTOSR is the EC! wilh non -deductibility of stock relief;
ECTOCA is the ECT without deducting capital allowances;
ECT01D is the ECT with non- interest deductibility;
ECTOACT is the ECT  under 1he classical system.
The above table shows the percentage o f companies that are tax 
exhausted under d iffe ren t assumptions o f the n o n -d e d uc tib ility  o f 
capital allowances, stock re lie f, interest payments and i f  the 
im puta tion  system was not operating during the sample period. The 
ffrst co lum n indicates that in 1974 nearly 42% o f the companies in
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the sample d id  nol pay tax. In th is  firs t ease, the firm  is considered to 
be tax exhausted i f  its  taxable p ro fit a fte r a llo w in g  fo r  a ll deductions 
is negative9. The rise in  the p roportion  o f tax exhausted companies in 
1974 comes from  the set o f re lie fs  companies where a llow ed to c la im , 
bu t the decrease in the num ber o f these tax exhausted companies in 
the subsequent tw o  years may ind icate a rise in  p ro fita b ility . On 
average d u rin g  the sample period, the existing corpora tion tax system 
together w ith  the p ro fits  atta ined has resulted in  30% o f the 109 
companies to  be tax exhausted. T h is  is a re la tiv e ly  significant 
p ropo rtion  given tha t the  p ropo rtion  varies between 20 and 40% . 
Thus some companies m ay have been tax exhausted d u ring  the whole 
sample period.
Th is  s itua tion  is not caused so le ly by capital allowances. As analysed 
above, stock re lie f, in te rest and A C T  are also deducted fro m  the 
taxable p ro fit. Fu rthe rm ore , losses carried fo rw a rd  may also be o f 
some im portance in exp la in ing  tax exhaustion position. In order to 
isolate the im portance o f each o f these elements i t  is necessary to 
s im ula te  the resu lts  obtained fro m  the tax model to  see w hat happens 
i f  p a rticu la r p rov is ion  is no t in operation.
The second co lum n o f the above tab le is computed on the assumption 
tha t companies were not a llow ed  to  c la im  stock re lie f. Assum ing tha t 
the absence o f th is  p rov is ion  d id  not a lte r the behaviour o f the 
companies, the p roportion  o f companies that w o u ld  have been tax
9. These deductions are capital allowances, stock relief, net interest payments, 
advance corporation lax and taxable losses carried forward. Double taxation 
relief (DTR) is equal to zero for all the firms in the sample because only 
domestic companies are considered.
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exhausted could have been as low  as 1.9% as opposed to 21% under 
the ex is ting  system in 1973. M oreover the elleet o f stock re lie f is 
more pronounced in 1974, where on ly  around 3% o f the companies 
w o u ld  have been tax exhausted as opposed to 41.5% w ith  the re lie f. 
Thus, 92 per cent o f the companies tha t are tax exhausted in 1974 
were o n ly  in  th is  position because o f the deduction o f stock re lie f. 
A lth o ug h  the im portance o f stock re lie f as a m ajor explanation fo r  
tax exhaustion has decreased s ign ifica n tly  a fte r 1981, because o f the 
in tro d u c tio n  o f a more sensible method o f ad justm ent applied to 
m ovem ents in stocks, the overa ll im portance d u rin g  the whole sample 
period is s t i l l  h ig h ly  s ign ificant, being 9% as opposed to 30% i f  
p rov is ion  is a llow ed fo r  stock re lie f.
The second co lum n describes the levels and the changes in  the num ber 
o f tax exhausted companies i f  the corporation tax system d id  not 
inc lude  any cap ita l allowances. As compared to  the previous co lum n, 
the im pact o f capita l allowances is not as sign ificant as the stock 
re lie f. W ith  the exception o f the last tw o  years o f the sample period, 
the p ropo rtion  o f tax paying companies w ou ld  have been 
su b s ta n tia lly  h igher i f  the stock re lie f p rov is ion  was no t in operation 
ra the r than i f  no capita l allowances were available, ceterus paribus . 
T h is  fac t has im po rta n t po licy  im p lica tions. I t  could be the case tha t 
companies increase th e ir stock unnecessarily to  take advantage o f the 
stock re lie f, b u t th is  reduces th e ir  debt-cap ita l ra tio  because, as we 
w i l l  see below, tax exhaustion s itua tions have a negative effect on the 
financing po licy . G iven the re la tiv e ly  constant in it ia l a llowance on 
cap ita l expenditure  d u ring  the sample period, the m ovem ents in the 
tax exhaustion companies under the assum ption o f no allowances is
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determ ined m a in ly  by the am ount o f investm ent expenditure 
undertaken du ring  the corresponding periods. Compared to the 
previous graphs, tax exhaustion seems to fo llo w  the same broad 
pa tte rn  as the elfeetive corporation tax rates, but the re la tionsh ip  is 
not sym m e trica l because o f the s ign ificant va ria tion  in the elfeetive 
tax rates. On average, i f  no capital allowances were ava ilab le  du ring  
the sam ple period, o n ly  around h a lf the existing num ber o f tax 
exhausted companies could have been in th is  s itua tion .
The re la tive  im portance o f in terest d e d u c tib ility  fo r  tax purposes is 
fu n c tio n  o f both the levels o f interest rates and the level o f debts. On 
average the p roportion  o f tax exhausted companies is not s ign ifican tly  
d iffe re n t fro m  the o rig ina l com putation (i.e. when a ll allowances are 
taken in to  account), when compared to  the effects o f deductions o f 
stock re lie f and capita l allowances. H ow ever, the significance varies 
fro m  one year to another. For instance i f  the respective figures fo r  
1974 and 1979 were compared, we can see tha t the p roportion  o f tax 
exhausted companies varies fro m  33% to  24%. Th is  m ay be p a rtly  
due to  the rise in  the base lending rate fro m  11.5% to 17% between 
the last quarte rs  o f 1974 and 1979.
The p ropo rtion  o f tax exhausted companies i f  the classical corporation 
tax system was in operation is ve ry  s im ila r  to  tha t under the existing 
system . H ow ever th is  co lum n does not necessarily measure the fu l l  
effect o f the im pu ta tio n  system, because as pointed ou t above, 
companies can deduct the A C T  fro m  th e ir mainstream corporation 
tax l ia b i l i t y  o n ly  in  the case where the gross d is tr ib u tio n  th a t fo rm s 
the basis o f the A C T  deduction does not exceed the taxable p ro fit. 
G iven tha t the present system a llo w s  firs t the deduction o f the stock
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re lie f and capital allowances before A C T, and the high im portance o f 
these tw o  deductions as seen from  the firs t tw o  columns, the 
im portance o f A C T may be h ig h ly  underestim ated.
4. Conclusion :
Th is  chapter has dealt w’ith  a num ber o f controversies that surround 
the corporation tax. In pa rticu la r, a tten tion  was focussed upon the 
reasons fo r  the existence o f the corporation tax and the basis fo r  
tax ing  companies. A lthough  there is no apparent reason fo r the 
existence o f corporation tax, since i t  does exist, i t  has effects that are 
w o rth  analysing. The last section has presented some resu lts re la ting  
to  the determ inants o f the effective corpora tion tax. I t  was found that 
the capital allowances and the stock re lie f provide the m ajor 
explanation fo r  the movements in the effective rates, bu t i f  the stock 
re lie f was not in  operation then there could have been s ign ifican tly  
more companies paying tax. In the next chapters, the effects o f the 
tax exhaustion position w i l l  be analysed in re la tion  to  the financial 
and investm ent decisions o f the 109 companies in  the sample.
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CHAPTER III
THE EFFECTS OF T A X A T IO N  ON TH E F IN A N C IN G  POLICY
OF TH E FIRM
One o f the reasons o f the existence o f corporation tax is fo r  the 
governm ent to  influence the f i rm ’s behaviour. The effects o f taxation  
on the f irm ’s financing decision m ay be seen in  th is  context. M any 
governm ents procla im  th a t changes in  the corporate tax has as main 
purpose a p rom otion  o f a d iffe re n t pattern o f the financing o f the 
p roductive  investm ents. The question, however, is, f irs t o f a ll, how 
does the tax system affects in re a lity  the financing behaviour o f 
corporations, and, secondly, how can the firm  respond e ffec tive ly  to 
such influences a ris ing  fro m  a com bination o f a va rie ty  o f personal 
and corporate tax in  o rder to e ffic ien tly  finance its  investm ents.
The existence o f taxa tion  w h ich  d iscrim ina tes between the 3 m a jor 
possible m ethods o f financing a given investm ent (i.e., debt, retained 
earnings and new issue o f shares), cou ld  make the investm ent po licy  
o f the firm  dependent on its  p a rticu la r financing po licy . As fa r as the 
corporate tax is concerned, the main advantage o f debt finance comes 
from  the fact tha t the interests paym ents are tax deductib le  expense, 
w h ile  d iv idends and retained earnings are not. Therefore, the re tu rn  
to bondholders escapes taxa tion  at company level, and the corporate 
tax provides a tax shie ld to  the levered firm , i.e. as i f  part o f the 
interest rate is paid by the governm ent. However, such argum ents 
could be va lid  o n ly  in a s itua tion  where a company pays tax, w here 
no bankrup tcy  risks  are taken in to  account, and also where a ll k inds
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o f personal income are taxed at the same rate.
The present chapter applies the corporate tax rates computed in the 
previous chapter to s tu d y  the ways in w hich  various tax provis ions 
affect the choice o f the financing po licy  pursued. The firs t section 
s ta rts  by  p rov id ing  a b r ie f sum m ary o f the theories o f capital 
s tru c tu re  in the absence o f taxation . Though the m ain purpose o f th is  
chapter is an analysis o f the effects o f taxation on the f irm ’s financing 
decision, th is  sum m ary is necessary as it  constitu tes a basis fo r  
com parison when taxes are introduced.
Section 2 deals w ith  the tax determ inants o f the financing behaviour 
o f the dom estic firm . The tw o  taxes tha t can affect a f irm ’s capita l 
s tru c tu re  are the corporation tax and the personal income tax. Th is 
constitu tes the basis fo r  a pa irw ise comparison amongst a num ber o f 
possible financing policies to  determ ine how a given investm ent po licy  
can be financed, and thus setting a possible op tim um  level o f d cb t- 
e q u ity  ra tio .
Section 3 presents the model used to test the re la tionsh ip  between the 
level o f debts as a p roportion  o f to ta l capital used, the tax variab le  
and the risk  element tha t may prevent the firm  fro m  increasing 
in d e fin ite ly  its  long term  borrow ings. Th is  is fo llow ed  by the 
m ethodology em ployed in such tests. Section 5 presents the results 
obtained using both the OLS and the SUR technique, fo r  the pooled 
cross-sectional and tim e  series data and fo r  ind iv id u a l cross-sectional 
fo r  each year in the sample period.
1. Theories o f Gearing Ratio :
In order to finance its expansion and its  replacement investm ents, a 
lirm  needs to  e ither use its  retained earnings, issue new shares, 
increase its  level o f debts o r em ploy any com bina tion  o f the 3. The 
decision as to w ha t m ethod o f finance to use to increase its  m arke t 
value has been a subject o f a num ber o f controversies amongst 
researchers in the field. D iffe re n t conclusions have been reached 
depending on w hich assum ption the p a rticu la r model is based. The 
present section does not in tend  to  rev iew  a ll the vast past lite ra tu re  
on the subject (see Chen and K im  1979 fo r  a su m m ary ), bu t ra ther 
give o n ly  a b r ie f ins igh t to  the models o f gearing ra tio .
1.1 Capital structure in a w orld  w ithou t tax and risk:
The firs t m ain co n trib u tio n  to the analysis o f the f irm ’s financial 
po licy  is tha t o f M od ig lian i and M ille r  (1958, 1963) in  w h ich  they 
state tha t in a w o rld  w ith o u t taxes and no ba nkru p tcy  costs, 
corporate financial po licy  is irre le va n t. They w ent on to  say tha t the 
owners o f the firm  w il l  be in d iffe re n t to  the de b t-eq u ity  ra tio  o r to 
the d iv idend  pay-ou t ra tio , w hen investm ent po licy  is held constant. 
Basically, th is  means that a firm  cannot change the to ta l va lue o f its  
securities ju s t by s p litt in g  the cash flows in to  d iffe ren t streams 
because the f irm ’s va lue is not determ ined by the securities it  issues 
bu t ra ther by its  u n de rly ing  real assets. Therefore, given a p a rticu la r 
investm ent po licy , ne ither d iv idends nor the methods o f finance used 
can affect the va lue o f the lirm . Th is  leads to a com plete separation 
o f the investm ent and financing decisions. Furtherm ore, the arb itrage 
and the perfect s u b s titu ta b ility  o f personal and corporate bo rro w ing
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a llow s  shareholders to undo any decision o f the firm  and get the ir 
desired deb t-eq u ity  ra tio  w ith o u t harm ing the l in n ’s m arket value. 
These argum ents o f the irre levance o f the l in n ’s financial po licy  can 
also be extended to the aggregate iinancia l po licy  o f the corporate 
sector as a whole. Such conclusions are however based on some 
re s tr ic tive  assumptions.
The model d id  not take account o f the bankrup tcy  costs. The interest 
rate faced by everyone is the same independently o f the am ount 
borrow ed and o f the na tu re  o f the borrow er. Thus in d iv id u a ls  and 
companies are a ll treated in the same w ay. Furtherm ore, firm s and 
in d iv id u a ls  arc expected to  be able to pay interest each period and 
also pay back the nom inal am ount o f debts when the contract expires. 
The p o ss ib ility  o f not being able to fu l f i l l  these requirem ents is not 
accounted fo r. W hat makes, in fact, th is  assum ption b ind ing  is more 
the cost in vo lve d  ra ther than the existence o f the b a nkrup tcy  itse lf. 
I f ,  fo r  instance, the firm  can go ba nk ru p t w ith o u t en ta iling  any costs 
and there are s t i l l  perfect substitu tes  fo r  the f irm ’s debt and e q u ity  in 
o ther ava ilab le  securities then the f irm ’s leverage is irre le va n t. For 
instance, S tig litz  (1969, 1974) incorporates some other assum ptions to 
prove that w ith  costless b a nk ru p tcy , corporate financial po licy  is 
irre le va n t. These cond itions re fe r to the existence o f financial 
in term ediaries w ho  can create any securities the firm  can create, and 
also are w il l in g  to repackage w ith o u t costs the financial s tru c tu re  o f 
the firm  whenever it m igh t be profitab le . But in the real w o rld  these 
conditions may be d il l ic u l l  to im plem ent.
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1.2 Bankruptcy Risks :
B ankrup tcy , when it  happens, incurs sonic costs such as expenses fo r 
law yers , accountants, w h ich  cannot be predicted. Th is  uncerta in ty  
increases the usual risk  o f the re tu rns on investm ent. B ankrup tcy 
puts e q u ity  holders in a h igher risk  re la tiv e ly  to  the bondholders, 
because the la tte r are paid firs t, before shareholders. In  re la ting  the 
ban k ru p tcy  risks  to the measurement o f the m arket va lue o f the lirm , 
researchers find  i t  ve ry  d if f ic u lt  to  firs t o f a ll, define the bankrup tcy  
costs and, secondly, to  measure them .
A n ea rlie r s tu d y  by W arner (1977 ) found  tha t on average an 
eventual d irec t costs o f b a nkru p tcy  amounted to 5.3% o f the m arket 
va lue  o f the f irm ’s securities and fo r  the largest 11 ra ilroads the costs 
were 1.7%. These estim ations are, however, o n ly  correct at that 
p a rtic u la r period o f tim e  and fo r  tha t p a rticu la r co u n try  and fo r  
these p a rtic u la r lirm s  stud ied. He also questioned w he the r these 
estim ates are high enough to  discourage the firm  fro m  increasing its  
borrow ings. The de fin ition  o f the bankrup tcy  costs also varies from  
one s tu dy  to another. Chen and K im  (1979 ) and Jensen and M eckling  
(1 9 7 6 ) relate these costs to  the agency costs resu lting  fro m  the 
arrangem ents needed to pro tect the cred itors. M yers (19 77 ) on the 
o ther hand, defines these costs in  term s o f the o p p o rtu n ity  costs, 
re fe rr in g  to the va luable oppo rtun ities  w h ich  w il l  be lost fo r  the firm  
w ith  high potentia l g ro w th , w h ile  K im  (1982 ) measures the im p lic it  
b a nk ru p tcy  costs by the ex-post am ount o f the unused non debt tax 
sh ie ld . M ayer (1 981 ) considers the potentia l penalties on managers 
on the event o f d ism issal.
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However, ne ither theory nor em pirica l evidence suggests substantial 
costs o f bankrup tcy  fo r  the f irm ’s investors. The measurement o f th is 
risk  o f bankrup tcy  is also a m ajor problem . A lthough , theoretica lly , 
one can see tha t there is a lw a ys  the poss ib ility  th a t the firm  may not 
able to  pay the interests on its  debt, the p ro b a b ility  o f th is  happening 
is v e ry  d if f ic u lt to  measure. Ta fflcr (1984) surveyed the d iffe ren t Z - 
scorc models tha t are em ployed to  assess com pany solvency. The 
ob jective  was to find a p ro b a b ility  th a t a company w i l l  go bankrup t 
using a set o f d isc rim ina n t variables. However, the variables found 
to  be sign ificant are d iffe re n t fro m  one s tudy  to another. 
Furtherm ore , he found tha t the model may depend on the indus tria l 
c lassification and on the size o f the firm .
An a lte rn a tive  model o f measuring the risk  o f bankrup tcy  is to 
assume tha t the risk  p rem ium  required by the shareholders is a 
fu n c tio n  o f the debt e q u ity  ra tio  o f the firm . The modern financial 
theory stipu la tes tha t, one w ay o f com puting the required rate o f 
re tu rn  by shareholders is by using the capital assets p ric ing  model 
(C A P M ) w hich  takes account o f the system atic risk  associated w ith  
the f irm ’s quoted stock. The cost o f capita l is thus computed as a 
fu n c tio n  o f the re tu rn  on the m arke t, the risk  free rate and the 
system atic risk  fo r  each com pany. The fo rm u la  used is :
Re = R f  +  j3(/?m - R f  ) (2 .1 .1)
W here Rv is the e q u ity  cost o f cap ita l, R f  represents the risk  free
ra le  o f re tu rn , Rm is the mean re tu rn  from  investm ent in the stock
m arke t and /3 measures the system atic risk  associated w ith  a
p a rtic u la r quoted share.
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Hamada (1969 ), R ubinstein (19 73 ) and Bowman (1979, 1981) used 
the above equation (3 .1 .1 ) to a llo w  fo r  the el feet o f gearing. They 
derived  the security  system atic r is k  as a fu n c tio n  o f the deb t-equ ity  
ra tio  :
J3, =  J3U0  +  D ( | r r )  ) (3 .1 .2 )
W here j3s is the geared beta, (5U ungeared beta, D the am ount o f 
f irm ’s debts, S the level o f e q u ity  and r  is the tax rate applicable to 
corporate borrow ings. M u lt ip ly in g  both term s o f equation (3 .1 .2) by 
the d ifference between the m arke t re tu rn  and the risk  free rate we 
obta in  :
(/?„, -  Rf  )/3v =  (/?„, -  Rf  )/3„ (1 +  ° 9 ~ r ) ) (3 .1 .3)
There fore  investors ’ r is k  p rem ium  increases the h igher the debt 
e q u ity  ra tio . E m p ir ica lly , Hamada (1972 ) found  a strong positive 
re la tionsh ip  between financial leverage and /3 fo r  a sample o f 304 
companies over the 1948-67 period. M oreover, M ande lker and Rhee 
(19 84 ) reported a h ig h ly  s ign ificant positive  re la tionsh ip  between j3 
and leverage using p o rtfo lio s  based on a sample o f 255 m anufac tu ring  
firm s  d u rin g  the period 1957-76.
A no the r w ay o f measuring b a n k ru p tcy  risk  is by com puting  the 
interest rate faced by each com pany. S im ila r ly  to the p o rtfo lio  
theo ry , the re tu rn  to bondho lders/banks could be a fu n c tio n  o f both 
the risk  free interest rate p lus a prem ium  fo r  risk  (a ’spread’ in 
in te rna tiona l banking). The fo rm e r is common to a ll companies. 
Accord ing to Fisher, it is de term ined by the am ount a ll firm s are 
w il l in g  to invest and the am ount a ll ind iv id u a ls  are w il l in g  to save. 
The la tte r, on the o ther hand, corresponds to the level o f risk  each
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firm  is in , w h ich , in tu rn , increases the higher the level o f outstanding 
debts. Since interests are paid before a llo w in g  fo r d iv idends, the risk 
p rem ium  on debts is expected to be low er than that required by 
shareholders.
1.3 T h e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  ta x a t io n  :
From the above section it  was clear that since a high level o f debts 
re la tive  to to ta l capita l leads to a rise in b ankrup tcy  costs w hich are 
m anifested th rough the high re tu rns  required by both shareholders 
and bondholders, firm s  are expected to reduce th e ir  level o f debt 
finance. On the co n tra ry , because o f the d e d u c t ib ility  o f interest 
paym ents fro m  p ro fits  before tax, corporation tax offers strong 
incentive  fo r  debt finance.
Furtherm ore, in  deciding on the method o f finance to  use, the firm  
may also consider personal income tax o f the investors. The 
difference between bondholders and shareholders does not o n ly  stem 
fro m  the fac t tha t the fo rm er category escapes corporate tax, but also 
that the income o f shareholders is taxed at personal income lax rate 
and at capita l gains tax rate. Since the la tte r rate is l ik e ly  to be much 
low er than the m argina l income tax rate o f the shareholder, because 
o f the allowances and the deferm ent, the overa ll a fte r  tax rate o f 
re tu rn  may be h igher fo r  shareholders than fo r bondholders. The 
present section deals in deta ils w ith  the effects o f corporate and 
personal income taxes on the debt equ ity  ra tio .
1.3.1 T a x  advan tages o f  debts: The second clement th a t makes the 
o rig ina l M o d ig lian i and M il le r ’s theory to fa il to hold in the real 
w o rld  is the existence o f taxation. Corporate tax systems a llow
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in terest payments to be* tax deductib le  expense w h ile  d iv idends and 
retained earnings are not. The advantage o f debt finance is tha t it  
provides a tax shield to the levered lirm . I f  the company borrow s fo r  
o n ly  one period then the present value o f the tax shield equals the 
product o f the m arginal tax rate by the interest paym ent, i.e.
W here PVTS is the present value o f the tax shield;
C T is the corporate tax rate;
RD is the interest paym ent on outstanding debts B.
I f  on the o ther hand the debt o f the levered lirm  is irrecoverable then 
the present value o f the tax shield is given by the product o f the 
corporate tax rate by the expected interest paym ents, discounted in 
p e rpe tu ity  by the expected re tu rn  on debts. The d iscount rate 
depends c r it ic a lly  on the a b il i ty  o f the firm  to  generate enough cash 
How to  cover in terest paym ents. Assum ing fo r  the tim e  being tha t 
the risk  is a lready inc luded in the interest rate charged, i.e. the risk  o f 
the tax shield is the same as tha t o f the interest paym ents generating 
them , then the present va lue o f the tax shield is :
The m arket value o f a levered lirm  equals to the sum o f the m arket 
va lue o f its  a ll e q u ity  financed and the present value o f its  tax shield.
W here V (u )  is the m arket value o f an unlevered lirm .
M od ig lian i and M ille r  (1963 ) derived th is  fo rm u la  as a correction o f 
th e ir ea rlie r a rtic le  (M o d ig lia n i and M ille r  1958) and argue tha t on
PVTSt = CTt *RDt *Bl (3 .2 .1 )
CTl *RDt *B{
(3 .2 .2)
V ( l  ) = V ( U )+CT*B(t ) (3 .2 .3 )
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the assum ption that
i)  a ll corporate re tu rns  arc taxed equa lly  at personal level, and
i i)  the tax savings fro m  the use o f debt can be regarded as a perpetual 
riskless (low ,
then the m arke t value o f a levered lirm  is increased at a rate equal to 
the corporate tax lo r  each u n it o f debt in  its  capita l s tructu re . 
Therefore  the in tro d u c tio n  o f corporate tax makes i t  more 
advantageous fo r  a lirm  to  be 100% debt financed. One w ou ld  expect 
the present value o f the tax shie ld to  be h ig h ly  correlated w ith  the 
corporation tax rate, and the firm  w il l  be ind iffe re n t between debt 
and e q u ity  finance o n ly  when the corporate tax is equal to zero.
However, in re a lity , companies ty p ic a lly  finance o n ly  about one 
q uarte r o f th e ir accum ula tions o f capital by a c tu a lly  issuing debts. 
A t the aggregate in d u s tr ia l and com m ercial companies, ICCs, the 
average level o f net debts over the m arket value o f o rd in a ry  and 
preference shares am ounted to  0.27, over the period 1973-19831. 
Furtherm ore , over the sample period, the p roportion  o f long term  
debts over to ta l capita l averaged 0.1, w h ile  the ra tio  o f long term 
debts over shareholders fun d s  wras 0.173. The question is, therefore, 
to find w h y  the s tra igh t fo rw a rd  all debt resu lt as reached by 
M od ig lian i and M il le r  (1963 ) is not applicable.
A num ber o f studies d u rin g  the m id  70s have taken the m idd le  o f the 
road and argue that an op tim a l level o f debt equ ity  ra tio  cou ld  be set
1. i \e l debts is computed us the sum of bank borrow ings plus  debts and loan stock 
p lus  other loans m in u s  liquid assets. (Data supplied by the Hank of Hngland).
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to ro lle d  the trade o il' between the tax advantages and the bankrup tcy 
risks (Brennan and Schw artz (1978), Chen (1978), K im  (1978), 
K raus and L itzem berger (1973) and Scott( 1976)). Therefore, even, as 
argued above, the costs o f bankrup tcy  are very hard to  assess, they 
may s t i l l  act at reducing the advantages o f taxation. More recently  
Gordon and M a lk ic l (1981) have presented models w ith  e xp lic it 
ban k ru p tcy  costs w h ich  reduce the advantages o f debts finance at the 
m argin  and encourage firm s to eq u ity  finance. I t  is not o n ly  the 
existence o f b a n k ru p tcy  costs th a t may prevent the firm  fro m  
financing a ll its  investm ent projects w ith  debts, but also personal 
income tax rates o f shareholders and those o f bondholders.
1.4 Effects o f  personal incom e taxes :
The financia l theo ry  o f the firm  is fu r th e r  complicated when the 
m arg ina l income tax rate o f investors is incorporated in to  the model. 
P rovided tha t in te rests on bonds and re tu rns  on equ ity  are taxed at 
the same rate, the in tro d u c tio n  o f personal taxes w ou ld  not affect the 
d e b t-e q u ity  ra tio . However, the income o f bondholder is l ik e ly  to be 
taxed at a d iffe re n t rate than the income o f shareholder, because o f 
the fa c t tha t shareholder is taxed at both personal income tax rate and 
cap ita l gains tax rate, w h ile  bondholder is o n ly  taxed at personal 
income tax rate. C ap ita l gains are taxed at low er income tax rate 
because o f the p a rtia l exclusion and de ferm ent advantages. In UK the 
firs t 5000 Pounds cap ita l gains were not taxed in  1982. Furtherm ore, 
cap ita l gains are not taxed when they occur but ra ther when they are 
realised. Th is makes the e lfeetive capita l gains tax much low e r than 
the s ta tu to ry  rate and debts may not a lw ays be pre ferred to 
d iv idends. Before undertak ing  a pa irw ise  comparison between
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taxa tion  on debts and d iv idends, i t  is w o rth  rev iew ing  the M ille r  
(1977 ) e q u ilib r iu m .
M il le r  (1 9 7 7 ) argued tha t, in the presence o f a progressive personal 
income tax w ith  favourab le  treatm ent o f equ ity  income, there is an 
e q u ilib r iu m  in which firm s  w il l  be faced w ith  the same cost o f capital 
fo r  debts and equ ity . T h is  e q u ilib r iu m  wdll be reached w'hen the tax 
advantages to debt are overridden  by the com bination o f the m arginal 
personal tax disadvantages to  debts w ith  the supp ly  side ad justm ent 
by  firm s. T h is  w il l  d r iv e  m arket prices to an e q u ilib r iu m  im p ly in g  
tha t f i rm ’s leverage w dll be irre levan t.
Let tjr and t p  be the effective lax rates on e q u ity  and debt income 
respective l}' faced by investor i, and suppose tha t rE is a fixed 
p ropo rtion , \pt o f t p , i.e.
*■/ =  'i>Ti>
A n inves to r wdll be ind iffe re n t between hold ing debt and e q u ity  on ly  
in  the case where :
(1 — 71) )rp  =  (1 — i//7/> )rE (3 .2 .4 )
W here r D and rE arc the re tu rns  on debt and eq u ity  respective ly. As
7j) increases, the in te rest rates rises to entice investors w ith  high
m arg ina l tax rates in to  the m arket fo r  corporate debt. On the other
hand, firm s  are in d iffe re n t between issuing debts and e q u ity  on ly
when :
r D (1 — t c ) =  (3 .2 .5 )
W here t (. is the corporate tax rale.
G iven tha t the e q u ilib r iu m  occurs when the supp ly  o f debts equals to 
demand, then the firm  w i l l  be w il l in g  to o ffer debts u n til the
- 63 -
fo llo w in g  equa lity , fo r  m arginal investor, is satisfied :
(1 - r t. X I  — ipr j ] ) =  (1 Tp ) (3.2.6)
Investors are thus expected to be sp lit. Those in personal tax brackets
below Tp w i l l  hold o n ly  debts, w h ile  those in h igher tax brackets
w il l  hold o n ly  equ ity , as th is  provides the highest post-tax rate o f
re tu rn . Th is  suggests tha t taxation has im p o rta n t effects on the
financial s tru c tu re  o f the firm . C orporation tax together w ith  the
p roportion  o f shareholders w ho pay income tax at a rate low er than
the corporation tax are the m ain determ inants o f the deb t-equ ity
ratios o f corporations as a whole. A t  in d iv id u a l com pany, there is no
op tim a l deb t-equ ity  ra tio , because, once fu l l  a rb itrage is taken place
in the m arket, no single lirm  can gain fro m  increasing its  level o f
debts.
Cordes and Sheffrin  (1981) argued, on the other hand, tha t the 
observed re la tive  re tu rns to f u l ly  taxed and tax exempts assets are 
not consistent w ith  M il le r ’s e q u ilib r iu m . F irm s do not supp ly  debts 
ine las tica lly  at a po in t where :
r L
T,) ( 1 t )
but ra ther d im in ish  the in terest rate they arc w il l in g  to  pay as the 
level o f debts supplied increases, because o f po ss ib ility  o f bankrup tcy  
costs. Thus equation (3 .2 .5 ) becomes :
(1 - tc ) <  n  (3 .2 .7 )
In other words, there should be a prem ium  on the rate o f re tu rn  to
equ ity  in order to obta in  e q u ilib r iu m .
M ille r  basic analysis im plies that investors are classified in to  high and 
low  gearing firm s according to the ir tax rates (K im , Lew ellen and
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M cConnell (19 7 8 )). Th is  specialisation is however moderated in the 
presence o f risk  aversion and Auerbach (1982), Auerbach and King 
(1983), K im  (1982 ) and M od ig lian i (1982) consider the trade-o lf 
between the lax advantages and risks costs associated w ith  specialised 
p o rtfo lio s 2.
In order to  test shareholders’ leverage clientele, and thus the firm  
d eb t-equ ity  ra tio , one cannot undertake cross-sectional tests o f the 
re la tionsh ip  between f irm ’s leverage ratios and shareholders and 
bondholders persona] tax rates, because th e ir c liente le  is defined in 
te rm s o f p o rtfo lio s  not in d iv id u a l firm . Thus K im  &  al. (1978) test 
fo r  the existence o f shareholders c liente le at the firm  level could be 
m isleading. In o rder to examine the effects o f taxation on the way on 
w h ich  shareholders borrow  or lend, the data should be on the 
in d iv id u a l’s p o r tfo lio  com position. Auerbach and K ing  (1983) 
explored the p o r tfo lio  behaviour o f investors d iffe r in g  w ith  respects 
to  both tax rates and risk  aversion in a general e q u ilib r iu m  model. 
Investors are segmented by tax rate in to  2 groups, one specialising in 
e q u ity  and the o ther in debts. They argue tha t when investors face 
d iffe re n t tax rates, there should be some conditions in the m arket fo r  
e q u ilib r iu m  to exist. In th is  case where value m axim isa tion  is 
o p tim a l fo r  companies, then investors w i l l  be com plete ly specialised 
in  e ither debt o r e q u ity . They conclude that re la tive  w ealths o f the 
tw o  groups determ ines the aggregate de b t-equ ity  ra tio  and each firm
2. In a general equilibrium  model ol taxation. Feldstein and Slemrod (19 80 ) have 
argued that portfo lio  diversification is a prim ary reason why both high and low  
income taxpayers invest in both sectors : incorporated which is highly taxed and 
low taxed unincorporated sector.
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is ind iffe ren t to its  Iinancia l po licy .
However, such resu lts  cannot be generalised because o f the d isparities 
amongst the shareholders personal income tax rate. In add ition  such 
tests do not take in to  account the corporation tax rate as effective to 
the firm . Because o f the w ide  va rie ty  o f the com position o f 
shareholders’ income tax rates the firm  financial leverage is u n lik e ly  
to  be explained by incom e tax alone.
In  the next section we analyse conditions under w h ich  debts may be 
less a ttra c tive  to companies because o f the com bination  o f re la tiv e ly  
favourab le  trea tm ent o f d iv id e nd s  by the im pu ta tion  system, low er 
effective capital gains and non-in te rest related tax shields.
2. Comparison o f  A ltern ative  M ethods o f Finance :
In o rder to determ ine the o p tim a l level o f debt, K ing  (1977 ) and 
N icke ll (1978) compared in  pa irs the three a lte rna tive  methods o f 
finance available  to  the firm , under conditions o f ce rta in ty  and perfect 
capita l m arkets. The idea behind th is  comparison is the 
de term ination  o f the cond itions o f the tax variables under w hich  fo r  
instance, issuing new shares is a better a lte rna tive  than increasing the 
level o f debts. I f  ta xa tion  is the o n ly  variab le  that affects com pany’s 
financing decision, then i t  is possible to determ ine w hich source 
invo lves paying the least am ount o f tax by comparing any tw o  o f the 
sources o f finance w h ile  ho ld ing  the th ird  constant along w ith  the 
investm ent plan o f the firm . The decision on w hether to use debt 
finance is accomplished th rough the fo llo w in g  comparison :
a)Chose between debt and new equ ity  : assuming tha t f irm ’s 
investm ent plan and re ten tions are constant over tim e, then the
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managers have lo  decide on w hich a lte rna tive  finance to use in l - l  to 
y ie ld  the best re tu rn  in l. I f  debts are chosen then the re tu rn  in t is 
paid o u t as interest. On the other hand, i f  investm ent is financed by 
new issue, then the re tu rn  is paid out in the fo rm  o f d iv idends in 
o rder to  keep the re ten tion  constant. Thus the net a fte r  tax re tu rn  to 
the supp lie r o f finance is (1 -m ) i f  project is debt financed, m being the 
m arg ina l income tax rate, w h ile  i f  new issues are used, then the firm  
pays corpora tion  tax on the re tu rn  and an add itiona l tax on the 
d iv idends. As a consequence, the re tu rn  to  shareholder is (1 -7)0 
where t is the corporation  tax rate and 0 = ( l - m ) / ( l - c ) ,  is the 
o p p o rtu n ity  cost o f retained earnings in term s o f d iv idends foregone, 
as defined in  the previous chapter. In these circumstances, the firm  
w i l l  p re fe r debts to  new e q u ity  i f  ( l - m ) > (  1-7)0.
U nder the classical system o f corporation tax, where 0 = 1-m, firm s 
w i l l  p re fe r debts to  new e q u ity  fo r  any positive va lue o f corporation 
tax rate (D eAngelo and M asu lis  1980b). The in tro d u c tio n  o f the 
im pu ta tio n  system alone w ou ld  not m o d ify  th is  preference fo r  debts 
so long as the corporate tax rate is higher than the im pu ta tion  rate 
(Fung and Theobald 1984). Th is  analysis, therefore, depends 
c ru c ia lly  on the level o f the corporation tax rate. I f  the s ta tu to ry  
corporate tax rate is used then th is  comparison w ou ld  not exp la in  the 
re la tiv e ly  low  levels o f dcbts-capita l ratios as observed fo r  our 
sample o f companies and fo r  the aggregate in d u s tria l and com m ercial 
companies.
b)Chose between re ten tions and debts : Suppose tha t d iv idends and 
new equ ity  finance are constant, then i f  investm ent plan is financed 
by debts, the al te r lax re tu rn  paid out as interest is equal to (1 -m ).
- 67 -
I f  on the other hand retained earnings are the m ain source o f finance 
then the value o f e q u ity  in period t w il l  be higher than otherwise. 
The retained earnings are subject to  both corporation tax and also to 
capital gains tax on the consequent appreciation o f the value o f 
equ ity . Therefore, the net re tu rn  is ( l - r ) (  1-z) where z is the effective 
capita l gains tax rate. Debts finance is thus p re fe rred  to  the use o f 
retained earnings on the cond ition  th a t ( l - m ) > ( l - r ) ( l - z ) .
I f  we suppose tha t the m argina l income tax rate is equal to the 
effective capita l gains tax rate, then debts w i l l  s t i l l  be preferred to 
d iv idends so long as the corporate tax rate is positive. G iven that the 
capital gains arc taxed at a standard rate rate o f income tax, the 
m arginal income tax rate m  is bound to be a lw ays h igher than the 
capita l gains tax rate fo r  a higher tax bracket taxpayer. Therefore, 
the ra tio  (1 — m ) / ( 1 —z ) is a lw ays  low er than u n ity . As a consequence, 
debts w i l l  be pre ferred to retained earnings i f  the corpora tion tax rate 
is h igher than the re la tive  p roportion  o f the difference between the 
m arginal income tax rate and the capital gains tax rate. I f  the 
standard rate o f corpora tion  tax is used, then we are lik e ly  to find, at 
any lim e , firm s to p re fe r debts to retained earnings.
N ic k c ll (1978) fou n d  th a t in the US o r U K personal and corporate tax 
system debt is pre fe rab le  to  re tentions and retentions is preferable to 
new share issues. T h is  conclusion does not, however, take in to  
account the effective corporate tax rate. As a consequence i t  may not 
exp la in  w hy  companies do not bo rrow  heavily.
K ing (1977) is the o n ly  one to have carried out fo rm a l tim e  series 
tests o f the exp lana to ry  power o f the tax advantage o f debts on
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company deb t-equ ity  ra tio . In a tw o  period ce rta in ty  fram ew ork, he 
conducted regression tests o f UK aggregate ind u s tria l and commercial 
companies’ debt ra tios fo r  the period 1963-1971 against the tax 
advantages o f debts w h ich  include both corporate and personal taxes. 
A lthough  he concludes tha t the de term inants o f deb t-equ ity  ra tio  can 
be obtained from  a sim ple  re la tionsh ip  between the target deb t-equ ity  
ra tio  and the tax variables, his resu lts  arc somewhat m ixed w ith  the 
coefficient o f on ly  one o f his tw o  exp lana to ry  variables [0 ( l - T ) - ( l- m ) ]  
is s ign ificant and w ith  expected sign (i.e . negative). Furtherm ore, his 
resu lts  m ay be due to  the short tim e  period used3. His theory, in 
add ition  to  his strong assum ption o f perfect capita l markets and 
ce rta in ty , considers the three a lte rna tive  methods o f finance as 
m u tu a lly  exclusive, w h ile  in re a lity  firm s usua lly  use a combination 
o f debts, new issue o f shares and retained earnings.
The above analysis d id  not take in to  account the noninterest-re la ted 
tax shields in com puting the corpora tion tax rate. In the previous 
chapter, we found that, because o f the tax re lie fs  and allowances, the 
effective corporation tax rate is su b s ta n tia lly  low er than the s ta tu to ry  
rate. Since the above comparison is m a in ly  based on the level o f the 
corporate tax rate o f firm s, we w o u ld  expect that a low er effective 
corporate tax rate w ou ld  change the preference fo r debts. DeAngclo 
and M asulis (1980a) extended the o rig ina l M ille r  (1977) analysis by 
considering the nonin terest-re la ted tax shields to demonstrate the 
relevance o f corporate leverage po licy . Fung and Theobald (1984)
3. The total period is divided into tw o sub-periods on which the regressions were 
performed : 1954 to 1961 and 1961 to 1971.
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extended th is  analysis to prove tha t the com bination o f the loss o f tax 
sh ie lds w ith  shareholders cred it method or the l in i l ’s d iv idend  credit 
m ethod makes the d iv idends dom inate debts. However, none has 
dealt w ith  the sim ultaneous re la tionsh ip  between the corporation tax 
rate, personal income tax rate and the effective capital gains tax rate.
To fo rm a lise  the re la tionsh ip  between personal taxes and corporate 
tax, we define m, c, z, and r  as the m argina l personal income tax rate, 
im p u ta tio n  rate, effective capita l gains tax rate and the effective 
corporate tax rate. The re tu rn  on debts are taxed o n ly  at personal 
leve l, m aking  the a fte r-ta x  re tu rn  equal to (1 -m ) fo r  each u n it o f 
in te res t. The re tu rn  to  shareholders, however, depends on the 
d iv id e n d  pay-ou t ra tio , defined as a . For each u n it o f d iv idends 
shareho lder w i l l  be taxed a t a ra te  ( l - m ) / ( l - c ) ,  and fo r  each u n it o f 
cap ita l gains, generated by the retained earning, he w i l l  be taxed at 
ra te  z. Therefore, his to ta l re tu rn  w o u ld  have been taxed at :
( 1 - r ) ( a ( ' ~ W? +  0 - < * ) ( ' - -  ))( l  —c ;
There fore , the decision on w he the r to use equ ity  as opposed to debts 
w o u ld  be based on the fo llo w in g  re la tionsh ip  :
(1 — m  ) <  (1 —r ) ( a ^A m )  +  (1 — a )(  1— z )) (3 .2 )
(1 — c )
I f  the inverse re la tionsh ip  is tru e  then we w ou ld  expect the firm  to 
p re fe r debts to e q u ity .
Equation (3 .2 ) is tested fo r  o u r sample o f companies. We assumed a 
fixed 20 per cent re tu rn  before-tax on both debts and e q u ity .
T h is  comparison require  the com putation  o f the effective capita l gains 
tax rate. As pointed out above the s ta tu to ry  rate may not reflect the 
actua l tax paid by the shareholder because capital gains tax is not on
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accrual basis but ra ther on rea lisation. Data on the period o f holding 
shares is not available. We fo llo w  K ing (1977 ) methodology and 
assume a propensity to sell assets o f 10 per cent and compute the 
e ffective capita l gains by d iscounting the fu tu re  notional rate o f 
cap ita l gains tax4. D uring the sample period there have been some 
m a jo r changes in the capital gains tax. In p a rticu la r, in  1982 the tax 
system a llo w s  the acquisition cost o f the asset to be indexed against 
in fla tion . M oreover, the am ount o f allowances changes du ring  the 
sample period and ind iv id u a l were a llow ed to opt fo r  an a lte rna tive  
w ay o f tax ing  the ir capital gains.
T h is  comparison requires also the com putation o f the d iv idend  pay­
o u t ra tio , average marginal income tax o f shareholders and the 
e ffective  corporation  tax rate. The la tte r is dealt w ith  in  the previous 
chapter and the m arginal income tax o f shareholders is based on the 
nationa l average, as computed in  chapter 4.
4. The standard rate of capital gains cannot be applied because individuals may 
elect fo r an a lternative basis under which one half of the gains are taxed as 
income. Data necessary to compute the notional capital gains tax has been 
extracted from  the In la n d  Revenue S ta t is t ic s  various issues. Prom 1972 to 19X0 
the yearly capital gains tax rates are calculated using Table 4.21 and 4.24. We 
divide the tax payments on realised gains on shares and debentures in companies 
bv the amount of gains. These relate to both individuals and trustees and to 
both assessments methods: on alternative basis and at 30%. Por 19X1-82 the 
capital gains lax payments on shares is not published. Instead the total amount 
of tax and gains -including land anti buildings and all other assets- is given. The 
notional tax rate is computed by dividing the sum of the total amount of capital 
gains tax paid by trustees and individuals by the total amount of gains realised 
by both these categories of investors. There was no data for 1983. (See In la n d  
Revenue S ta t is t ic s  19X6 fables 5.2 and 5.3 pp. 67 -68 ).
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TAH1.K 3.1. Hypothetical Example on the Return to Investors















ATRS ( * >  
(8)
1972 0.386 0.288 0.167 0.395 0.4460 0.00 12.28 08.90
1973 0.413 0.291 0.140 0.236 0.3037 0.30 11.74 13.04
1974 0.432 0.284 0.115 0.097 0.3631 0.33 11.36 15.74
1975 0.437 0.286 0.117 0.247 0.3649 0.35 11.26 13.20
1976 0.428 0.292 0.119 0.203 0.3250 0.35 11.44 14.04
1977 0.417 0.29 3 0.129 0.170 0.3091 0.35 11.66 14.59
1978 0.392 0.262 0.117 0.157 0.2687 0.34 12.16 15.06
1979 0.364 0.250 0.109 0.180 0.3044 0.33 12.72 14.90
1980 0.360 0.249 0.105 0.261 0.3150 0.30 12.80 13.32
1981 0.390 0.246 0.100 0.307 0.2560 0.30 12.20 12.37
1982 0.370 0.236 0.104 0.240 0.2934 0.30 12.60 13.64
Notes : Column One : Average marginal tax rate applicable to 
dividends paid by ICCs. See chapter 4 for the method used.
Source The Survey of Personal Incomes’ and Inland Revenue 
Statistics’ Y’arious issues.
Column two : Notional capital gains tax rate, computed 
bv dividing the amount of gains tax by the amount of gains.
Source Inland Revenue Statistics’ Tables 4.21-4.24 & 5 .2 -5 .4. Various issues.
Column three : Effective capital gains tax 
r  =  0.1 *NKCT/( 0 . 1 ) where r is redemption yield on long dated 
government stocks. (See King (1977 ) for discussion).
Column four : Effective corporation tax rate for the sample 
of companies. See chapter 2 for details.
Column five : Average dividend-pav-out ratios for the firms 
in the sample. See chapter 4.
Column six : Advance corporation tax rale.
Column seven: A fte r-tax  return to bondholders assuming a 
before lax of 2()9i and an average income tax rate equal to that 
of shareholders. A T R j i  — 0 .2 ( 1—tn  ).
Column eight: A fte r-tax  return to shareholders assuming a 
before lax return of 20%. This is computed as :
A T R S =0 .2 ( 1 - t)[<*( 1 —m)/< 1 - t  > +  (1 - a ) (  1 - r  )].
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In co lum n (7 )  and (8 ) wc compute the a fte r tax re tu rn  on debts and 
e q u ity . W h ile  the interests arc assumed to  be subject to on ly  the 
m arg ina l personal income tax rate, the income o f shareholders is 
taxed, firs t, a t the corporate tax rate, and, second, at personal level. 
The la tte r  depends on the am ount o f d iv idends d is tr ib u te d  by the 
f irm , as d iv idends are taxed at the m arginal personal income tax rate, 
w h ile  capita l gains are taxed at the effective capital gains tax rate. Wc 
assume that there is no tim in g  difference between the payment o f 
d iv idends  and the recovery o f A C T and that both d iv idends and 
interests are subject to the same m arginal personal income tax rate. 
We find, tha t w ith  the exception o f 1972, the a fte r tax re tu rn  on 
e q u ity  is m uch higher than tha t on debts. Equation (3 .2 ) is, 
there fore , ve rified  fo r  a ll the years in  the sample period. As a 
consequence, firm s , in  order to  m axim ise th e ir shareholders’ w ealth , 
m ay p robab ly  have pre ferred  to  use eq u ity  ra ther than debts.
H ow ever, in th is  analysis the average corporate tax rate was used. 
T h is  does not reflect d ire c tly  the fact that many companies in the 
sample were not paying tax at a ll. For a positive  d iv idend  
e q u ilib r iu m  to exist, firm s should be w ill in g  to supp ly  debts as 
opposed to e q u ity . A necessary condition fo r th is  e q u ilib r iu m  is fo r  
the corporate tax to  be negative or zero (Fung and Theobald 1984). In 
the next section a tte m p t is made to determ ine the im pact o f tax 
exhaustion on the leve ls o f debt-cap ita l ratios.
3. The Mode]
The rev iew  o f the lite ra tu re  has shown that debt e q u ity  ratios are 
influenced by both taxes and expected bankrup tcy  costs. The fo rm er 
im p lies  h igh leverage, w h ile  the p o ss ib ility  o f co s tly  bankrup tcy  
predicts the opposite. The present model tries to  capture  both these 
influences.
In o rder to  test fo r  the influences o f taxation on financing behaviour 
we look at how debt e q u ity  ra tios have varied over tim e  and through 
firm s w ith  a va ria tion  o f a num ber o f exp lanatory variables. The 
o p tim a l level o f debt re la tive  to  its  eq u ity  the firm  wishes to have 
m ay be seen as the outcome o f some complex in te raction  between the 
im pact o f u n ce rta in ty  and the f irm ’s tax position.
Because o f the allowances created by the tax system, firm  could have 
negative taxable p ro fit w ith o u t being in financial d istress o r on the 
verge o f b ankrup tcy . The strong assumption behind the models 
review ed above is tha t l in n  is assumed to have a pos itive  taxable 
p ro fit against w hich tax shields can be obtained. In  re a lity  th is  
cannot be a lw ays  the case. DeAngelo and M asulis (1980a) model is 
based on th is  idea. They argued tha t the benefits o f debts d im in ish  as 
the taxable capacity o f the firm  becomes exhausted and as a resu lt it  
is possible to  obta in an o p tim a l level o f gearing. In  the previous 
chapter we find that the e ffective corporation tax rate is much low er 
than the s ta tu to ry  rate. Therefore, firm s  in the sample were not able 
to  c la im  a ll the tax advantages to  debts (Table 2.2, p .47). In 1974, 
fo r  instance, I hey were, on average, able to claim  on ly  19 per cent o f 
th e ir tax shields*’ , and 41 per cent o f them were not able to cla im
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an y th in g  at a ll as th e ir  taxable p ro fit is negative. For the whole 
sample period, firm s were able to take o n ly  44 per cent o f the ir tax 
shields6. T h is  s itua tion  is, therefore, l ik e ly  to  co n tribu te  s ign ificantly  
to  the observed low  leve ls o f debt-cap ita l ra tios o f the companies in 
the sample.
The model tested here is based on these argum ents. The tax position 
o f the firm  used is the effective corporation tax rate w hich takes in to  
account cap ita l a llowances, stock re lie f, im pu ta tion  rate and the level 
o f p ro f ita b il ity  o f the firm . It is assumed tha t the target debt-capita l 
ra tio  is lin e a r ly  re lated to  the tax variables, the previous level o f 
debt-cap ita l ra tio  and to  the level o f risk  as measured by the required 
rates o f re tu rn  by  shareholders and bondholders/banks. 
F u rthe rm ore , it  is assumed th a t the firm  cannot ad just com plete ly, in 
one period, its  target debt-cap ita l ra tio  because o f the costs invo lved 
(M ye rs  1984). The fo llo w in g  estim ating equation o f debt-capita l 
ra tio  is obtained.
Lt =oc + &}RPRIMti +  j32 Lt _ h +  &3TAXEXH ti +  fiALTI Rt (3.3.1)
W here L  is the debt-cap ita l ra tio  o f firm  i at tim e t;
RPR1M is the risk  p rem ium  required by shareholders to compensate 
fo r  the b a nkrup tcy  costs tha t m ay arise fro m  the high level o f debt- 
cap ita l ra tio . It is obtained fro m  equation (3.1.3).
5. The statutory corporation tax, adjusted for small firms, in 1974 was 50.88 per 
cent w hile  the effective tax rate was only 9.65 per cent. Therefore, they were 
claiming only a small proportion of their tax shields which amounts to 
9 .65 /50 .88  = 18.9 per cent.
6 . In the US Cordes and Sheffrin (1981 . 1983) find that the marginal tax advantage 
of interest deductions on debts is only tw o thirds of the fu ll corporate tax.
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T A X E X H  is a du m m y va riab le  ind ica ting  w hether the company i is 
lax exhausted at tim e  t. The e ll'eclive corporation tax rates are 
obtained fro m  the tax m odel, and th is  variab le  is defined as the lax 
exhaustion before a llo w in g  fo r  interest payments.
LT IR  is the long term  in te rest rate w h ich  is assumed to  incorporate a 
p rem ium  fo r  risk  requ ired  by bondholders/banks.
3.1 Variable estim ation :
T h is  model is estim ated using data extracted from  the E X T A T  data 
bank fo r  a sample o f 109 firm s  over the period 1972 to 1983. M arke t 
values cou ld  have been o f m ore interest than the book values but no 
data on the m arket va lue  o f debentures was available. Instead data 
extracted fro m  the balance sheets o f the firm s in the sample is used to 
com pute the debt-cap ita l ra tio  fo r  each year, the results o f w hich are 
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Figure 1. Average debt-capital ralio 
The ye a rly  average o f the debt-cap ita l ra tio  has not changed
s ign ifican tly  d u rin g  the sample period, and a fte r 1977, firm s appear to
re ly  less on long te rm  debts to  finance the ir projects. For the whole
sample period, long te rm  debts represented about 10 per cent o f total
long te rm  finance, i.e. in c lu d in g  provis ions and reserves.
The m a jo r prob lem  w ith  using in d iv id u a l companies’ data extracted 
fro m  th e ir  published accounts is that these accounts are based on 
accounting conventions w h ich  do not a llow  fo r  in fla tion . In 
p a rticu la r, since one exp lana to ry  variab le, the risk  p rem ium  required 
by shareholders, is based on m arket values, the com putation  o f debt-
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capita] ra tios  on h is to rica l cost basis m ay not produce the same 
results as when m arke t values are used. However, Bownm an (1980) 
and Auerbach (1985 ) used both m arke t values and book values but 
d id  not find any s ign ificant differences in  th e ir  resu lts. Furtherm ore, 
to test fo r  the re la tionsh ip  between beta and leverage, Hamada (1972) 
and M ande lke r and Rhec (1984 ) have used book values o f both debts 
and e q u ity . Therefore, the resu lts  are not expected to  be biased ju s t 
because o f the use o f book values.
The debt-cap ita l ra tio  va riab le  is com puted using data extracted fro m  
E xta t database. The num era to r, long -te rm  debts, is ca lcu la ted as the 
sum o f bank loans (C 1 4 0 )7, o ther loans ( C l41), debenture parent 
company ( C l36), debenture subs id ia ry  com pany ( C l37), loan parent 
company ( C l 38) and loan o f subs id ia ry  com pany ( C l39). The 
denom inator is the sum o f the long te rm  debts and shareholders 
fu n d s  (C l 32 )8.
Long te rm  in terest ra te va riab le  is also computed fro m  the E x ta t data 
bank. I t  is the ra tio  o f long term  in te rest paym ents (C 54 ) over the 
ou tstand ing  long te rm  debts at the beginning o f the period. There 
were, however, some problem s in com puting th is  va riab le , due 
m a in ly  to the t im in g  o f the paym ent o f in terest and the redem ption 
o r the con tracting  o f debts. In  ve ry  few  cases, there was no 
re la tionsh ip  between the level o f in te rest paym ents and the am ount
7. Values between brackets refer to Extat numbers.
8 . There are a number of ways of computing debt-capital ratio at book value. 
Bowman (1 9 8 0 ) fo r instance, included such elements as current liabilities and 
deferred tax in calculating total debts. However, these items do not bear any 
interest and also may be contracted unintentionally by the firm . Preference 
capital, on the other hand, is included in shareholders’ funds.
o f debts outstanding, in  such a w ay as the in te rest rate was found  to 
be around 60 per cent. T h is  is due to the fact tha t when the accounts 
were published, the com pany m ay have paid part o f its  debts b u t has 
not com pleted the paym ent o f interests due. In o the r cases, the 
reverse happened. In terest rates were found  to be ve ry  lo w  (around 2 
per cent). Th is  is p robab ly  due to the fac t tha t the company may 
have ju s t contracted new debts and have not started paying interest, 
thus m aking the denom inator much h igher than the num erator. 
G iven th a t these cases where exceptional and am ount to  less than 5 
per cent o f the to ta l sample, such unreasonable observations are 
considered as m issing values.
Risk p rem ium  (R P R IM ) va riab le  is com puted using the capita l assets 
p ric ing  model (C A P M ). Beta, the system atic r isk , is obtained by 
regressing the m o n th ly  log re tu rn s  extracted fro m  the London Share 
Price Database (LSPD ), fo r  each com pany over 5 year period 
preceding the year in question, thus g iv ing  60 observations fo r  each 
ye a rly  beta, against the corresponding m arke t re tu rns. The risk  free 
rate o f re tu rn  and the m arke t re tu rn  used to com pute the risk 
p rem ium  are taken as the average re tu rn  over the w hole  period9.
The tax exhaustion va riab le  indicates w he ther the com pany is able to 
take advantage o f the tax shields. The effective tax rates are 
com puted assuming th a t the firm  is a ll e q u ity  financed, and p ro fits  are 
adjusted fo r  the actual in terest payments. I f  the effective tax rate is 
low e r o r equal to  zero, th is  d u m m y  variab le  is set to  one, and to  zero
(). See chapter 6 for the computation of beta, market return and the risk tree rate.
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otherw ise. I f ,  as the theo ry  predicts, corporate tax influences the 
desired level o f debts, then th is  dum m y variab le  w ou ld  be significant. 
T h is  va riab le  is also assumed to constitu te  a key element in 
in fluencing  the decision on w he the r a p a rticu la r p ro ject is financed by 
debts o r e q u ity  o r reta ined earnings. Th is variab le  is expected to be 
negative ly re lated to  the level o f the debt-cap ita l ra tio , because the 
more the com pany is tax exhausted, the less tax shields gained, thus 
the low e r the deb t-cap ita l ra tio .
4. M ethodology :
To construct a pooled tim e-serics cross-sectional ra tios  o f long term  
debts to  long te rm  cap ita l (long  te rm  debts plus shareholders’ 
fu n d s ), a sample o f 109 firm s non-financia l dom estic firm s  was 
selected fro m  E X T A T  data bank. The data covers 1972 through 
1983. The firm s are chosen on cond ition  tha t th e ir m ain a c tiv itie s  are 
in  the dom estic m arke t, because in te rna tiona l companies are able to 
bo rro w  in o ther countries o r to use borrow ings o f th e ir  subsidiaries 
abroad. T h is  fac t cou ld  d is to r t the results because o f the lik e ly  
differences in the behaviour between in te rna tiona l and dom estic firm .
Because of' the special s tru c tu re  o f the data, the fre q u e n tly  used 
o rd in a ry  least squares m ethod is l ik e ly  to give biased coefficients due 
to  the contemporaneous covariance. Th is  problem  arises when a 
random  exogenous fac to rs  such as m a jo r po litica l events o r any other 
om ited variab le  m ay a lfect the independent variab le  o f a ll the firm s 
in the sample at the same tim e. The econometric m ethod to use 
depends on the assum ption on w hether the e rro r term  v{ t is a fixed 
o r random . Th is depends on vt being correlated w ith  X t l . For the
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purpose o f th is  s tudy  it is assumed tha t th is  re la tionsh ip  is fixed and 
use Seemingly Unrelated Regressions ra ther than the Generalised 
Least Squares w ith  d u m m y variables. Th is  choice is due to the large 
num ber o f firm s in the sample and a d um m y variab le  fo r  each firm  
w o u ld  not have too much exp lanation. M oreover, the large num ber 
o f firm s  com paring to the lo w  num ber o f years (109 as against 12 
years) w ou ld  make th is  e rro r term  ins ign ifican t. (C ham berla in  
(1 983 ), and N icke l! (1 981 )).
The pooled cross-sectional and tim e series regressions constra in the 
coefficients o f the exp lana to ry  variab les to  be equal th rough a ll the 
years in the sample period. I f  these coefficients have changed 
s ign ifica n tly  d u rin g  the sample period then the resu lts  obtained 
cannot be said to reflect the general behaviour o f the firm s. Cross- 
sectional data is there fore  used fo r  each year in  the sample period and 
the estimates are compared to  those obtained fro m  pooled data. 
H owever, given the re la tiv e ly  high num ber o f cross-sectional 
regressions, year to year comparison may not be an efficient w ay o f 
testing fo r  the significance o f lim e  effect. Instead, the Chow test is 
com puted. I t  invo lves ca lcu la ting  F s ta tis tics  as a weighted o f the 
sum o f squared residuals obtained fro m  the restric ted equation and 
the unrestric ted one. The restric ted  equation is where a ll the 
coefficients are assumed to  be constant through tim e, and the 
unrestric ted  equation relates to  the coefficients o f the cross-sectional 
regressions. I f  the value obtained is higher than the c ritica l va lue then 
we can say that the results obtained from  pooled cross-sectional and 
tim e  series data are s ign ifican tly  d iffe re n t from  those o f cross- 
sectional.
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A no the r problem  tha t m ay fa u lt  the resu lts is the lik e ly  presence o f 
heteroscedasticity w h ich  arises fro m  the fact tha t the companies in 
the sample are not o f the same size. Thus i f  fo r  instance the am ount 
o f debts is used as the dependent variab le  then the high level o f debts 
fo r  large firm s m ay be due to  th e ir need ra the r than to  the advantage 
o f corpora tion  tax o r to  th e ir  lo w  risk  o f b a n k ru p tcy . To avoid th is  
m is-specification a ll the variab les are taken as ra tios. Long term  
debts arc d iv id ed  by the sum o f long term  debts plus shareholders’ 
funds, and the rem ain ing  exp lana to ry  variab les are also defined as 
e ithe r rates o f re tu rn  o r as d u m m y  variables.
5. Results o f  E stim ating Leverage Equation :
Table 3.2 records the resu lts  o f estim ating  equation 3.1 fo r  the pooled 
cross-sectional tim e-series data, using both the o rd in a ry  least squares 
(O LS) and the seem ingly unre la ted regressions (SU R ) m ethod, fo r  a 
to ta l o f 88 firm s over 11 year period. The to ta l sample includes 109 
companies, however, due the m issing values the regressions are o n ly  
perform ed fo r 88 companies because the num ber o f observation has to 
be the same fo r a ll years in  o rder to use the SUR.
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TABLE 3.2. RESULTS OF ESTIMATING LEVERAGE EQUATION 
POOLED DATA
L h = a  + & iRPRIMh + d 2Li: , +  /33TA X E X H it + H4LTIh j
1
COEE. OLS i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
■! a1 0.(X) 17 0.0163 -0.005 0.005 0.030 0.004 Ii (0.26) (4.25) (-0.89) (0.79) (2.30) (0.076)
j / 3 , 0.562 - 0.351 0.581 1.97 0.401 j
(2.86) (1.78) (2.95) (5.02) (2.47) !j
02 0.847 0.853 0.885 0.862 - 0.866
i (57.82) (58.43) (66.38) (59.84) (72.86) '
03 -0.013 -0.014 - -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 ;
(-3.22) (-3.45) (-3.12) (-1.73) (-2.54)
:04 0.136 0.138 0.132 - 0.052 0.089
i (4.47) (4.53) (4.08) (8.68) (3.80) |
i
i 0.777 0.775 0.776 0.773 0.090
: ° 0.0545 0.0547 0.0589 0.055 0.110
T.M. 963
Notes : T.M. denotes the trace m atrix;
cj is the slandard error o f eslimate;
—  ^
/? “ is the adjusted coefficient o f determination; 
t-statistics in brackets;
At 5% level, t r = 1.960, (tw o-ta iled  t- te s t).
A l l  coefficients in the above tab le  in co lum n 1 using OLS and when 
SUR technique is used (co lum n  6 ) are h ig h ly  significant and are o f the 
predicted sign. C o lum n (2 )  to (5 )  test fo r  m u lt ic o llin e a rity  amongst 
the variab les using F risch ’s Confluence Analys is. Since each tim e any 
o f the variab les included in co lum n  (1 ) is excluded, R 2 is reduced, 
w ith  a rise in the standard e rro r  o f the estimates, c j , and low er I-
sta tis tics  o f the rem ain ing coefficients, we can say tha t, even i f  there 
is m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  amongst the variables, its  possible effect is not 
su b s ta n tia l10.
The m ost dom inan t coefficient in term  o f its  significance is the lagged 
level o f debt-cap ita l ra tio . In co lum n (5 )  when th is  variab le  is 
excluded the ove ra ll significance decreases s ig n ifica n tly . Th is  points 
ou t to  pa rtia l ad justm ent o f firm s tow ards th e ir desired debt-cap ita l 
ra tio . Because o f the costs invo lved  and o f th e ir  com m itm en ts  when 
debts contracts are signed, firm s  cannot ju s t decide to  reduce the ir 
debts at a p a rticu la r po in t in  tim e , b u t ra ther they base the ir 
decisions concerning any ad justm ent to  th e ir  target debt-cap ita l ra tio  
on th e ir  ex isting  level o f debts.
Tax exhaustion va riab le  confirm s the tax shie ld hypothesis. Together 
w ith  the r is k  variab les they are consistent w ith  the hypothesis o f 
th e ir respective opposite d irec tion  effects on the target debt-cap ita l 
ra tio . I f  the com pany expects to take advantage o f the tax shields 
created by the ex is ting  tax systems, then it  is l ik e ly  to  increase its  
debts in  order to  finance its  investm ent projects. On the o the r hand, 
i f  such gains are not possible at present o r in the near fu tu re  because 
o f the tax exhaustion s itua tion  the firm  is in, then financing a 
p a rtic u la r project by debts w i l l  o n ly  lead to an increase in
10. None of these criteria alone is a satisfactory indicator of m u ltico llinearity . 
because large standard errors do not only arise from  the pre.sence_.9f linear 
relationship among the explanatory variables. Moreover, the overa ll R “ may be 
high but the coefficients may be of the wrong sign or have a low er t-statistics. 
Thus, the detection of possible m ulticollinearity  should be based on a 
simultaneous comparison of these criteria, in addition to the correlation between 
explanatory variables, (koutsoyiannis 1977).
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b a nkru p tcy  risks. The cocllic ient o f th is  va riab le  indicates tha t i f  a 
lin n  is not paying any corporation lax then i t  is expected to  reduce its  
debt-cap ita l ra tio  by about one per cent, w h ile  in the long run  i t  is 
like ly7 to decrease i t  by 7 per cent11. T h is  percentage is significant 
considering that, d u rin g  the sample period the debt-cap ita l ra tio  was 
on average equal to 0.114. Relating these resu lts  to  the s im u la tion  
analysis perform ed in chapter tw o , we can say th a t i f  the stock re lie f 
has not con tribu ted  su b s ta n tia lly  to  the h igh leve l o f tax exhausted 
companies, the average debt-cap ita l ra tio  w o u ld  have been much 
higher.
The r is k  prem ium  required by shareholders and the leve l o f interest 
rates are used as an approx im ation  fo r  the risk  associated w ith  a high 
level o f leverage. As expected, both these variables are pos itive ly  
related to  the level o f debt-cap ita l ra tio , meaning tha t both 
shareholders and bondholders o r banks requ ire  higher re tu rns  the 
higher the level o f debts re la tive  to  the cap ita l o f the firm . For tw o  
companies w ith  the same leve l o f shareholders funds , the required 
rate o f re tu rn  fo r  the high levered one is expected to be h igher than 
tha t w h ich  has a lo w e r level o f debts. The m agnitude o f the 
coefficients o f these variables is d iffe ren t. Since bondholders o r banks 
have p r io r ity  over shareholders in case o f bankrup tcy , the level o f 
th e ir  required ra le o f re tu rn  is low e r than that o f shareholders. For 
each u n it o f debt-cap ita l ra tio  above the normal level shareholders
11. In the long run the present and the lagged value are equal, i.e. L t = A r _ j .  
Solving for the tax variable assuming the other coefficients to be zero. the long 
run impact of the corporation tax may be found.
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w ou ld  requ ire  0.4 un its  increase in th e ir  required re tu rn  w h ile  
bondholders w o u ld  o n ly  ask fo r  a rise o f about 0 . 1  un its .
Both the OLS and the SUR lead to s im ila r  results. There is no a p r io r i 
d irec t test to  use to  chose between the 2  methods and to test fo r  the 
existence o f the contemporaneous covariance, because the SUR method 
does not g ive enough sum m ary sta tistics. The strong s im ila r ity  in the 
resu lts  using both methods is p robab ly  due to  the absence o f 
contemporaneous covariance amongst the e rro r te rm s o f each firm .
The pooled analys is imposes, however, fixed coefficients on the 
independent variab les fo r  each o f the 11 years period. I f  the debt- 
cap ita l ra tios have varied s ign ifica n tly  d u rin g  the 70s then th is  
re s tric tion  m ay bias the resu lts  given in  table 3.2. Equation 3.1 is 
thus re-estim ated fo r  each o f the years 1973 to 1983. The results 
obtained arc reported in table 3.5 and tab le  3.6 fo r  the seemingly 
unrelated regressions and the o rd in a ry  least squares, respective ly.
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TABLE 3.3. RESULTS () I; CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS LEVERAGE: SUR




$2 $ 4 Uu °r F  5,83
1973 0.026 -0.13 0.85* -0 .014 0.48 0.058 0.3315
(1 .1 4 ) (-0 .1 9 ) (15 .3 ) (-0 .9 7 ) (0 .3 1 ) 0.058
1974 0.017 0.993 0.934* - 0.011 0.073 0.041 1.253
(-0 .9 7 ) (1 .7 4 ) (24 .3 ) (-1 .3 0 ) (1 .4 0 ) 0.042
1975 0.007 0.27 1.03* -0.015 0.054 0.050 3.091**
(0 .3 3 ) (0 .3 9 ) (23 .1 ) ( -1 .3 0 ) (0 .5 7 ) 0.055
1976 0.014 -0 .33 0.96* -0 .006 0.005 0.031 2.555**
(1 .1 3 ) (-0 .7 9 ) (39 .9 ) ( -0 .9 ) (0 .0 8 5 ) 0.033
1977 0.019 -0 .209 0.776* - 0.11 0.035 0.047 2.538**
(1 .0 6 ) (-0 .3 5 ) ( 21.6 ) ( -1 .3 ) (0 .3 5 ) 0.050
1978 -0 .049* 1.39* 0.85* 0.012 0 .33* 0.048 1.609
(-2 .5 1 ) ( 2.11) (18 .1 ) (1 .0 6 ) ( 2 .88 ) 0 .050
1979 0.0023 1.25* 0.588* - 0 .02* 0 .172* 0.051 4.887**
( 0 .12) ( 2.02 ) (12 .52 ) ( -2 .2 5 ) (2 .3 0 ) 0.058
1980 0.0013 1.16 0.876* - 0.02 -0 .09 0.055 1.118
(0 .0 6 ) (1 .8 3 ) (12 .75 ) ( -1 .4 4 ) (-0 .7 6 ) 0.057
1981 0.019 -0.43 0.92* -0 .016* 0.11 0.034 1.151
(1 .5 2 ) (-1 .0 9 ) (26 .25 ) ( - 2 .02 ) (1 .8 1 ) 0.035
1982 -0.014 0.472 0.95* 0.006 0.097 0.041 0.1468
(-0 .9 2 ) (1 .0 1 6 ) (21 .4 ) (0 .6 1 ) (1 .9 1 ) 0.041
1983 -0.03 1.26* 0 .818* 0.005 0.35* 0.046 1.773
(-1 .7 7 ) (2 .3 6 ) (16 .43 ) (0 .3 8 ) (3 .7 3 ) 0.048
Notes: ** significance at 5% level F  5  ^ 3 — 2 .329;
t-statistics in brackets. t c —  1 .960  at 5% level (two-tail t-test): 
O u Standard error of estimates for unrestricted;
CJr  Standard error of estimates for restricted form (pooled): 
Number of observations = 88.
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TABLE 3.4. RESULTS <)1; CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS LEVERAGE: OLS
= a  + faRPRIMi  +  faLi.t +  0 3 TAXEXHi  +  fi4L T I t
YEARS
Ck 01 02
C O EFFIC IENTS  
0 3  04 R 2 a F  4,83
1973 0.028 0.051 0 .863* -0 .019 -0.06 0.724 0.059 58.23
( 1.11) (0 .0 7 ) (1 3 .8 ) (-1 .1 4 ) (-0 .3 4 )
1974 -0 .014 1.05 0 .94* -0 .018 0.06 0.869 0.042 146.3
(-0 .7 6 ) (1 .7 2 ) (2 3 .1 1 ) (-1 .7 9 ) (1 .1 1 3 )
1975 0.032 - 0.22 1.01* -0 .03* 0.157 0.849 0.051 123.0
(1 .2 9 ) (-0 .2 9 ) (2 0 .3 0 ) (-2 .1 6 ) (1 .4 4 )
1976 0.01 - 0.21 0 .957* -0.005 0.002 0.94 0.032 342.0
(0 .7 3 ) (-0 .4 5 ) (3 5 .4 0 ) (-0 .5 6 ) (0 .0 33 )
1977 0.005 0.35 0 .728* -0 .013 0.17 0.807 0.047 91.7
(0 .2 6 ) (0 .5 2 ) (1 7 .4 9 ) (-1 .1 8 ) (1 .4 2 )
1978 -0 .0 5 8 * 1.696* 0 .89* 0.014 0.22 0.814 0.049 96.2
(-2 .7 5 ) (2 .3 7 ) (1 7 .3 4 ) ( 1.101) (1 .7 3 )
1979 -0.014 1.57* 0 .62* -0 .017 0.147 0.673 0.052 45.8
(-0 .6 7 ) (2 .3 4 ) (1 2 .1 9 ) (-1 .3 0 ) (1 .7 0 )
1980 0.011 0.95 0 .89* -0 .026 -0.08 0.684 0.056 48.2
(0 .4 7 ) (1 .3 7 ) (1 1 .7 3 ) ( - 1.68 ) ( -0 .6 1 )
1981 0.015 -0 .34 0 .93* -0 .014 0.104 0.879 0.035 159.6
( 1.02 ) ( -0 .7 7 ) (2 3 .0 ) (-1 .4 7 ) (1 .3 8 )
1982 0.042 0.215 0 .91* -0.006 0.105 0.829 0.042 106.7
(0 .2 6 ) (0 .4 2 ) (1 8 .7 1 ) (-0 .5 2 ) ( 1.86)
1983 -0 .029 1.27* 0 .853* -0 .003 0.35* 0.804 0.047 90.4
(-1 .4 7 ) ( 2 .21 ) (1 5 .9 9 ) ( -0 .2 6 ) (3 .4 3 )
Notes: t-statistics in brackets. t c — 1 .9 6 0  at 59< level ( tw o -ta il t-test);
CJ Standard error o f estimates:
'y
R  “ = Coefficient of determ ination adjusted for the degrees of freedom: 
C ritical value of / ’ at 5% level is 2.530:
Num ber of observations = 88.
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In the above tables cross-sectional regression resu lts  are presented. 
Because o f the m issing variab les the sample has to  be reduced fro m  
109 firm s to  8 8  companies per year. The o rd in a ry  least squares 
sample has to  be lim ite d  to  be the same as tha t o f SUR so that 
com parison between the tw o  methods may be made. Table 3.5 
sum m arises these resu lts  by reporting  the num ber o f coefficients th a t 
are s ign ificant and w ith  the expected sign.
TABLE 3.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF COEFFICIENTS OF LEVERAGE 
EQUATION
j Melhod Criteria I R P R ! M i L i , T A X  E X  H i L T I i  ;
I SURI!












and significant 0 0 0 0
i1i
OI ,s Correctly signed 8 11 9 9 :i
i
Correctly signed 




j Uncorrectly signed 




A lth oug h  a re la t iv e ly  large num ber o f the coefficients o f the 
exp lana to ry  variab les are o f the expected sign, o n ly  a sm all
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p ropo rtion  o f these arc s ign ificant. In p a rticu la r, the tax exhaustion 
va riab le  is significant in o n ly  one case when the o rd ina ry  least 
squares technique is used. When the seem ingly unrela ted regressions 
technique is em ployed, o n ly  25 per cent o f the coefficient th a t are o f 
the correct sign are s ign ificant. None are u n co rrec tly  signed and 
s ign ificant. However, in  o rder to  be able to  compare these resu lts to  
the one obtained fro m  the pooled cross-sectional tim e  series data, i t  is 
necessary to  test fo r  w he the r tim e  exerts any im pact on debt-capita l 
ratios.
Table 3.3, co lum n 7 reports  the F  s ta tis tics to  measure the degree o f 
significance between the restricted and the un restric ted  regressions, 
using the C how  test w h ich  compares the sum o f squared residuals 
obtained fro m  the regression when a ll the coefficients are constrained 
to  be equal and the sum o f squares residuals obtained fro m  the 
un restric ted  specification. A t  5 per cent confidence level, the 
re s tric tion  o f the coefficients to  be the same th rough a ll the sample 
tim e  period is rejected in o n ly  4 cases1 2  w h ile  accepted in 7 cases. 
S im ila r ly , table 3.4 w h ich  reports the resu lts  o f cross-sectional using 
OLS does not show significance differences between the corre la tion 
coefficients obtained fo r  each separate year. M oreover, the standard 
e rro r o f the estimates obtained using both the SUR and the OLS 
techniques are ve ry  s im ila r. Therefore, one can say tha t tim e  has no 
effects13. The Trace M a tr ix , w h ich  measures the sum o f the diagonal
12. A t 1% confidence level, the restriction is rejected in only 1 case. 1979.
13. 1’he variation through the years in the explanatory variable determines whether 
lim e effect is significant or not. The tax exhaustion variable has remained 
constant through time. It  is only w ith  the introduction of the stock relief in 
1974 that this variable changed significantly, because more companies became 
tax exhausted. Otherwise, the proportion of lax exhausted firms has remained 
fa ir ly  constant for the whole period (as analysed in chapter 1).
- 90 -
elements o f the covariance m a tr ix  o f the transform ed residuals, o f the 
pooled and cross-sectional resu lts  is s im ila r  in both specifications14.
The m ain  difference between the resu lts obtained using the o rd in a ry  
least squares and the seem ingly unrelated regressions technique 
concern the estimated standard erro rs  o f param eter estimates. In 
general more o f the SUR estim ates are s ign ificant. The test fo r  the 
appropria te  use o f the SUR as against OLS is given by the m axim um  
like lih o o d  test s ta tis tics  com puted as (Judge & al 1985) :
k  = T (ln  IU ()I - I n  I f l j l )
W here = the un restric ted  SUR e rro r covariance m a tr ix ;
O 0  = the corresponding OLS e rro r covariance m a tr ix ;
T  is the sample size.
To test fo r  the n u ll hypothesis tha t the OLS is adequate Cl is 
res tric ted  to  being a diagonal m a tr ix  and k  has then an asym pto tic  
C hi-squared d is tr ib u tio n  w ith  M ( M - l ) / 2  degrees o f freedom  (M  is 
the num ber o f seem ingly unre la ted  equations). The s ta tis tica l 
package used fo r th is  ana lys is  (T im e  Series Processor) does not 
p rov ide  enough sum m ary s ta tis tics  to compute th is  test. We re ly  on 
the previous studies w hich  have found  tha t the SUR estimates are 
m ore efficient than the OLS ones (Z e lln e r and Huang (1962 ), Km enta 
and G ilb e rt (19 68 )), and we con firm  th is  by com paring the sign and 
the significance o f the cocfficicnces obtained fro m  both techniques.
14. W hen cross-seclion data is used for each year the Trace M atrix  amounts to 
962 .95 , w hile when the lim e is taken as constant its value is 951.43.
6. Conclusion :
A tte m p t is made in th is  chapter to expla in  the observed low  debt- 
cap ita l ra tio  o f the firm s  in the sample d u rin g  the 1973-83 period. 
W e have found  that, one possible reason fo r  companies to  p re fe r 
e q u ity  as against debts, m ay be related to the fact tha t, on average, 
fo r  an equal cost o f debt and e qu ity , the a fte r  tax re tu rn  on e q u ity  is 
h igher than tha t on debts. Th is resu lts fro m  a com bination o f a low  
levels o f corporate tax rates, favourab le  trea tm en t o f d iv idends w ith  
the in tro d u c tio n  o f the im pu ta tio n  system and lo w  effective capital 
gains tax rate.
In th is  chapter, the assum ption tha t firm s w il l  a lw a ys  have positive  
taxable p ro fits  against w h ich  interests m ay be deducted is relaxed, 
instead, the im pact o f tax exhaustion is analysed. It  is hypothesized 
tha t, i f  a com pany is tax exhausted, then a high level o f debts w o u ld  
o n ly  en ta il an increase in risk . Using the pooled cross-sectional tim e  
series data we find th a t the tax position o f the firm  exerts some 
influence on its  level o f debt-cap ita l ra tio . The hypothesis th a t r isk  
and tax shields act at opposite d irec tion  on the desired level o f debts 
cannot be rejected. The strength o f these resu lts  is increased by the 
s im ila r it ie s  in both methods used (OLS and SUR). A l l  the coefficients 
are s ign ificant and o f the expected sign. However, when tim e effect is 
taken in to  account, in  some years, because o f the m ajor changes tha t 
have occurred in the tax system or in the level o f in terest rate, one 
cannot d ra w  defin ite  conclusions. But the sum m ary sta tis tics  con firm  
the re jection o f the hypothesis o f any tim e effect.
The resu lts  im p ly  tha t firm s tha t have losses a n d /o r allowances ca rry
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fo rw a rd s  and irrecoverable o r unrecovered ACT, are expected lo  issue 
less debts. S im ila r ly , the resu lts  im p ly  tha t firm s w h ich  invest more 
in  p lan t and m achinery than in bu ild ings are lik e ly  to  issue less debts 
because o f the high allowances offered by the tax system fo r  
inves tm en t in  p lan t and m achinery. Th is  is c le a rly  an im po rta n t 
d irec tion  fo r  fu tu re  w o rk .
As opposed to  previous em p irica l studies on the effects o f taxation on 
d e b t-e q u ity  ra tio  at the aggregate, th is  s tu d y  has concentrated m ore at 
desegregated level where a num ber o f im po rtan t variab les, such as 
the e ffective  corpora tion tax do affect the target deb t-cap ita l ra tio . 
Indeed, it  cou ld  be argued th a t the tax advantage o f debt has been 
m is-specified by previous studies as the nom inal corporate tax rate is 
assumed to  be the effective  m argina l tax rate fo r companies.
M oreover, the degree o f r is k  w hich constra in t the firm  fro m  
increasing in d e fin ite ly  its  debts is measured by beta, the system atic 
risk  th a t shareholders th in k  the p a rticu la r com pany is in . A n 
a lte rn a tive  measure is also tested, being the required p rem ium  fo r  
risk  lenders w ou ld  expect fro m  the firm  to protect them  against any 
loss o f funds. T h is  la tte r is assumed to be incorporated in the 
interest rate the firm  has to  pay.
In try in g  to analyse the effects o f taxation on the level o f debt-cap ita l 
ra tios, there are some im po rta n t facto rs  to bear in m ind . F irs t, 
because o f the v a r ie ty  o f w ays in w h ich  corporate leverage can be 
measured, there arc a va rie ty  o f proxies fo r the target deb t-cap ita l 
ra tios  o f companies, and most im po rtan t is that answers fro m  these 
tests may be dependent on the proxy used. There cou ld  also be a
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num ber o f o ther variab les tha t could help exp la in ing  the desired 
deb t-cap ita l ra tios and thus could show some contemporaneous 
covariance amongst a ll the equations. H ow ever, the fac t tha t the 
ad justed R 2 is h ig h 1 5 and the resu lts  obtained using both SUR and 
OLS m ethods are consistent, p o in t to  the fac t th a t these problem s d id  
not affect the resu lts.
In the next chapter the effects o f taxation on d iv idends d is tr ib u tio n  
w i l l  be analysed, and in  chapters 7 and 8  these effects w i l l  be related 
to  the investm en t fu nc tions .
—— ^
15. In general R~ is around 70%. King (1 9 7 7 ) also found sim ilar R squared, using 




EFFECTS OF T A X A T IO N  ON D IV ID E N D  POLICY
The object o f th is  chapter is to t r y  to  analyse the effects o f 
co rpora tion  and personal income taxa tion  on the d iv idend  paym ents 
o f a sample o f 109 companies d u rin g  the period 1972-83. There are a 
num ber o f reasons fo r  trea ting  the im pact o f taxation  on the d iv idend  
d is tr ib u tio n  in  some deta ils. F irs t ly , economists, in investiga ting  
aggregate investm ent expend itu re  have examined the re la tionsh ip  
between the corpora tions’ reta ined earnings and th e ir  leve l o f 
investm ent. A  num ber o f e m p irica l studies have found  a strong 
re la tio nsh ip  between changes in  pay-ou t ra tio  and investm ent po licy  
(D h rym es and K u rz  1967). Thus, any po licy  w h ich  aim s at a lte ring  
the leve l o f pay-ou t ra tio  w o u ld  au to m a tica lly  have some 
consequences on the level o f investm ent. One im po rtan t p o licy  tha t 
cou ld  p lay  th is  ro le is taxes on d iv idends.
Secondly, the main purpose fo r  changes in corporate tax system  is fo r  
the au th o ritie s  to make firm s a lte r th e ir method o f financing th e ir 
projects. As found in the p rev ious chapter, there is a strong 
re la tionsh ip  between the f irm ’s financing po licy  and the tax system . 
I f  because o f the tax exhaustion position debt is no longer a p ro fitab le  
m ethod o f finance, the firm  is, in theory, expected to  reduce its  
d iv id e n d  pa y-ou t ra tio  to finance its  investm ent ra ther than issue new 
shares s im u ltaneous ly  as m a in ta in ing  its  level o f d iv idends to  reduce 
its  overa ll tax b il l .  Th is  brings about the th ird  reason fo r 
incorpora ting  th is  chapter, being w hy  companies pay d iv idend s  w h ile  
investm ent could be financed cheaply using retained earnings.
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The firs t section lays ou t some theories o f d iv id e n d  paym ents in 
s itua tions  where re ten tions are subs tan tia lly  lax favoured. Th is  is 
fo llo w e d  by a review  o f the existing models o f d iv id e n d  behaviour in 
section 2. Section 3 presents the estim ated model and the 
m ethodology used is in  section 4. In section 5 resu lts  are analysed 
and possible exp lanations fo r  the effects o f taxa tion  are provided. 
The em p irica l evidence shows tha t tax va riab le  docs appear to 
influence the d iv id end  p o lic y  o f the firm . T h is  analys is is fu r th e r  
extended to take possible tim e  effects in to  account and differences in 
the econom etric model specifications.
1. Theories o f D ividend P olicy  :
A  num ber o f theories have been advanced to exp la in  the s ta b ility  o f 
the d iv id e n d  pay-ou t ra tio  o f most companies, observed e m p ir ica lly . 
The firs t s tu d y  by L in tn e r (19 56 ) based on in te rv ie w s  suggested th a t 
managers ad just th e ir  pa y -ou t ratios to  lon g -ru n  target levels, w h ile  
five  years la tte r, M o d ig lian i and M ille r  (1961 ) dem onstrated tha t 
d iv id e n d  po licy  o f the firm  cou ld  not affect a f irm ’s to ta l va lue i f  
cap ita l m arkets were perfect and there were no taxes. However, the 
re laxa tion  o f these tw o  m a jo r assum ptions raises new questions as to  
w h y  companies do pay d iv idends. In th is  section, we firs t look at how  
taxa tion  affects the decision on w hether to d is tr ib u te  or to re ta in  a fte r  
tax p ro fits  before in tro du c in g  other factors tha t m ay influence the 
d is tr ib u tio n .
1.1 Effects o f  taxation  on dividend distribution :
Previous studies on the im pact o f taxation  on d iv idends using 
in d iv id u a l com pany data have examined share price m ovem ents
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around ex-d iv idend  days (E lto n  and G luber (1970), Auerbach 
(1983b ), Hess (1982), L itxem berger and Ram aswanm y (1979, 1982), 
M il le r  and Scholes (1 982 ), Poterba and Sum m ers (19 84 )). I f  
m arg ina l investors are untaxed, then changes in d iv idend  taxation 
w o u ld  no t affect share prices. I f ,  on the o the r hand, m arginal 
investo rs  are taxed m ore he av ily  on d iv idends th a t on capita l gains, 
then we w o u ld  expect share prices to  fa l l  by less than the d iv idend  
paym ents. E m p ir ic a lly , the la tte r  s itua tion  is observed in  most cases, 
im p ly in g  th a t the m arg ina l investors are taxed. Studies tha t 
a ttem pted to  inc lude personal and corporate taxa tion  in to  the 
d iv id e nd  decisions o f the in d iv id u a l company are rare. The present 
section a ttem pts  to find some re la tionsh ip  between the d iv idend  
decision, personal income taxa tion  o f shareholders and tax position o f 
in d iv id u a l com pany.
In  o rder to  analyse the re la tionsh ip  between taxa tion  and d iv idend  
p o licy  one needs to measure the re la tive  tax price o f d iv id e nd  and 
retentions. K ing  (1977 ) has defined a tax d isc rim ina tio n  variab le , 0, 
as the a fte r  tax income w h ich  shareholders w o u ld  receive i f  the 
com pany reduces its  retained earnings by one u n it, r  the effective 
corpora tion  tax i f  the com pany d is tr ib u te d  noth ing, and z the 
e ffective  lax rate on capita l gains. I f  m is the m arg ina l personal 
income tax rate, then when the firm  d is tribu tes  one u n it o f d iv idends 
shareholder w i l l  receive ( 1 -m )  under the classical co rpora tion  tax 
system . In an im p u ta tio n  corporate tax system he/she w i l l  receive 
some cred it fo r  the corporate taxes a lready paid on d is tr ib u te d  
corporate income, and 0  w i l l  then be equal to ( l - m ) / ( l - s )  w here s is 
the rate o f im pu ta tio n . I f  the im pu ta tion  rate is equal to
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shareho lder’s m arginal income tax rale, then no add itiona l tax is paid, 
thus 0  is equal to u n ity , o the rw ise  the shareholder is taxed at a rate 
(m -s ).
The decision on w hether to  d is tr ib u te  o r re ta in  al te r tax p ro fits  may 
depend on shareholders’ personal income tax rate. I f ,  on the one hand 
the firm  d is tr ib u te  d iv id e nd s  then the am ount received increases 
d ire c tly  the taxable income o f shareholders. I f  on the other hand 
p ro fits  are retained in the com pany, they w i l l  generate capita l gains 
w h ich , because o f the fac t th a t o n ly  i f  these gains exceed a certain 
am ount (e.g. £5000  in U .K . in  1982) that they  become taxable and the 
tax occurs at rea lisation ra th e r than when the gains accrue, arc taxed 
at lo w e r effective cap ita l gains tax rate. Therefore, basically, 
shareholder wri l l  be be tte r o ff w ith  d iv idends i f  and o n ly  i f  the 
am ount o f tax paid on receipt o f d iv idends is lo w e r than tha t he 
w o u ld  pay on capita l gains. Since retained earnings y ie ld  ( 1 -z ) to the 
investo r and d is tr ib u tio n  y ie ld s  0 , shareholders are ind iffe ren t 
between retention  and d is tr ib u tio n  o n ly  in  the exceptional case when 
( l - z ) = 0 , as the a fte r tax re tu rn  is the same .
T h is  tra d itio n a l v iew , however, assumes that a u n it re tention 
increases the f irm ’s va lue by one u n it. In o ther w ords, w hether the 
income is in the hands o f the shareholders o r invested in the 
com pany, the m arket values both a lte rna tives  accord ing ly , as the 
in fo rm a tio n  is fre e ly  ava ilab le . U nder the U .K . tax system , investors 
that pay lax are expected to have p re fe rred  re tention to d is tr ib u tio n  
in the period 1966-73, because o f the classical corpora tion tax 
operating du ring  that period, and (1 -z )> 0 . But since 1973, the 
basic-tax-payer should have pre ferred  d iv idends to cap ita l gains as
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( l - z ) < 0  under the im p u ta tio n  system ( i f  z is taken as effective, then 
the basic tax payer cou ld  p re fe r d is tr ib u tio n s  to re tentions). 
Investors facing higher m arg ina l tax rate m ay s t i l l  p re fe r capital 
gains to  d iv idends bu t to  a lesser extent than before the changes in the 
corpora tion  tax system. The fo llo w in g  graph shows how the d iv idend  
paym ents by  the in d u s tr ia l and com m ercia l companies in  the U K  has 
moved fro m  1963:1 to  1984:4.
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Figure 4.1. Industrial and Commercial Companies dividend payments 
There are m a in ly  three sharp d isco n tin u itie s  w h ich  may be related to
tax changes: lirs t qu a rte r o f 1966, second q u a rte r o f 1973 and th ird
qu a rte r o f 1979. Before the in tro d u c tio n  o f corpora tion tax in  1965,
d iv id e nd  received by shareholders were a lready taxed at standard
rate o f income tax. Th is  tw o  rate system was retained fo r  the
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financial year 1965/66. Thus companies have taken advantage o f th is  
system by increasing th e ir  paym ent in 1966:1. U nder the classical 
co rpora tion  tax system the paym ent o f d iv idends has been re la tive ly  
stable (1966 :2  to  1973:1). The second m a jo r change in  the level o f 
d iv idends  paid occurred in the firs t q u a rte r o f 1973 as a resu lt o f 
changes in  the corporation tax system . D iv idends started ris ing  
m a in ly  fro m  1973, the year o f the in tro d u c tio n  o f the im pu ta tion  
sys tem 1. There is, f in a lly , another sharp rise in 1979, when, because 
o f the changes in the governm ent, the personal income tax system was 
re fo rm ed, together w ith  the leg is lation on d iv id e nd s2. Therefore, as 
the classical theory o f d iv idends d is tr ib u tio n  w o u ld  predict, an 
increase in  0  cou ld  have led companies, at the aggregate, to  increase 
the level o f th e ir  d iv idends  paym ents.
How ever, th is  increase in  d iv idends cou ld  also be due to  the increase 
in p ro f ita b il ity  o r a rise in  the num ber o f companies inc luded in the 
In d u s tr ia l and C om m ercial Companies classification. For the sample 
o f companies studied here the re la tionsh ip  between gross and net 
d iv id e n d  pay-ou t ra tio  is portrayed  in the fo llo w in g  graph :
1. hank of England (19X 4). M ayer and M eadow crofl (19X 4) and W illiam s (19 81 )  
found that profits have decreased in the mid of 1970’s. As a consequence, the 
im putation system m ay have failed to operate to its fu ll extent.
2 . The relaxation in dividend control could explain this rapid rise in the amount of 
dividends paid by Industrial and Commercial Companies (see Bank of England 
Q uarterly  Bulletin (19X0) for details on the restrictions on payments of 
dividends.
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Figure 4.2. Dividend pay-out ratio 
D iv idends are d iv id ed  by the sum o f d iv idends d is tr ib u te d  and the
retained earnings (ava ilab le  fo r  d iv idends). The d iv ide nd  p a y -ou t-
ra tio  has remained re la t iv e ly  stable d u rin g  the sample period fo r  the
companies considered. Thus, as opposed to the substan tia l rise in
to ta l d iv idends paid by in d u s tr ia l and com m ercial companies at the
aggregate, when d iv idends arc expressed in terms o f p ro fits  one can
see tha t in general companies fo llo w  a certa in  path in the p roportion
o f th e ir  d is tr ib u tio n . A lte rn a t iv e ly , the lo w  d iv idend  pay-ou t ratios
m ay be the resu lts o f the decrease on p ro fita b ility . A no the r w ay o f
look ing  at the trends in d iv idends d u rin g  the sample period is by
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p lo ttin g  the values o f d iv idends  per share, a ra tio  w hich is not 
related to  p ro fits .












Figure 4.3. Dividend per share 
The rap id  rise in 1979 is w e ll p ic tu red  by th is  graph and fo llo w s
exactly  the movements in  the paym ents o f d iv id e nd s  given by a ll the
in d u s tr ia l and Com m ercial Companies (graph 1). Data was not
ava ilab le  before 1972, thus a com parison between the classical system
and the im p u ta tio n  system cannot be made to  a la rger extent from
th is  graph. The m argin  between the tw o  curves represent the effects
o f the im p u ta tio n  system.
The advantage o f th is  tra d itio n a l v iew  o f d iv id e nd  po licy  is that it  
relates d ire c tly  tax variables to  d iv ide nd  d is tr ib u tio n , and i f  one
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includes the u n ce rta in ty  effects (as discussed be low ) then i t  may be 
possible to  exp la in  w h y  do companies d is tr ib u te  d iv idends. However, 
i t  is based on m a in ly  tw o  assum ptions. Investors are assumed to be 
able to sell th e ir  shares costlessly, and a u n it o f retained earnings is 
assumed to increase the va lue  o f the firm  by one u n it.
I f  transaction costs were in troduced , then the above ru le  o f p re fe rring  
d iv idends to  re ten tions applies when 0 > ( l - z - c )  where c represents 
the rate o f transaction  costs per u n it o f share va lue sold. D ividends, 
as a d irect source o f income, e lim ina tes transaction costs w hich  could 
make the net re tu rn  fro m  d is tr ib u tin g  earnings higher than tha t from  
re tention. H ow ever, th is  a rgum ent cannot exp la in  w h y  companies do 
pay d iv idends. As K ing  (1 977) has showed, the u n d e rw rit in g  costs o f 
issuing new shares arc su b s ta n tia lly  h igher than investors ’ costs o f 
se lling  shares in  cases w here a firm  pays d iv idends and issues new 
shares s im u ltaneous ly . M oreover, i f  transaction costs are the main 
de te rm inan ts o f d iv id e n d  d is tr ib u tio n , then one w ou ld  expect to find 
tw o  classes o f companies, one w ith  zero pay-ou t ra tio  owned by 
investors w ho  de rive  th e ir  income fro m  capital gains, and another 
w ho  pays d iv idends, the shares o f w h ich  are held by investors who 
w an t d iv idends. H ow ever, th is  does not explain the em pirica l 
find ings that nearly  a ll companies have s im ila r pay-ou t ratio . 
Furtherm ore , transaction  costs could be reduced s ign ifican tly  i f  
investors sold shares less fre q u e n tly .
The second c r it ic is m  o f the above tra d itio n a l view  o f d iv idend  po licy 
stems from  its  assum ption th a t the m arket values in the same w ay 
d iv idends  and re tentions, because retentions are used to purchase one 
u n it o f new equ ipm ent. Thus T o b in ’s q is equal to 1. T h is  makes 0
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and z d ire c t ly  com parable. However, Auerbach (1979), B radford
(1 9 8 1 ) and K ing (1 9 7 7 ) (A B K  the rea fte r) have relaxed th is 
assum ption and developed a theory, re fe rred  to as the tax 
cap ita lisa tion  model, in  w h ich  positive  d iv idend  paym ents are 
consistent w ith  shareholder asset m arke t e q u ilib r iu m , precisely 
because the m arke t va lue  per u n it o f retained earnings is less than 
one, i.e. the e q u ilib r iu m  va lue  o f T o b in ’s q is d iffe re n t fro m  u n ity . I f  
the firm  re ta ins one u n it  o f p ro fit, the cap ita l gains w i l l  be ( l- z )q ,  
instead o f ju s t ( 1 -z ), w here q is the m argina l increase in  the m arket 
va lue o f the firm  re su ltin g  fro m  a u n it o f new investm ent, then 
shareholders w i l l  be in d ifl'e re n t to  d iv idend  po licy  i f  and o n ly  i f  : 
0 = (1 — 2  )q o r q = 0 / (1 —” ). A t  any o ther value o f q, shareholders 
w o u ld  p re fe r e ithe r no d iv idends  o r no retentions.
T h is  theo ry  assumes th a t d iv idends are residuals. From the funds 
flow  id e n tity , d iv ide nds  are re lated to o ther uses and sources o f funds 
by :
Dt =  ASt +  ABt +  Et -  A /, (4 .1.1)
W here A represents net change, S, B, E, I and D are external equ ity
finance, debt finance, earnings, investm ent and d iv idends d u rin g  the
period, respective ly.
D iv idends are o n ly  paid i f  there is a su rp lus  o f funds, i.e. i f  the righ t 
hand side o f the above equation (4 .1 .1 ) is positive. Therefore changes 
in  d iv id e n d  taxes w o u ld  not have d irec t effects on investm ent decision 
o f the firm , and d iv id end s  are expected to va ry  according to the 
investm ent o p po rtu n ities  o f the firm .
M oreover, th is  v iew  im p lies  tha t d iv idends are the o n ly  mean fo r  a
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com pany to  tran s fe r m oney to  its  shareholders. The m arket value o f 
corporate  assets is equal to  the present va lue  o f the a fte r-ta x  
d iv id e n d s  w h ich  firm s are expected to  pay. In  re a lity , however, 
companies can increase the income o f th e ir  shareholders th rough share 
repurchases3, takeovers and purchasing shares in  o the r companies.
T h is  theo ry  also a lw ays  assumes tha t q < l ,  th is  is thus incom patib le  
when <7 ^  1 as is the case fo r  some investors d u rin g  the im pu ta tion  
system . F urtherm ore , the cap ita lisa tion  v iew  im p lies  tha t, so long as 
q <  1 then firm s  w o u ld  never issue new shares and pay d iv idends 
s im u ltaneo us ly . H ow ever, recen tly  Edw ards (1984a) reported that 
25% o f a sample o f large B rit is h  companies paid d iv idend s  and issued 
new e q u ity  in  the same year, w h ile  17% , not o n ly  paid d iv idends but 
raised th e ir  d iv idends d u rin g  years when they issued new shares.
A B K  theo ry  assumed e x p lic it ly  th a t a ll investors have the same tax 
rates 0 and z in any com pany to  have the same preferences. This 
causes the m arket segmentation o f firm s depending on w hether they 
pay no d iv idends o r have no retained earnings. H ow ever, as Feldstein 
and Green (1983) have argued, even i f  companies set th e ir financial 
polic ies to  cater fo r  the differences in shareholders’ tax rates, 
investors m ay be w il l in g  to d iv e rs ify  th e ir p o r tfo lio  fro m  companies 
th a t g row  faster as a resu lt o f high retained earnings to  the other
3. In some countries, such as the U .S.. companies can repurchase their own shares. 
H ow ever in the UK Section 55  o f the Companies Act 1948 precludes share 
repurchases. The Companies A ct 1981 Sections 53 -60  introduced, however, a 
system whereby a lim ited company can buy back its own shares out of 
distributable profits or proceeds from  new shares issue but there are a number 
of restrictive rules to be compiled w ith  before payments by a company to 
repurchase its own shares can be exempted from  treatm ent as distribution.
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w h ich  d is tr ib u te  d iv idends. T h is  is because there is an uncerta in ty  in 
the rea lisa tion  o f capital gains.
A n o th e r exp lanation of* d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  is tha t o f M ille r  and 
Scholcs (1978 ). They argued tha t the m argina l inves to r in corporate 
equ ities is e ffec tive ly  untaxed on both d iv idends and capital gains 
incom e because o f the num ber o f allowances offered by the tax 
system . U nder the US tax law , an in d iv id u a l’s deduction fo r  
inves tm en t interest, in a d d itio n  to mortgage and business interest, is 
l im ite d  to investm ent income p lus 10,000 D olla rs . The a llow ab le  
in te res t deduction  is raised by  one u n it fo r  each extra  u n it o f 
d iv id e n d  income4. I f  th is  cons tra in t is b ind ing , then the taxable 
incom e rem ains unchanged because an extra  u n it o f d iv idends is ju s t 
offset by the extra  u n it  o f in te rest deduction. A lte rn a t iv e ly , th is  
m arg ina l inves to r could be an in s titu tio n a l investo r fo r  whom  the 
m arg ina l personal income tax rate and the effective corporation tax 
ra te are both zero. There fore  d iv idends are not affected by taxation. 
U nde r th is  tax irre levance v iew , investm en t is independent o f the 
d iv id e n d  pay-ou t ra tio  and th is  leads to  the M ille r  and M od ig lian i 
(1 9 6 1 ) irre levance theory. H owever, when th is  theo ry  is tested 
e m p ir ic a lly , Feenburg (1 9 81 ) found  tha t in 1977 o n ly  2.5% o f 
d iv id e n d  income is a c tu a lly  received by shareholders fo r  whom  th is  
cons tra in t is b ind ing5.
4. The US tax code allow s the a ccu m u la to r  investors to set up some strategies to 
avoid the income tax on dividends by borrwing to generate interests which 
offset dividend income and by offsetting the high risk associated w ith  this 
levered position by tax deferred lending such as purchasing life  insurance.
5. Litzemberger and Ramaswany (1 9 8 2 ) have shown that, in order fo r a non- 
accum ulator not to hold shares at a ll. the a fter-tax  expected rate of return on 
shares must be less than the a fter-tax  rate of interest.
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Polerba and Sum m ers (1983, 1985) compared these d iffe ren t
hypotheses about d iv id e n d  paym ent. Using tim e series aggregate 
d iv id e nd s  paid by the in d u s tr ia l and com m ercia l companies as a 
p ro p o rtio n  o f the m a x im um  d iv idend  the firm  could pay du ring  the 
period 1955 to  1983, they find tha t companies take account o f th e ir 
d iv id e n d  taxes in de te rm in ing  the exten t to  w h ich  th e ir a fte r tax 
p ro fit is d is tr ib u te d . Tax po licy  changes induce short and long-run 
ad ju s tm e n ts  in the d iv id e n d  pay-ou t ra tio . M oreover, app ly ing  the 
inves tm en t rate to an a lte rn a tive  d e fin itio n  o f the Tob in  tax adjusted 
Q, they find  tha t the specification o f Q w ith o u t the capita lisation 
effect exp la ins  better the investm ent behaviour.
So fa r  a com pany is a lw ays  assumed to  be able to  recover the 
advanced corpora tion  tax i t  pays when i t  d is tr ib u te s  d iv idends, i.e, 
th a t the im p u ta tio n  system is f u l ly  operational. As analysed in 
chapter tw o , m any companies are tax exhausted before a llo w in g  fo r  
the im p u ta tio n  rate. T h is  makes m any companies unable to c la im  the 
advanced corpora tion  tax rate d u rin g  the paym ent period. M oreover, 
given tha t d u rin g  the sample period A C T  can be carried back to tw o  
years o r fo rw a rd  and tha t the am ount o f A C T  m ust not be higher 
tha t 30 per cent o f the taxable p ro fit in  any given year, these 
companies m ay not be able to  recover the A C T  a t a ll. In th is  case the 
lirm  w i l l  be as i f  i t  is operating under the classical corporation tax 
system w here it may not be encouraged to  d is tr ib u te  d iv idends. Fung 
and Theobald (1 9 84 ) argued tha t th is  lim ita tio n  on recovery is 
expected to induce a negative effect on d iv idends. Edw ards and al. 
(1 9 85 ) found  that when a correction fo r  the unrecovered A C T  is 
made in  th e ir  d iv id e nd  model, the influence o f taxation on d iv idend
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se tting  is increased. S tudies tha t have used aggregate data cannot 
account fo r  th is  p o ss ib ility .
1.2 U n certa in ty  effects in d ividend policy :
Taxa tion  on its  ow n w o u ld  not exp la in  d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n . I f  tha t 
was the case then one w o u ld  expect takeovers to be based so le ly  on 
the changes in the financia l p o lic y 6. I f  shareholders consider o n ly  tax 
va riab les  in  chosing th e ir  inves tm en t, then a takeover ra ide r is l ik e ly  
to  purchase the d iv id e nd  pay ing  com pany, change its  financia l po licy  
and sell i t  at a large p rem ium . H ow ever, in  practice th is  is not the 
case, and there are a num ber o f o the r consideration w h ich  should be 
inc luded  in  any d iv id e n d  p o lic y  model in order to  undertake an 
e m p irica l analysis o f d iv id e n d  d is tr ib u tio n . The present section 
rev iew s b r ie fly  the m ain theories th a t have been advocated p rev ious ly  
to  exp la in  w h y  companies do pay d iv idends a lbe it the tax 
disadvantages o f such po licy .
One o f the most popu lar a rgum ent given fo r  d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  is 
based on the fact tha t shareholders and managers have d iffe re n tia l 
in fo rm a tio n , a ris ing  fro m  the separation o f ow nersh ip  and con tro l. 
D iv idends act as a signal o f the in fo rm a tio n  possessed by managers on 
the com pany fu tu re  investm ent and fu tu re  p ro fit oppo rtun ities  w h ich  
is unkno w n  to  the shareholders (see fo r  example Ross (1977 ) , 
Bhattacharya (1979 ) and E dw ards (1 981)).
6 . There are other motives for merger activity encouraged by taxation, such as 
combined interest deductions. Smirlock, Beatty, and Majd (1985) offer a survey 
of such tax motivated merger activities.
-  1 0 8  -
Given tha t the in fo rm a tio n  tra n s fe r is ve ry  im p o rta n t under this 
theo ry , then i t  is possible to  find  companies issuing new eq u ity  in the 
same tim e  as paying d iv idends. U nder im pe rfec t capita l m arkets, one 
o f the o n ly  w ays a shareholder can know  w hether the company is 
prosperous o r not is by look ing  at how much the com pany d is tribu tes 
as d iv idends. Thus one w o u ld  expect a pos itive  re la tionsh ip  between 
the d iv id e nd  d is tr ib u tio n  and the level o f investm ent undertaken by 
a com pany, because the m ore the com pany is prosperous, i.e. the more 
i t  is l ik e ly  to  generate h igher p ro fits  in  the fu tu re , the higher the 
d iv id e n d  paym ents. H ow ever, in  theo ry , companies w h ich  have 
m any o p po rtun ities  in  te rm s o f present investm ents are lik e ly  to have 
greater demand fo r  in te rn a l fu n d s  and not d is tr ib u te  them as 
d iv idends  (E dw ards 1981). M oreover, i f  the purpose o f d iv idends is 
ju s t com m un ica ting  in fo rm a tio n , i t  is hard to  imagine w h y  companies 
do no t use o ther means, such as d isclosing more de ta ils  on the ir 
investm en t plans to  make shareholders more confident about the 
prospects o f the com pany.
A c lose ly related exp lanation o f d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  to th is  
s igna lling  argum ent is the ’'B ird  in H and” theory developed by Wood 
(1 975 ). He argued th a t investors p re fe r the ce rta in ty  o f d iv idends to 
the unce rta in ty  o f cap ita l gains. He stated tha t :
" Dividends, by putting cash into the shareholders' hands, enter a benefit on 
him which is certain and tangible in a sense in which retained earnings, 
hoM’ever lucratively invested, do not"
He argues tha t, because shares are traded in a w ide  v o la tile  and 
uncerta in  m arket, investors cannot p red ic t th e ir income fro m  capital
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gains, and not because the com pany’s investm en t and fu tu re  p ro fits  
are uncerta in . I t  is observable th a t share prices e xh ib it some large 
fluc tua tions , bu t i t  m ay be th a t these fluc tua tions are somewhat 
around the mean and the actual re la tionsh ip  between d iv idend  and 
share prices cannot be said to be com ple te ly  irre le va n t.
A n  a lte rn a tiv e  exp lanation o f d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  relies on the v iew  
th a t management uses re ta ined earnings not e ffic ien tly . In th is  case, 
d iv id e nd s  act as a mean to  reduce the scope fo r  management to  
undertake  unpro fitab le  inves tm en t projects. A  num ber o f em pirica l 
stud ies support the view' th a t retained earnings are used ine ffic ien tly . 
R ayner and L it t le  (1 9 66 ) fo u n d  evidence, using a sample o f B ritish  
companies, tha t the rate o f re tu rn  on projects financed fro m  
re ten tions is ty p ic a lly  w e ll be low  tha t o f e x te rn a lly  financed projects. 
S im ila r  resu lts  were reported b y  Baum ol, Heim , M a lk ic l and Q uandt 
(1 9 70 ) fo r  the US. The fo rm e r s tu d y  tr ie d  to  analyse w ha t influences 
size o f the firm  and the am oun t o f retained earnings had on g row th  o f 
earnings per share. The coefficient o f the p roportion  o f the retained 
earnings is found to  be ins ign ifican t and w ith  the w rong sign when i t  
is regressed against the increase in  p re-tax earnings fro m  1958 to  
1959.
These studies re late d ire c t ly  investm ent decision to d iv idend  
d is tr ib u tio n . They show' tha t re ten tions are used to finance less 
p ro fitab le  investm ent pro jects and th a t debt is m aintained at a level 
w here its  m arginal cost is equal to tha t o f retentions. Baumol el al. 
(1970 ) found tha t the rate o f re tu rn  on retentions debt and equ ity  
capita l are in the range o f 3 .0 -4 .6 %, 4.2-14%  and 14.5-20.8% 
respective ly.
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H ow ever there are some considerations to take in to  account when 
in te rp re ting  these resu lts. The resu lts  o f the fo rm er study (R ayner 
and L it t le  1966) may be due to  the short sample period used (i.e. one 
year). The average re tu rn  is also assumed to  be the same fo r  a ll the 
companies stud ied. F u rthe rm o re , the figure given by Baumol et al. 
(1970 ) m ay concern o n ly  these companies studies, the tim e period 
when th is  s tu d y  has been done and the co u n try  or the area in  w hich 
i t  has taken place. The econom etric specification o f these studies also 
need a ca re fu l exam ination  as i t  includes some a rb itra ry  assumptions. 
Baumol et al. (1970 ) d id  not test fo r  the s ta tis tica l significance o f 
the differences in  pro jects re tu rn s  and there were no corrections fo r  
the riskiness o f the pro jects stud ied. T h e ir em pirica l find ings could 
be due to  the fac t th a t they considered o n ly  the firs t few  years o f a 
p ro jec t’s life t im e . T hey also d id  not correct fo r  the 
hcteroscedastic ity. Thus, a lthough  the OLS coefficients estimates are 
unbiased, the estimates o f the variance o f the coefficients is l ik e ly  to 
be biased, w h ich  could make them  unsign ifican t. Brealey, Hodges and 
Capron (1976 ) found  strong evidence o f the presence o f 
heteroscedasticity. When i t  is taken in to  account the estimated rate 
o f re tu rn  on re ten tion  is lo w e r than tha t o f the tw o  other a lte rna tives 
sources o f finance, b u t the d ifference between the estimated rates o f 
re tu rn  is not genera lly  s ta tis tic a lly  s ign ificant.
Th is b r ie f rev iew  o f the theories o f d iv id e n d  po licy  does not however 
provide a s tra igh t answer to w h y  companies pay d iv idends. In the 
next section the ex is ting  m odels o f d iv id e nd  behaviour are reviewed 
to sec how the tax va riab le  affects d iv id e nd  d is tr ib u tio n .
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2. M odels o f  D ividend P olicy  :
A lm o s t a ll econometric models that tried  to analyse the effects o f 
taxa tion  on d iv idend  behaviour have used aggregate data. They are 
a ll based on the standard pa rtia l ad justm ent model proposed by 
L in tn c r  (1 9 56 ) w hich  is derived  fro m  an em p irica l generalisation o f 
the resu lts  o f in te rv ie w s  o f 28 US companies. He argued tha t 
companies determ ine desired d iv idends in any period by re la ting  a 
target p a y -o u t ra tio  r  ( fu n c tio n  o f some specific characteristics o f the 
f irm )  to  cu rre n t reported earnings, i.e.
D* =  rEt +  et (4 .2 .1)
The actua l d iv idends in  one year, Dt , are then adjusted by some
constant fra c tio n  k  o f the difference between th is  period ’s desired
d iv idends  and the previous period actual d iv idend  payments, D ,_ lt
by:
Dt - £ > ,_ !  =  \ [ D , * - £ > ,_ , ]  + vr 0 < \ < 1 .  (4 .2 .2)
C om bin ing  equations (4 .2 .1 ) and (4 .2 .2 ) and adding the constant term
to  reflect the re luctance o f the firm  to  pay negative d iv idends y ie lds  :
Dt = <Xq +  OL^ Et +  a 2D f _j  +  (jt (4 .2 .3 )
W here : a j  =  kr  ; a 2 =  (1 — k); fit = et -1- vt
Feldstein (1970, 1972) was the firs t to estimate such an econometric 
model o f d iv id e nd  behaviour by inc lu d in g  a tax variab le  as a 
regressor. He used q u a rte r ly  data o f aggregate companies fro m  1953 
to 1964. He concluded th a t the long run  e la s tic ity  o f d iv idend  pay­
ou t w ith  respect to  the tax price o f d iv idends was about 0.9. K ing  
(1972b, 1977), on the o ther hand, found  a sm a lle r tax e la s tic ity  (0 .4 ) 
when annual data fo r  the period 1950-72 is used w ith  e xp lic it 
managerial preferences. Nevertheless, they both found  tha t
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d iffe re n tia l taxation affects d iv idend  po licy o f the firm s at the 
aggregate.
In order to  test fo r  the tax effects, Feldstein and K ing defined a 
variab le  0  to  measure the o p p o rtu n ity  cost o f retained earnings in 
term s o f net o r gross d iv id e n d s 7 foregone. Equation (4 .2 .1 ) becomes :
D* = AE taet^ Ut (4 .2 .4)
Because o f the delayed response to raise d iv idends w ith  a rise in
pro fits , the actual d iv idends are assumed to ad just according to :
D, D* A
' (4 .2.5)
A - i  D i - \
Then the estim ated equation is derived by com bin ing equations 
(4 .2 .4 ) and (4 .2 .5 ) and by using logarithm s as fo llo w s  :
In D t = klnA  +  koclnEt +  (1 — k)LnDt +  kfilnOt +  /a, (4 .2 .6)
Fane (1975 ) estim ated a lin ea r d iv idend  equation and a llow ed fo r
specific tim in g  effects o f tax changes. He argued tha t, ignoring the
tim in g  effects, leads to  serious over-estim ation  o f the long -run  im pact
on d iv idends o f changes in  the re la tive  rates o f tax on d is tr ib u te d  and
u nd is tr ibu ted  p ro fits , the reason w h y , he argues, that the estimates o f
Feldstein and K ing  o f tax price e lastic ities are biased aw ay fro m  zero.
H owever, no e la s tic ity  ca lcu la tions were reported. M oreover, i t  is
d if f ic u lt to compare his resu lts to  those o f Feldstein and K ing  because
his equation d id  not in vo lve  logarithm s.
There are a num ber o f reservations when in te rp re ting  the results
7. The difference between the two is explained below. Basically, if 0 is defined in 
terms of gross dividends then the marginal personal income lax of shareholders 
is not taken into account.
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obtained by c ith e r using equations o f the fo rm  (4 .2 .3 ) o r (4 .2 .6 ). The 
m ain problem  is that the estimated equations show some residual 
au toco rre la tion  in the e rro r term  , and since they perfo rm ed tim e- 
scrics regressions, th is  problem  could bias the results. Feldstein and 
Fane a ttem pted  to use autoregressive least squares by adding / i  
and jll i _ 4  to th e ir  specification (equations (4 .2 .6 ) and (4.2.3) 
respective ly ). K ing  (1977), on the o ther hand, imposed an 
A R M A (1 ,1 ) e rro r s tru c tu re  on the residuals and estim ated his model 
by  m a x im u m  like lih o o d .
Furthe rm ore , because o f the fac t that the pa rtia l ad jus tm en t model is 
not f irm ly  grounded in the op tim is ing  decisions o f ra tiona l agents, the 
resu lts  o f estim ating  i t  are open to  d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tions  (Edwards 
1981). H ow ever, the basis o f  such model can s t i l l  be regarded as 
co n s titu tin g  a theo ry  because L in tn e r derived  i t  fro m  h is fie ld w ork , 
in v o lv in g  deta iled  s tudy  on how the companies have made the ir 
d iv id e nd  decision, and not ju s t because i t  fitted  the data.
The most im p o rta n t problem  w ith  the above studies is perhaps the 
fac t tha t they were a ll done p r io r  to the m ajor change in corporate 
taxa tion , being the in tro d u c tio n  o f the im pu ta tion  system in 1973. 
Thus the effects o f the im pu ta tion  rate are not analysed. Poterba
(1 9 82 ) recstim atcd K in g ’s model by inc lud ing  the post 1973 period. 
He found  that the tax variab le, 0, had a sizable coefficient and 
s ign ificant fo r  the ea rly  sample (1951-72 ) and (1951-69 ), b u t in  the 
fu l l  sample when the im p u ta tio n  system was in eff ect, (1 9 51 -8 0 ) and 
the 1960-80 period the coefficient o f th is  tax variab le  is ins ign ificant. 
The parameters o f Feldstein and K ing d iv idend  model were not 
s ta tiona ry  d u rin g  the pos t-w ar period. In add ition  he found  that the
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e rro r s tru c tu re  dynam ics have changed in im p o rta n t ways. However, 
Poterba and Sum m ers (1 9 8 5 ) have estim ated a s im ila r  equation but 
by redefining 08 and p ro f it9. Using OLS w ith  a m ax im um  like lihood  
correction fo r  second o rde r serial co rre la tion , they found  th a t the 
long -run  d iv idend  paym ents e lastic ities w ith  respect to  the to ta l tax 
preference ra tio  is between 2 . 6  and 1 . 8  depending on specification and 
tim e period chosen. But when changes in  0, and 0r + 1  are included 
th is  e la s tic ity  decreases s lig h tly .
K ing  (1977) has defined 0 in  te rm s o f gross ra th e r than net d iv idends 
foregone. In doing so, he d id  not inc lude the m argina l personal 
income tax rate o f shareholders. The re la tionsh ip  between 0 and 0 
w h ich  he used is s im p ly  0 = ( 1  —m ) 0  where m is the m argina l personal 
income tax rate faced by  shareholders. C le a rly , th is  specification is 
o n ly  su itable  i f  one uses tim e-series data, unless i f  e ffective  advance 
corporation tax fo r  instance is used, as opposed to  the s ta tu to ry  tax 
tha t cross-sectional regressions m ay be perform ed. A t  com pany level, 
Edwards (1981) defined in the same w ay as K ing  h is tax variab le  
when he estimated the lin e a r d iv id e nd  equation fo r  a sample o f 119 
U K  companies over the period 1955-72. H is resu lts, however, do not 
support the v iew  th a t changes in the degree o f tax d isc rim ina tion  
have sign ificant effects on d iv id e n d  paym ents.
The above studies have m a in ly  analysed the effects o f taxa tion  on 
d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  by  ta k in g  aggregate, ra the r than in d iv id u a l
8 . 6 is defined in terms of capital gains. It is equal to -----•')’( ] --------) '
9. Profit is defined as the m axim um  feasible gross dividends of the firm
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com pany, data in th e ir tests10, and th is  could raise the problem  o f the 
aggregation bias. M oreover, com puting the tax d iscrim ina tion  
va riab le , 0 , ju s t on the basis o f the average tax rate o f a ll the 
shareholders in  the economy does not provide  any in fo rm a tio n  on 
how  firm s  a c tu a lly  do make th e ir d iv idend  decisions. G iven the 
num erous characteris tics th a t d is tingu ish  one firm  fro m  another, i t  is 
im p o rta n t to  analyse the effects o f taxation on in d iv id u a l company 
ra th e r than a l the aggregate. Th is  provides a w a rra n t fo r  fu r th e r  
em p irica l investiga tion  o f the effects o f taxation at in d iv id u a l f irm ’s 
leve l. T h is  is the main concern o f the fo llo w in g  section.
3. Form ulation o f the M odel o f  D ividend Policy :
The aim  o f th is  test is to  analyse the variables tha t could expla in  the 
d is tr ib u tio n  o f d iv idends. The concern o f th is  research is m a in ly  
w ith  the tax effects, b u t o ther factors do influence the f irm ’s d iv idend  
po licy  and the fa ilu re  to  take them in to  account when estim ating  a 
d iv id e n d  equation could resu lt in an inadequate representation.
3.1 Model form ulation :
The above rev iew  o f the lite ra tu re  revealed tha t there is no a priori 
theory  behind the models o f d iv idend  po licy . The present s tu d y  does 
not in tend  to  find  one, b u t ra ther extend the existing models to find 
the influence o f taxa tion  on d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  on a num ber o f 
companies. The L in tn e r (1956) specification is fo llo w e d . I t  is
10. fam a  and Babiak (196S ) used individual firm data. However, their estimated 
equation is slightly different from  the Lintner model as it includes a lagged 
profit and it did not include any tax effects.
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assumed tha t the level o f d iv id end  o f a p a rticu la r company at a 
p a rtic u la r  tim e  is a fu n c tio n  o f the pro fits  and lagged d iv idends in a 
stock ad jus tm en t equation.
In  o rder to  test fo r  w he the r changes in the re la tive  lax  trea tm ent o f 
d iv id e n d s  and re ten tions affect the long-run  pay-ou t ra tio , previous 
studies have s tipu la ted  th a t d iv idends are related to  norm al earnings 
by a ra tio  w h ich  depends on the o p p o rtu n ity  cost o f retained pro fits  
in te rm s o f net d iv id e n d  foregone. Thus :
Dt = f  (0, TAX, EPS, ).
W here 0 defined as the ra tio  o f ( 1 — m )/(1  — s ), is expected to  have a 
pos itive  effect on d iv idends  d is tr ib u tio n s  because a rise in 0  
corresponds to  a reduction  in  the tax d iscrim ina tion  against the 
paym ent o f d iv idends. T A X t w h ich  defines companies tha t are tax 
exhausted, on the o the r hand, w o u ld  have a negative im pact on the 
d is tr ib u tio n  o f d iv idends, because i f  the firm  is tax exhausted then it  
m ay not be able to recover its  AC T. Fo llow ing  Feldstein (1970, 
1972) and K ing  (1977 ), th is  model is supposed to be estim ated in log 
lin e a r fo rm . H ow ever, given tha t a substantia l num ber o f firm s had 
zero d iv idends o r a negative earnings per share fo r  at least one year in 
the sample period, the log linea r fo rm  o f th is  model reduces 
s u b s ta n tia lly  the num ber o f observations, and thus i t  is rejected. The 
lin e a r fo rm  is, there fore , used to estimate the d iv idend  model by 
adding the tax d isc rim in a tio n  variab le  as an add itiona l regressor. 
Fane (19 75 ) used s im ila r  specification in his s tudy o f the q u a rte rly  
aggregate d iv id e nd  paym ents in  the U K . We assume that the desired 
d iv idends  were de term ined by :
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D* =  &EPSt +  yOt +  STAX', (4.3.1)
T h is  e q u ilib r iu m  means tha t, when it  is achieved, the firm  w ou ld  not
be w il l in g  to change its  d iv idends paym ents unless some o f the
exogenous variab les have changed. The actual d iv idend  paym ent at
tim e  t ad jus t according to  :
D, — £>,_, =  <* +  \[D,* -  D ,_ , ]  +  v, (4 .3.2)
W here a  is in troduced to constra in firm s fro m  reducing the ir
d iv idends. By com bin ing equations (4 .3 .1 ) and (4 .3 .2 ) we can obtain
Dt — a. +  kfiEPSt +  T  k8TA X t +  (1 —A.)Z)r _ j +  vt (4 .3 .2)
T h is  equation is used in  th is  s tu dy  to  investigate the effects o f
d iffe re n tia l personal taxa tion  and corporate taxation on d iv idends at
the in d iv id u a l com pany leve l. Defining :
=  Aj3 ; j32  =  (1 — k)  ; /33  =  k y  and /34  =  k8
the estim ated equation becomes :
NDSt j  = ;30  +  &iEPSt mi +  j32N D St _ l f /  +  j33 0t +  ^ T A X ,  mi (4 .3 .3) 
W here A?DSti is the net d iv id e nd  per share o f company i at tim e  t;
EPSt ni represent the earnings per share o f firm  i at tim e  t;
TA X t i = d u m m y va riab le  to measure the p o ss ib ility  tha t a 
com pany may no t recover its  A C T.
The coefficients j3lt  /32 and j33  are a ll expected to  be positive, w h ile  the 
coefficient /34  is expected to  come w ith  a negative sign.
3,2 D efin ition and estim ation o f  the variables:
The de fin ition  o f the tax d isc rim ina tio n  variab le  used in th is  s tud y  is 
the same as tha t used by Fane. I t  is the o p p o rtu n ity  cost o f retentions 
in term s o f net d iv idend  foregone. 0 is thus a fu nc tion  o f the
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average m argina l personal income tax o f shareholder, computed as 
fo llo w s .
As i t  is ex trem e ly  d if f ic u lt to find exactly  not o n ly  the composition o f 
the d iffe re n t shareholders o f each com pany, b u t also th e ir respective 
holdings, the com putation  o f the tax d isc rim ina tio n  variab le 
necessitates a num ber o f assum ptions about the personal income 
taxation  o f the d iffe re n t shareholders. There are three m ain problems 
invo lved  in  th is  com putation . The categorisation o f shareholders fo r  
each com pany, the com putation o f the average m argina l personal
f J < i , ,  i i i i i i < i i i i r  < < * t 1 i 1 1 1 1 1
income ^ax fo r  each category, and also the ho ld ing  o f each category.
As fa r  as the firs t problem  is concerned, we fo llo w  K ing  (1977) in 
d iv id in g  the to ta l shareholders in to  three categories according to the ir 
position tow ards income tax :
a) Persons: Th is  category includes in d iv id u a ls  as w e ll as u n it and 
investm ent tru s ts  because investm ents th rough these interm ediaries 
do not a ire d  the u ltim a te  tax burden born by investors.
b) Insurance companies: They are taxed using a special rate.
c) Pension funds  and charities: They are exempt fro m  ta x 11 thus 
th e ir income tax is zero.
The m ain problem  lies in the com putation o f the average personal 
income tax rate fo r  the firs t category. The average fo r  a ll persons is 
com puted fro m  the Inland Revenue Statistics . O rhn ia l and Foldes 
(1975 ) assumed tha t income is d is tr ib u te d  according to  the a Pareto
11. King and I'u llerton  (1 9 8 4 ), showed that this category's personal income tax rate 
is in effect negative rather than zero. It is assumed here, however, that it is zero.
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d is tr ib u tio n . The data provided by the Inland Revenue Statistics 
cannot be used d ire c t ly  as the d is tr ib u tio n s  given are e ither by 
assessed income o n ly  o r by tota l income. In o rde r to obtain the 
re la tio nsh ip  between the tw o  d is tr ib u tio n s , O rhn ia l and Foldes (1975) 
assumed th a t income is d is tr ib u te d  according to a Pareto d is tr ib u tio n  
where a s tra ig h t lin e  can be obtained i f  the lo g a rith m  o f income is 
p lo tted  against the log a rith m  o f to ta l num ber o f people w ith  income 
in excess o f each level o f income. In th is  w ay, the leve l o f net income 
tha t corresponds to any given level o f assessed incom e can be read
i i i i i j i i i i i i i i i i i i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1and also the tax thresholds fo r  each band can be expressed in term s o f
to ta l net income. The m arg ina l tax rates on d iv idends and interest 
can there fore  be ca lcu la ted as the weighted average o f the m arginal 
tax rates w ith  w eights given by the p roportion  o f d iv id e nd  income 
respective ly accru ing to  recip ients in  each tax bracket.
Thus a fte r  th is  categorisation o f shareholders and the com putation  o f 
the average tax rate fo r  each category, we need now  the p roportion  o f 
hold ings o f each category in each company. The m a jo r problem  is the 
lack o f in fo rm a tio n  on the such holdings. The Stock Exchange (1982) 
provides a general descrip tion  o f the holdings o f each category fo r  a ll 
the firm s  in  the stock m arke t from  1963 to 1981. T h is  in fo rm a tio n , 
together w ith  some pub lica tions  o f the holdings in some companies’ 
accounts p rov ide  a use fu l w ay o f com puting the average persona] 
income tax rate fo r  a ll the companies studied. H ow ever, i f  th is  
average is used fo r  each company, then the tax d isc rim ina tio n  
variab le  w ou ld  not have any explanation, as it w i l l  be neglected by 
the regression in cross-sectional. It is thus necessary to  find 
som eth ing tha t d is tingu ishes one company from  another.
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One o f the im p o rta n t d ifference considered here, is the interest o f the 
d irectors. G iven tha t it  is them w ho make the financial decision o f 
the firm  we w ou ld  expect them to consider th e ir tax position as the 
m ain de te rm inan t fo r  the d is tr ib u tio n  or re tention . Data on these 
ho ld ings is taken fro m  the Ex tel cards and fro m  Datastream. 
H owever, since th is  data is o n ly  ava ilab le  fo r 1980-1983, the average 
hold ings fo r  these 4 years is assumed fo r  a ll the sample period. This 
assum ption m ay not be res tric tive , given the fact th a t shareholders 
m ay sometimes look at the change in the holdings o f the d irectors to
, , , , | | | | | I I I I I I I I I t I I 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 '
make the decision on w he the r to hold o r to sell th e ir  shares. So i t  is
assumed th a t the d irec to rs  do not change th e ir hold ings ve ry  often.
From  a num ber o f companies’ accounts and fro m  the Exte l cards, it  
was found  tha t in  general' the sa lary o f the d irec to rs  is on average 
tw ice  as much as the highest tax bracket. The average m arginal 
income tax rate o f d irec to rs  is computed using the s ta tu to ry  rate fo r  
each year to th e ir average earnings. For each com pany, the average 
income tax rate o f the shareholders is calculated as :
;?7, tf. =  DIRi *HRt +  (1 - D I R i  )ARt
W here DIR,- is the % o f d irec to rs  interests in each com pany i;
H R t is the higher rate o f income tax fo r  each period t;
A R t is the average rate o f personal income tax rate.
The tax d isc rim ina tion  variab le , 0, is therefore computed as :
W here c is the standard im pu ta tio n  rate, equals to  zero fo r  1972.
The tax variab le  is com puted as a du m m y variab le equals to u n ity  i f  
the com pany’s taxable p ro fit is zero or negative before a llo w in g  fo r
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A C T, and equal to zero o therw ise.
G iven that ou r sample covers the period o f the im pu ta tion  system, 
there is no need to detine the dependent variab le  in term s o f gross 
d iv idends. M oreover, since the tax d isc rim ina tion  va riab le  relates to 
the actual d iv idend  received by the shareholder, the use o f gross 
d iv idends  as a dependent va riab le  may lead to  a m is-specification o f 
the m odel. The use o f d iv id e nd  per share as against d iv idend  pay-ou t 
ra tio  avoids the problem  o f double counting o f the im pu ta tion  rate, 
because a fte r  tax p ro fits  depend on the f irm ’s pay-ou t po licy  when the 
im p u ta tio n  system is in  effect. The num ber o f shares fo r  each 
com pany is obtained fro m  Datastrcam and Extel Cards.
4. M ethodology :
The above equation (4 .3 .3 ) is estimated using tw o  econometric 
specifications : seem ingly unrelated regressions (SUR) and the
o rd in a r ily  least squares (O LS). It is l ik e ly  tha t since the data is both 
cross-sectional and tim e series, the coefficients tha t w i l l  be obtained 
m ay be biased. Indeed dealing w ith  pooled data creates problem s o f 
hctcrosccdastic ity and contemporaneous covariance. The fo rm e r 
problem  arises because o f the large differences in the firm s ’ sizes. 
Thus, a company that has lo w e r d iv idends does not mean necessarily 
tha t it  has higher retained p ro fits . Th is bias w i l l  m a in ly  be seen in 
the residuals wrhich w i l l  not have a common variance. T h is  makes 
some coefficients appear to be s ign ificant w h ile  in re a lity  they m ay not 
be. In order to  correct fo r  th is  problem , a ll the variables are taken as 
ra tios (M addala  (1977) p.93) by  d iv id in g  them by the to ta l num ber 
o f shares. Profits are not taken as a common denom inator because o f
-  1 2 2  -
the J'aci tha t one o f the exp lana to ry  variab le is a lready p ro fit. Logs 
cou ld  also be used to correct fo r  the heteroscedasticity, but, as 
M adda la  (1 9 77 ) pointed ou t, th is  w i l l  resu lt in g iv in g  undue weight 
to  the large observations.
The problem  o f contemporaneous covariance is l ik e ly  to  arise because 
o f the p o ss ib ility  o f the existence o f a co rre la tion  between d iffe ren t 
d isturbances in  d iffe re n t equations, w hich at a given po in t in tim e  are 
l ik e ly  to  reflect some common unmeasurable o r om itted  factors. 
Since L in tn e r ’s model is based ju s t on in te rv iew , one cannot ru le  out 
the p o ss ib ility  tha t some o ther facto rs  w hich could influence d iv idend 
behaviour were not m entioned in the in te rv iew s bu t w h ich  could be 
im p o rta n t in o ther countries o r in  o ther periods (K in g  (1977) p. 1 71). 
F u rthe rm ore , d u rin g  the sample period d iv idend  con tro l has been in 
effect in  some years and th is  cou ld  have had same effect on a ll the 
firm s  in  the sample. A  d u m m y  variab le  fo r  such re s tric tion  could 
have been defined bu t w o u ld  not be taken in to  account in cross- 
sectional regressions. I t  is there fore  necessary to  t r y  another 
specification o ther than OLS. SUR helps in dealing w ith  problems 
because i t  sp lits  the data in to  a set o f regression equations. I t  consists 
o f tim e  series observations on a num ber o f cross-sectional firm s and i t  
a llo w s  each cross-sectional com pany to  be described by one equation 
fro m  the system. Nevertheless, the results obtained fro m  both 
methods, OLS and SUR, are presented to a llo w  fo r  comparisons to be 
made. G iven the short tim e  period in the sample (12  years), the 
concentration is more on the v a r ia b ility  across companies ra the r than 
across tim e. SUR is p re ferred to a lte rna tive  specification because 
using the random coefficient estim ato r w ou ld  worsen the problem
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associated with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
5. Results o f  Estim ating D ividend Equation :
The fo llo w in g  table (4 .1 ) reports the resu lts obtained when equation
(4 .3 .3 ) w'as estimated fo r  the pooled cross-sectional and tim e series 
data, using both econometric specifications, SUR and OLS.
TABLE 4.1. RESULTS S U M M A R Y  OF E S T IM A T IN G  D IV ID E N D  EQ U A TIO N :
POOLED
NDSt j  =  a + )3 xEPSt ,  + /3 2A!DSt . hi +  03^  , T  04TAXt i
C O EFFIC IENTS
a 01 02 03 04 R 2 CT T .M .
OLS
(1) 0.03 0.088 0.316 0.033
(27.62) (22.77)
(2) 0.003 - 0.95 - - 0.827 0.016
(4.11) (73.16)
(3) -0.04 - - 0.093 - 0.042 0.040
(-3.32) (7.09)
(4) 0.043 - - - -0.01 0.013 0.036
(37.29) (-4.16)
(5 ) -0.05 0.088 - 0.09 - 0.359 0.032
(-5.32) (23.54) (8.71)
(6 ) -0.011 - 0.940 0.017 - 0.828 0.016
(-2.42) (71.58) (3.09)
(7) -0.018 0.033 0.84 0.026 - 0.863 0.015
(-4.34) (16.95) (64.22) (5.05)
(8) -0.018 0.048 0.816 0.025 -0.002 0.875 0.013
(-4.97) (19.53) (64.71) (5.63) (-2.10)
SUR -0.015 0.036 0.840 0.021 _ 1113.6
(-5.31) (21.21) (76.54) (5.84)
-0.015 0.036 0.840 0.022 -0.002 1113.8
(-5.29) (21.29) (76.81) (5.98) (-2 .4 5 )
Notes : t-statistics in brackets: t c — 1 .9 6 0  at 5 c/< level:
T .M . = trace m atrix obtained from the SUR: R ~ = adjusted coefficient of determination:
(J = standard error of the estimates: Num ber of observations = 1122.
The signs o f the estimated coefficients sa tis fy  a ll p r io r expectations.
A ll coefficients in table 4.1 are assumed to remain the same through
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lim e , thus o n ly  t:ompany effects are captured. The evidence shows 
c le a rly  th a t w hatever m ethod o f estim ation em ployed, the tax 
d isc rim in a tio n  va riab le  0 , is a lw ays  sign ificant and w ith  the expected 
sign. T h is  means tha t a reduction  in  the average m arginal personal 
incom e tax rate by 1 0 % w ou ld  resu lt in an increase in d iv idends by
0.2%. In  the long -run  an increase in the im p u ta tio n  rate, fo r  instance, 
by  10% w o u ld  resu lt in an increase in d iv idends by 1.37 per cent. 
M oreover, the resu lts  im p ly  tha t i f  the com pany is tax exhausted, 
then i t  pays low e r d iv idends, because o f the p o ss ib ility  tha t the 
advanced corpora tion tax m ay not be recovered. Therefore the 
hypothesis tha t taxa tion  does not influence the f irm ’s d iv idend  po licy 
can be rejected.
The o the r exp lana to ry  variab les are also sign ificant and w ith  the 
expected sign. There is a strong s im ila r ity  between the tw o  
specifications in the size o f the coefficients and the level o f the ir 
significance. From the coefficient o f the earnings per share we can say 
tha t a rise by one u n it in the p ro fit o f the firm  w ou ld  have as an 
im m edia te  consequence an increase o f 0.036 to 0.049 un its  in the level 
o f d iv idends paid by the firm . In the long -run  the same increase in 
p ro fit w o u ld  resu lt in a rise o f between 0.266 and 0.225 un its  in the 
level o f d iv idends depending on w hich  econometric m ethod used. 
T h is  is qu ite  consistent w ith  the average d iv idend  pay-ou t ra tio  fo r  
the w hole  sample o f around 0.29.
These resu lts seem to  con trad ic t the com m ents made by W h ittin g to n  
(1 9 7 1 ) on Fe ldste in ’s o rig ina l paper, on the in te rp re ta tion  o f a 
s ign ificant positive  coefficient o f the tax d isc rim ina tion  variab le . He 
pointed ou t tha t a change in the tax system w hich increased the
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d iffe ren tia l taxation o f d iv idend , thus low ering  0 , w ou ld  invo lve  a 
re d is trib u tio n  o f post tax income from  companies w ith  re la tive ly  
high pay-ou t ratios to ones w ith  re la tiv e ly  low  pay-ou t ratios, and 
hence th is  income d is tr ib u tio n  effect w ou ld  resu lt in  lo w e r aggregate 
d iv idend  even i f ,  fo r  some unexpla ined reasons, in d iv id u a l companies 
d id  not change th e ir desired pay-ou t ratios. In fac t, these results 
presented here po in t to the opposite. They do, in general, support the 
macro-economics evidence o f the effects o f taxation  on d iv idend  
d is tr ib u tio n .
There m ay, however, be a p o ss ib ility  o f a presence o f linear 
re la tionsh ip  among exp lana to ry variables, and as a re su lt the above 
estimates o f the coefficients m ay be indeterm inate  and the standard 
errors o f these estimates could be in f in ite ly  large. In o rder to  test fo r  
the absence o f m u lt ic o llin e a r ity , a method based on Frisch ’s 
Confluence A na lys is  is em ployed. (K ou tsoy iann is  (1 9 77 ) pp.233- 
257). I t  invo lves  regressing the dependent variab le  on each one o f the 
exp lana to ry  variables separately. Then g ra du a lly  add itiona l 
variables are inserted and th e ir  effects on the in d iv id u a l coefficients, 
on the ir standard e rrors and on the ove ra ll R 2 are exam ined. I f  the 
coefficients are affected, by the in tro d u c tio n  o f the new variab le  in 
such a w ay as to become unacceptable (w ron g  sign o r decreases the 
significance o f coefficients o r reduces s ign ifican tly  the R 2), then 
m u lt ic o llin e a rity  is a serious problem . T h is  is done in equation (1 ) 
through to equation ( 8 ) in table 4.1.
Com paring equations (1 ) to  (7 ) w ith  equation ( 8 ) we can see tha t the 
best fit is obtained when a ll the variables are included in the equation 
in term s o f high R 2 and low  standard e rro r o f the regression.
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M oreover, in table (4 .1 ) each lim e  a new variab le  is introduced, the 
R 2 increases together w ith  the significance o f the coefficients o f the 
p rev ious variables, and are a ll o f the correct sign. The standard e rro r 
is lo w e r in  equation 8 . Th is shows tha t the effects o f 
m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  is not serious fo r j3j and j32* The sim ple corre la tion 
between the earnings per share in the period and the d iv idend  per 
share d u rin g  the previous period is (0 .436).
I t  is also w o rth  no ting  tha t the constant, a , becomes negative o n ly
when the tax variab le, 0 ,v i^ i^n^rovdi^cx;d v(t;qqa\ic\n^ 3,5V6 J  \a n d \8 ) . \ \ \ \ \ \
There cou ld  be a trade-o ff, as fa r  as the tax is concerned, in w hich a
com pany is ind iffe re n t between paying d iv idends and reta in ing
earnings. T h is  breaking po in t is obtained when 6 is equal to 0.43
( fro m  equation 3). Assum ing the average im pu ta tion  rate fo r  the
period to  be 0.30, then the firm  w i l l  be in d iffe re n t between paying
d iv idends and re ta in ing  earnings i f  the m arg ina l personal income tax
rate o f the shareholders is equal to  0.70. In o ther words, firm s  tha t in
the sample w o u ld  not have paid any d iv idends i f  the average persona]
income tax o f th e ir shareholders has been greater than 0 -7 0 .
H ow ever, the mean o f m d u rin g  the sample period is 0.44, th is  gives 
an average o f 0 o f around 0.81. I f  the im pu ta tion  system was not in 
operation, we w ou ld  expect firm  not to pay d iv idends i f  the marginal 
personal income tax rate o f the shareholders is 57%. Therefore the 
existence o f the im pu ta tio n  system has a significant effect on the 
d is tr ib u tio n  o f d iv idends as it  rises the breaking po in t o f average 
personal income tax at w h ich  firm s pay d iv idends.
The above m ethod, however, d id  not take account o f the possible tim e 
effects in  the d iv idend  po licy . I t  is assumed that the coefficients
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rem ain constant th rough tim e, and that d iv idends and the 
exp lana to ry  variab les d id  not change s ign ifican tly  d u rin g  the 1 1  year 
period o f analysis. In  order to  re lax th is  assumption, equation (4.3.3) 
is re-estim ated fo r  each year fro m  1973 to 1983. The resu lts  o f such 
exercise are presented in the fo llo w in g  tables (4.2 and 4 .3).
\  \ \
i
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TABLE 4.2. RESULTS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS DIVIDENDS
EQ U A T IO N : SUR
N D S ; =  a  +  ^ E P S j  +  f a N D S - t j  +  &30; +  f i4T A X ;
YEARS COEFFICIENTS
a 0 1 0 2 03 04 <*u ° r F  5,97
1973 -0.006 0 .0 2 1 * 0.79* 0.007 0.00006 0.008 13.24**
(-1 .37 ) (2 .06) (25.15) (1.09) (0.035) 0 . 0 1 0
1974 0.005 0 .0 1 2 * 0.875* -0.003 -0.0004 0.007 7.36**
(0 .52) (2 .42) (28.72) (-0 .29) (-0 .28) 0.009
1975 -0.005 0.038* 0.893* 0.0074 -0.004*
V V  \ V
(-2 .52)
0.009i \ I I V 1.345\  \ v  \ '
\  \  v  v [-6.5$) b . ' i i )  v (24.6) ( 0 .6 6 )
\ S \ \ \
0.009
1976 -0.006 0.008 1.09* 0.006 - 0 . 0 0 2 0.007 17.53**
( - 0 .8 6 ) (1 .65) (42.97) (0.75) (-1 .18) 0 . 0 1 0
1977 -0.018* 0.032* 1 .0 2 * 0 . 0 2 0.003 0 . 0 1 0 9.40**
( - 2 .0 0 ) ( 6 .1 0 ) (35.0) (1.84) (1.54) 0 . 0 1 2
1978 - 0 . 0 2 0 0.04* 0.97* 0.017 0.005 0.009 7.32**
(-1 .98 ) (11.29) (38.3) (1.81) (0.26) 0 . 0 1 0
1979 0.008 0 .0 2 2 * 1.04* -0.005 - 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 1 1 12.83**
(0 .78) ( 6 .2 0 ) (35.13) (-0 .42) (-1 .03) 0.015
1980 -0.07 0.087* 0.64* 0.086 0 . 0 0 1 0.024 3.93**
(-1 .41 ) (8 .41) (11.48) (1.47) (0.25) 0.027
1981 -0.070* 0.045* 0.780* 0.089* -0.005 0.014 0.500
(-2 .04 ) (9 .17) (21.4) (2.17) (-1.85) 0.014
1982 -0.030 0.040* 0.665* 0.050 -0.007 0.019 2 . 0 1 0
(-0 .74 ) (8 .07) (13.19) ( 1 .0 2 ) (-1 .73) 0 . 0 2 1
1983 -0.023 0.040* 0.770* 0.040 -0.005 0.013 0.895
(-0 .87 ) (8 .64) (23.63) (1.18) (-1 .85) 0.013
Notes: t-statistics in brackets:
* significant at 5% level, t c — 1.960 (tw o-ta il test); 
Ou -  standard error of cross-sectional estimates:
CJr = standard error of pooled estimates;
** Chow test, significant at 5% level, F  5  9 7  = 2.37. 
Trace matrix = 1101.23.
Number of observations = 102.
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TABLE 4.3. RESULTS OI; CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS DIVIDENDS
EQUATION: OLS
NDS; = a  +  EPS i + j3 2 M D S _u +  j330,. +  fi4TAX;
YEARS COEFFICIENTS
a 0 i 0 2 03 04 R 2 cr
1973 -0 .006 0.010 0 .823* 0.006 0.00003 0.925 0.008
(-1 .1 9 ) (0 .9 3 ) (2 3 .9 2 ) (0 .9 0 ) ( 0 .02 )
1974\ \ \ 0.005\ \ \ 0.009\ \ v \ \ W  v -0 .003 v p.q0()2 V vO.926 v 0.007 v \
(0 .5 0 ) (1 .7 0 ) (2 5 .6 8 ) ( -0 .22) ( 0 .12)
1975 -0 .006 0.050* 0 .850* 0.010 -0 .005* 0.904 0.009
(-0 .7 0 ) (5 .0 9 ) (1 9 .4 5 ) (0 .8 7 ) (-2 .5 7 )
1976 -0.006 0.008 1.060* 0.008 -0.002 0.946 0.008
(-0 .8 9 ) (1 .4 3 ) (3 9 .5 1 ) (0 .9 4 ) (-1 .3 6 )
1977 -0.018 0 .031* 1.010* 0.021 0.003 0.924 0.010
( -1 .9 5 ) (5 .1 3 ) (3 1 .9 0 ) (1 .8 4 ) (1 .4 0 )
1978 -0 .018 * 0.044* 0 .980* 0.018 0.002 0.945 0.009
(-2 .1 7 ) (10 .94 ) (3 7 .1 0 ) (1 .81 ) ( 0 .86)
1979 0.006 0 .026* 1.010* -0.002 - 0.002 0.923 0.012
(0 .5 4 ) (6 .9 1 ) (3 3 .1 2 ) (-0 .1 5 ) (-1 .0 4 )
1980 -0.068 0.079* 0 .660* 0.080 0.006 0.668 0.025
(-1 .2 8 ) (6 .6 2 ) (1 0 .8 9 ) (1 .3 3 ) (1 .0 6 )
1981 -0 .060 0 .040* 0 .082* 0.080 -0.006 0.908 0.014
(-1 .8 0 ) (7 .1 8 ) (2 0 .4 7 ) (1 .9 0 ) ( -1 .7 8 )
1982 -0 .030 0 .040* 0 .660* 0.050 -0 .009 0.828 0.020
( -0 .7 0 ) (6 .5 5 ) (1 1 .6 5 ) ( 1.00 ) ( -1 .8 3 )
1983 -0.013 0.028* 0 .826* 0.020 -0 .006 0.930 0.013
(-0 .4 8 ) (5 .2 6 ) (2 1 .0 8 ) (0 .7 3 ) (-1 .7 8 )
Notes: t-statistics in brackets:
* significant at 57c level. t c — 1 .960  (tw o-ta il test); 
R ~ coefficient of determination adjusted f or d .f.; 
cr = standard error of the estimates;
Number of observations = 102.
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From the cross-sectional estimates, d irec t conclusions on the effects o f 
taxation on the d iv ide nd  d is tr ib u tio n  cannot be d raw n . Throughouto
the sample period, 0 has not been a lw ays s ign ificant as are the other 
tw o  exp lana to ry  variables. The coefficient o f the tax d isc rim ina tion  
variable, 0, is of’ the expected sign in 82 per cent o f the cases. 
However, o u t o f these, 0 is s ign ificant in o n ly  one case. S im ila r ly , the 
tax exhaustion va riab le  is o f the expected sign in most o f the cases, 
v v v b u t i t  ^igYiifidaiit in ^ n lj ) '  one year.v iW ne, however, is uncorrectly  
signed and s ign ificant. Edwards el aL (1985) also found  no 
significance when tim e  effect is taken in to  account. They computed 
the tax subsidy on a u n it  o f d iv id end  d is tr ib u tio n  using aggregate tax 
rates, and used change in  d iv idend  per share as a dependent variable. 
T he ir resu lts  show a substan tia l decrease in  the significance o f th is  
tax va riab le  and in its  lagged value when tim e effect is inc luded as 
opposed to  the high significance and the correct sign o f the coefficients 
o f the tax variab les when o n ly  company effect is considered. A 
num ber o f possible explanations may be given to the differences in 
the level o f significance when the tim e effect is taken in to  account.
When cross-sectional regressions are perform ed, the most im po rta n t 
facto r to bear in m ind  is the tim ing . Do companies respond d ire c tly  
to  a change in the tax va riab le  ? Fane (1975) emphasised the need to 
d is tingu ish  tim in g  fro m  the level effects o f changes in the tax 
d isc rim ina tion  variab le . I f  we suppose tha t the changes in 0 (e ith e r in 
the m arginal income tax rate o r in the im pu ta tion  ra te) are know n 
beforehand, then firm s w ou ld  probab ly have the o p p o rtu n ity  to
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sw itch  the tim in g  o f th e ir  d iv idends payments. They could postpone 
them u n til 0  is high or, conversely, b ring ing them fo rw a rd  in to  
periods when the add itiona l tax on d iv idends is low . I f  we ignore 
these tim in g  effects, the coefficient o f the tax d isc rim ina tion  variable 
could be overestim ated. In his em pirica l w o rk , Fane (1975) found 
tha t the neglect o f the t im in g  effect caused a serious upw ard  bias 
(n e a rly  60%) in the estim ate o f the level effect o f changes in the 
re la tive  rates o f taxa tion  on d iv idend  and retentions. Equation
(4 .3 .3 ) was re-estim ated using lagged 0 instead o f cu rren t 0. The
V V V V v V > V V V N ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' V  ' ' ' ' ' ' ■ ' ' V ' ' ' ' ' ' '
resu lts obtained d id  not change s ign ifican tly  .
The re la tionsh ip  between the constant and the tax d iscrim ina tion  
va riab le  obtained fro m  the cross-sectional regressions is the same as 
th a t fro m  the pooled data. Indeed, the constant is o n ly  positive  when 
0 is o f the w rong  sign (i.e  1974 and 1979) and i t  is s ign ificant on ly  
when the tax on d iv idends is too. Therefore, the hypothesis tha t 
firm s may be w il l in g  not to pay d iv idends i f  the shareholders’ 
personal income tax is above a certa in  level cannot be be rejected. 
W ith o u t inc lu d in g  the tax variab le, Theobald (1978) found  that the 
constant is pos itive  and significant in  most cases. H ow ever, th is  
s tudy  used tim e-series data, therefore, i t  m ay not be appropria te  fo r  
comparison.
12. When OLS is used, the above results in table (4 .1) become :
NDSt i= -0.014 +0.052 EPSt i +o.si/VDS, ,
(-5 .44 ) (20.79) (64.66)
-0.002TAXt i + O .O 2 O 8 0 J  — 1 •
(-2 .65 ) ’ (6.48)
R 2 =  0.874 o =  0.0128.
When time effect is taken into account the results are also similar to the above.
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The w rong  sign, a lthough not s ign ificant, o f the tax d isc rim ina tion  
va riab le  appear to occur o n ly  in 1974 and 1979 in Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.3. There are m a in ly  tw o  possible explanations. The firs t 
relates to the change in  the governm ent in  1979 w hich  has brought 
about a substan tia l reduction  in  the level o f personal income tax rate. 
The standard rate o f incom e tax fe ll fro m  33 to  30% w h ile  the top 
rate was reduced fro m  83 to  60%. G iven the assum ption tha t 
d irec to rs  are taxed at th is  h igher rate, th is  substantia l reduction is
ve ry  l ik e ly  to exp la in  the negative sign o f the tax variab le.
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \  \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ' ' ' ' '  ^  ^ '
The second exp lanation fo r  the negative re la tionsh ip  between the 
d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  and the tax va riab le  in  1974 m ay be related to 
the m a jo r change in  the corporate tax system in 1973, when the 
im p u ta tio n  system was in troduced . I t  is l ik e ly  tha t there was an 
incentive  to  delay the paym ent o f d iv idends u n til the im p u ta tio n  rate 
became effective in  1974. T h is  system, as analysed above, encourages 
companies to increase th e ir  d is tr ib u tio n  by a llo w in g  a certa in 
p ropo rtion  o f tax to be deducted fro m  the to ta l tax o f the firm . The 
paym ent o f d iv idends cou ld  also be re in forced in 1974 by the easing 
in d iv idend  res tra in t. Edw ards el al. (1985) included tw o  variables 
to capture d iv idend  con tro l, they were both significant and w ith  the 
expected sign.
The above equation (4 .3 .3 ) was estimated using linear regression. It 
is, however, possible tha t the fac t that the log linear specification was 
not em ployed, could d is to r t the results. However, the log specification 
used by Feldstein and K ing  was p a r t ly  to  correct fo r  the 
heteroscedasticity w h ich  is accounted fo r  here by d iv id in g  the 
variab les by the to ta l num ber o f shares. Moreover, th is  specification
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is not expected to d is to rt the results, as Fane (1975 ) found the same 
results w ith o u t using logs.
The assum ption u n de rly in g  the com putation o f the tax d iscrim ina tion  
variab le  could bias the coefficient o f th is  variab le . However, the 
above com putation seems to  be the o n ly  way to  d isc rim ina te  amongst 
the companies. An a lte rna tive  de fin ition  o f 0 w o u ld  be to  to exclude 
the average income tax rate o f shareholders, and use K in g ’s (1977) 
de fin ition . Using the pooled data, equation (4 .3 .3 ) was re-estim ated 
by .iny lpd jng  () r^atjiep tham 0 ,\ both the coefficients and the the1 te v d  6 f ' ' 1 1 '
\ i i r
significance were ve ry  s im ila r than the resu lts reported above in  table 
4 .113.
The sample tim e  period does not a llow r to analyse the fu l l  effects o f 
the im pu ta tion  system because com pany’s data wras ava ilab le  on ly  
fro m  1972, and because o f the lagged va lue o f the d iv idends, the data 
was a c tu a lly  taken o n ly  fro m  1973. I t  w ou ld  have been im po rta n t to  
analyse such effect i f  i t  is possible to get the data fro m  early  50’s so 
tha t the m ajor changes in the corporation tax system could be 
analysed and resu lts  could be compared to the previous em pirica l 
studies w h ich  have used aggregate data.
The sta tis tica l tests do not support a lw ays  the hypothesis tha t o f the 
significance o f the tim e  effects. There is ve ry  l i t t le  difference between
13. L’sing ihe OLS the follow ing equation is obtained :
NDSt 1= -0.043 +0.048£PS£ f. +Q.H3lNDSt ,
(-3.53) (19.48) ~ ’ (66.20)
-0.002774^, i +0.03050, j
(-2.40) ’ (3.72)
R 2 = 0.871 a  =  0.0128 ,A ]
Where 0 is defined as 0 =  - ------  w ith  s as the imputation rale.
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the trace* m a tr ix  obtained under these tw o  assum ptions. In tabic (4 .2 ) 
the Chow test is com puted to  test w he ther a ll the 5 coefficients can be 
constrained to be equal against the a lte rn a tive  tha t they va ry  through 
tim e. The n u ll hypothesis arc fo rm u la ted  as fo llo w s  :
A - =
W here j3r represent the betas obtained fro m  cross-sectional;
are the betas obtained fro m  pooled cross-sectional tim e 
series data. The n u ll hypothesis is accepted in  4 cases, i.e. we can say 
 ^  ^ th a t there is a subs^arjtipl ^di^fl'^r^n^e ^bqt^e^nd lie  popfi|cients\obtained \ \ \ \ \ 
fro m  the tw o  estimates in  7 cases.
The poor significance o f the tax variables when cross-sectional
regressions are perfo rm ed m ay be due to the m is-spccification o f the 
econom etric techniques used. Indeed, cross-sectional estimates may 
not be accurate using the o rd in a r ily  least squares because we assume 
tha t a ll companies are homogeneous except fro m  the differences 
a ris ing  fro m  earnings per share, tax d isc rim ina tion  variab le, tax 
exhaustion position and th e ir  lagged d iv idend  paym ents. However, 
there may be some o ther in te r- f irm  differences w hich  are not taken 
in to  account. For instance, i f  a firm  is established w e ll before the 
beginning o f ou r sample period, i t  could have had some k ind  o f
reputa tion  in the paym ent o f its  d iv idends, w h ile  a n e w ly  form ed
com pany m ay s t i l l  be in the process o f setting up its  desired level o f 
d iv idends. M oreover, in d u s try  classification could be an im po rtan t 
de te rm inan t o f d iv idend  paym ent. However, because o f the re la tiv e ly  
sm a ll num ber o f tim e  series observations, these characteristics cannot 
be taken in to  account. In cross-sectional regressions, the o n ly  w ay o f 
accounting fo r these possible differences is by using d um m y
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variables. H ow ever, th is  w ou ld  lead to a substantia l decrease in the 
degrees o f freedom . Therefore, u n til such adjustm ents could be 
made, by selecting a ll companies from  o n ly  one in d u s try  o r increase 
the tim e  series data, the hypothesis that taxa tion  exerts an influence 
on com pany d iv id e nd  d is tr ib u tio n  cannot be rejected. However, these 
resu lts  cannot be d ire c t ly  compared to these obtained fro m  in te rv iew s  
a n d /o r questionnaires w ho found  tha t taxa tion  is not a m a jo r fac to r 
in the d iv id e n d  decision o f companies (A la m  (1985), Cadle and 
Theobald (1 9 85 ), Edwards and M ayer (1985))^ T^hjs Js^bqca^uqe fhqsq  ^
studies concentrate on a m uch sm a lle r tim e  period, w h ile  in  the s tudy 
we were concerned w ith  a larger sample period.
6. Conclusion :
In  th is  chapter, the effects o f taxation on d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  have 
been tested. Using the L in tn c r  model o f d iv idends, i t  was fou nd  tha t 
the d iv idend  tax d isc rim ina tio n  va riab le  and the tax position o f the 
Arm appear to exert a strong influence on the com pany’s d iv idend  
po licy . Using pooled cross-sectional tim e  series data, we And th a t both 
tax variables considered here are o f the expected sign and h ig h ly  
s ign ificant. Therefore, the hypothesis o f the absence o f re la tionsh ip  
between d iv id e n d  po licy and the tax variables can be rejected. 
H owever, fro m  the cross-sectional estimates d irect conclusions on the 
im pact o f taxa tion  on d iv idend  po licy  cannot be draw n. T h is  is due to 
the fac t tha t in  cross-sectional Arms cannot be assumed to be 
homogeneous as they are not selected fro m  one in d u s try . H ow ever, 
not a ll the coefficients obtained fro m  the cross-sectional are 
s ign ifican tly  d iffe re n t fro m  these obtained using the pooled data.
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These resu lts  are based on a certa in num ber o f assum ptions about the 
com putation  o f the tax variab le. G iven the u n a v a ila b ility  o f 
in fo rm a tio n  on the categories o f shareholders in  each company, the ir 
respective hold ings and th e ir  in d iv id u a l m arg ina l tax rate, the average 
m argina l personal income tax rate is m a in ly  based on the d irectors ’ 
in terests in  the com pany and on the national average income tax rate.
Id e a lly , i t  w ou ld  be w o rth  com puting fo r  each one the marginal 
personal incp ipe^a^ faj-e., Tfhjs js a w a y /fo r  fu r th e r  research. / t < 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
v v 1 V h e n  the tax va riab le  is calculated, the denom inator, i.e., the 
im p u ta tio n  rate is taken as the s ta tu to ry  rate, ra th e r than the 
effective rate. From  the shareholders’ position the s ta tu to ry  
im p u ta tio n  rate is im p o rta n t as th is  cons titu te  a basis fo r  the 
com puta tion  o f h is /he r personal income tax. H ow ever, as fa r  as the 
firm  is concerned, the app lica tion  o f the im p u ta tio n  rate depends on 
its  tax position. G iven the fac t than a num ber o f companies are tax 
exhausted, it  is ve ry  l ik e ly  tha t not a ll the companies in the sample 
are able to recover th e ir advanced corporation tax. A lthough , in these 
resu lts  an a ttem p t was made to capture th is  effect using a dum m y 
va riab le  to  reflect the tax exhaustion position o f the firm , a more 
accurate estim ation o f the irrecoverable A C T  m ay s t i l l  be needed.
T h is  is c le a rly  one d irec tion  fo r  fu r th e r  research.
It  is im po rta n t, when in te rp re tin g  these resu lts  to bear in  m ind  that 
the model used is not based on any theory, bu t ra the r on L in tn e r ’s 
resu lts  o f in te rv iew s. Thus there may be a num ber o f o ther factors 
w h ich  are not included in the regressions and w hich cou ld  be very  
im p o rta n t to a p a rticu la r cou n try , firm  or period o f s tudy .
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In spite o f these reservations, the resu lts  po in t to a some influence o f 
taxa tion  on the d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n . H ow ever both the short term  
and the long term  im pact are sm all given the low  level o f the 
coefficient. T h is  cou ld  exp la in  the s ta b ility  in the d iv idend  pay-out 
ra tio .
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C HAPTER V
TA X E S  A N D  IN V E S T M E N T  BEH AVIO U R
T h is  chapter investigates the d iffe re n t influences on investm ent 
expenditure. In the f irs t section the neoclassical model is presented, 
fo llo w e d  by some c r it ic is m s  and extensions. In section 2 the d iffe ren t 
a lte rna tive  models o f inves tm en t are c r it ic a lly  analysed, together 
w ith  the ro le  o f l iq u id i ty  in  exp la in ing  investm ent behaviour. 
Section 3 deals w ith  the m ore recent investm ent equation w hich  
a ttem pts to exp la in  inve s tm en t expend itu re  through the va lua tion  
ra tio .
1. The Neoclassical Fram ew ork :
The present section does not in tend  to  deal in  de ta ils  w ith  vast 
lite ra tu re  on investm en t (see Jorgenson (1971), Bridge (1971) and 
Lund  (1 976 ) fo r  a su rve y ). M ost p revious studies have concentrated 
on tim c-series data and a t the aggregate, thus not in the s p ir it  o f the 
present analysis. For instance, these econom etric studies d id  not agree 
on the de fin ition  o f the p roduction  fu n c tio n , or lag s truc tu res w h ich  
are more problem s re la ted to  economics ra ther than to  management. 
H owever, some po in ts re la tin g  to  the assumptions o f these models 
need some discussions, and thus w i l l  be dealt w ith  accord ing ly.
1.1 The Jorgenson M o d e l:
The neoclassical model was firs t developed by Jorgenson, in  a series o f 
papers in the m id -1960s and ea rly  seventies (Jorgenson (1963, 1965, 
1967). Th is  theory is then extended by H a ll and Jorgenson (1967, 
1971). The model is de rived  fro m  a theoretical w o rk  based on the
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m axim isa tion  o f p ro fits  by a firm , as opposed to  p rev ious ly  employed 
ad hoc approaches such as the accelerator o r l iq u id ity  models. The 
accelerator model assumes tha t investm ent is sole ly dependent on the 
level o f o u tp u t and the l iq u id ity  models relate investm ent o n ly  to 
p ro fits . The Jorgenson model combines both these effects as i t  is based 
on the recognition tha t the decision to  invest depends on the stream o f 
re tu rns (w h ich  in tu rn  are a fu n c tio n  o f p roduct m arke t conditions, 
fa c to r costs and tax rates), in terest rates, the price o f cap ita l goods 
and o u tp u t. Furtherm ore  o ther studies have assumed a fixed cap ita l- 
o u tp u t ra tio , w h ile  Jorgenson in troduced  in to  his model a neoclassical 
p roduction  fu n c tio n , thus recognising the p o ss ib ility  o f cap ita l-lab ou r 
su b s titu tio n .
The neoclassical model o f investm ent assumes tha t companies operate 
in  a com petitive  m arket, seek to  m axim ise p ro fits  (defined as the 
d ifference between the cu rren t revenue and cu rren t o u tla y  less the 
renta l va lue o f capita l services) over tim e. They are, however, 
subject to  a set o f technological constra in ts  reflected in the p roduction 
func tio n  w hich  describes the p ropo rtio n  o f labour and capital 
necessary to produce a certain level o f o u tp u t, and in  the cvo lvem cnt 
o f capita l stock. U nder these conditions, the firm  w i l l  increase its  
capita l expend iture  up to the po in t where the m argina l revenue 
product o f the last u n it is equal to  the cost o f using i t  fo r  one period.
To fo rm a lise  th is  re la tionsh ip , le t P be the price o f ou tpu t, MPPk be 
the m arg ina l level o f o u tp u t a ttr ib u te d  to a u n it increase in  cap ita l 
and the cost o f using the capital fo r  one period by e. Then the 
fo llo w in g  re la tionsh ip  holds any tim e :
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Pq * M PPk = c  (5 .1 .1)
In the absence o f taxation, the rental price o f cap ita l, c, is derived by
m u lt ip ly in g  the acquis ition price o f capita l Pk by a fra c tio n  equal to
the rate o f interest, i, p lus depreciation o f assets d u rin g  the period, 6 ,
m inus  any capital gains resu lting  from  a change in the assets’ price,
h  ■■
c = P t ( i + 8 - P t ) (5 .1 .2 )
The renta l price o f capital measures the m in im u m  rate th a t an
investm ent m ust earn to  break even. Fo rm u la tion  (5 .1 .2 ) can be
extended to  incorporate tax effects. There are basica lly  tw o  tax
variab les tha t could influence the user cost o f capita l : The
corpora tion tax rate and the capita l allowances. The fo rm e r increases
the user cost o f capital because i t  reduces the a fte r tax re tu rn  on the
investm ent. The la tte r, on the o ther hand, has the opposite effect as i t
reduces the cost o f ob ta in ing  an equipm ent ( in it ia l an d /o r investm ent
a llow ance) o r low ers the depreciation charges (depreciation
allowances). W ith  the in tro du c tio n  o f taxa tion , equation (5 .1 .2 ) fo r
the user cost o f capital becomes :
Pk U + 8 - P k ) ( \ - A )
c =
(1 — t )
W here A is the present value o f allowances;
(5 .1 .3 )
r  is the effective corporation tax faced by the firm .
Therefore, instead o f fo rm u la tin g  an em pirica l investm ent equation 
w ith  separate evaluations o f the effects o f interest rates, changes in 
prices o f capital and a w ide va rie ty  o f tax factors, the com puta tion  o f 
the user cost o f capita l, c, a llow s  a ll these factors to be combined 
together in to  a single variable.
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The em p irica l re la tionsh ip  between the investm ent expenditure and 
the lax variables depends c r it ic a lly  on the specification o f the 
p roduction  fun c tio n  w hich  determ ines the m arginal physical product 
o f cap ita l (MPPk ). It  relates to the technological re la tionsh ip  
describ ing the a b il ity  o f the firm  to subs titu te  between capital and 
labou r at d iffe re n t levels o f ou tp u t. I f  the production  technology can 
be described by a Cobb-Douglas p roduction  fu n c tio n , then there is a 
fixed re la tionsh ip  between labour in p u t and cap ita l in p u t in  the 
process o f producing a given level o f o u tp u t. The q u a n tity  o f ou tpu t, 
Q, is obtained fro m  the fo llo w in g  re la tionsh ip  :
The m argina l p roduct o f capita l is given by :
and the o p tim a lity  cond ition  is achieved where :
W here a  is the e la s tic ity  o f o u tp u t w ith  respect to  capita l. The 
desired capita l stock, is thus given by :
The desired capita l stock is p roportiona l to the value o f o u tp u t 
deflated by the price o f capita l services. Therefore, there arc tw o  
m ain  de term inants o f the desired capita l stock, nam ely value o f 
o u tp u t, QPq , and the re la tive  price o f capita l services, c.
The capita l stock is assumed to evo lve over tim e  according to  the 
fo llo w in g  process :
Q = A K aL® (5 .1 .4 )
(5 .1 .5 )c
( A', —A', _ , )  +  8K, = / , (5 .1 .6 )
- 142 -
w hich  stales tha t gross investm ent is composed o f new capital stock 
( K t — p lus replacement investm ent (SK), where 6  is the rate o f
depreciation.
The present demand fo r  capita l by the lirm  is based on stock rather 
than flow  model. Equation (5 .1 .6 ) and (5 .1 .5 ) cannot s im p ly  be 
com bined to a rr iv e  at the investm ent equation. A n y  investm ent 
program m e invo lves  some stages in its  developm ent. These processes 
re la te to  the in it ia t io n  o f the project, appropria tion  o f funds, find ing 
contractors, issuing o f orders before the actual investm ent takes 
place. Thus, the investm ent expenditure  may be regarded as an 
extended process w ith  substantia l lags in  between these stages, some 
o f w h ich  are fin ished in  the cu rren t period and some others are 
carried  over fro m  previous periods. The desired capita l stock in the 
above equation (5 .1 .5 ) at the end o f the period, includes the existing 
cap ita l stock, the new sta rts  in  the period and the backlogs o f 
uncom pleted projects. I f  co0  is the p roportion  o f an investm ent 
pro ject com pleted in  its  f irs t year, then the "starts" (S) and the 
investm en t expend itu re  in  period t are related by :
/* =  *Z  (5 .1 .7)
/ =  o
Using the lag operator, equation (5 .1 .7 ) can be w ritte n  as :
/ 1 = co(L  )St — (ct>o +  Cl>jL  T  o>2 L  “ + ........+  con —\ L n )St (5 .1 .8 )
Rearranging th is  equation, Jorgenson obtained the fo llo w in g
investm ent equation :
/ ,  =  a)(L )[K* -  A /_ ,  ] +  8Kt _i (5 .1 .9 )
The level o f new s ta rts  is equal to the changes in the desired capital
slock fro m  one period to  another p lus replacement investm ent w hich
- 143 -
is assumed to be p ropo rtiona l to the beginning o f the period existing 
cap ita l stock.
P
Since the re la tive  price ra tio , ( — ), is one o f the main de term inant o fc
the investm ent behaviour, then any changes in the user cost o f capita l 
w o u ld  resu lt d ire c tly  in  a m a jo r s h ifts  in the level o f investm ent 
undertaken by  the firm . In p a rticu la r the im m edia te  effect o f a 
change in  tax po licy  w o u ld  be an in it ia l s h if t  in  the desired capital 
stock w h ich  w i l l  move to  its  new level, a permanent change in gross 
investm ent resu lting  fro m  replacement o f a d iffe ren t level o f capital 
stock and fin a lly  in a p roportionate  change in net and gross 
investm ent caused by changes in  o ther determ inants o f desired capital 
stock.
From  equation (5 .1 .3 ) o f the user cost o f capita l i t  is im m ed ia te ly  




A n  increase in  the present va lue  o f allowances, A , low ers the cost o f 
cap ita l to  the firm  and consequently increases the level o f the desired 
cap ita l stock, and as a re su lt the level o f investm ent. M oreover, i f  
desired capita l stock increases then once actual stock has increased to 
its  new desired leve l, the long run  increase in investm ent expenditure 
w i l l  o n ly  be that suffic ient c o n tin u a lly  to replace the extra  capita l 
stock. Therefore, the long run  increase in I t w i l l  be SftK* (Thom as 
1985). Using equation (5 .1 .5 ) and (5 .1 .3 ) and assuming tha t there are
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no capita l gains, then :
0A7 P. Qt
V -  =  - « - i T -  (5 .1 .10)
ck'< c ,  -
and
t o  ( f + . s ) o - / 4 )
(5 .1 .11)
dPk, 0 - 0
C om bin ing  equation (5 .1 .10 ) and (5 .1 .11 ) we ob ta in  :
a*; at-, o-sxi-^)
■5Ta7v="“^ -----n=o— < 5 - , - , a
Using the value o f a  obtained fro m  the regression and tak ing  the 
values fo r  P  , Qt , i t , P ki and t x as an average fo r  the w hole  period or 
as a values fo r  the last period, the long run  response in the present 
value o f allowances m ay be estimated. S im ila r ly , the long run  
e la s tic ity  o f the desired capita l stock to  the corporation tax rate Tt 
can be obtained by tak ing  an average fo r  the present value o f the 
allowances A . From  equation (5 .1 .12) the e la s tic ity  o f K* w ith  
respect to P is -1. T h is  is because o f the assum ption tha t the 
production  fun c tio n  is o f the Cobb-Douglas fo rm . Th is  make the 
e la s tic ity  o f desired cap ita l stock to both o u tp u t and to the re la tive  
price ra tio  to be u n ity . The long run  e lastic ities o f the investm ent 
expend iture  w ith  respect to  its  determ inants, remains however, a 
basic lim ita tio n  o f the model.
H a ll and Jorgenson (1967, 1971) have computed the effects o f changes 
in taxation on investm ent by ca lcu la ting  the renta l price o f cap ita l, c, 
on the assum ption th a t the change in po licy d id  not take place. The 
changes in the desired capita l stock and investm ent fo r  the resu lting  
renta l price o f capita l are calculated using the parameters estim ated
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from  the investm ent equation. Then the user cost o f capital is re­
calculated on the assum ption th a t p a rticu la r .po licy  has taken place. 
The resu lting  changes in the desired capita l stock and investm ent 
fro m  the fitted  investm ent fu n c tio n s  are calculated. The difference 
between the tw o  policies is thus determ ined. A p p ly in g  th is  model to 
the US economy, they concluded tha t :
"Tax jxJicy has been highly effective in changing the level and tim ing of 
investment expenditures... The adoption o f accelerated methods o f depreciation 
and the reduction in depreciation lifetimes fo r tax purposes increased 
investment expenditure substantially. They also resulted in a shift in the 
composition o f investment away from equipment towards structures. Limited 
to equipment the investment tax credit has txyen a potent stimulus to the level 
o f investment."  H all and Jorgenson (1971) p. 11.
1.2 Criticism s o f  the Jorgenson M od el:
The hypothesis tha t tax allowances s tim u la te  investm ent is not, 
however, o ve rw h e lm in g ly  supported. Using the aggregate data o f 
Sweedcn d u ring  the 1963-80 period, Dcrgstrom  and Sodersten (1984) 
concluded that the tax allowances aimed at low ering  capital costs and 
s tim u la tin g  investm ent m ay have resulted in an increase in p ro fits  on 
investm ent that w o u ld  have been undertaken regardless o f the tax 
incentives. Eisner (1 971 ) argued fo r  the p o ss ib ility  tha t a decrease in 
the corporate tax rate w o u ld  have a negative im pact on corporate 
investm ent. F u rthe rm ore , H a ll and Jorgenson (1969) assumed tha t 
the before tax rate o f re tu rn  is le f t unchanged when they s im ulated 
th e ir results. I f  corporate tax increases, then, because o f the 
d iffe ren tia l trea tm ent o f re tu rns  to debt holders and shareholders, the
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before tax y ie ld  on real investm ent should be higher to a llow  
payment o f the same a fte r lax re tu rn  to shareholders and 
bondholders.
The above conclusions on the strong effects o f taxation on investm ent 
expend itu re  m ay be due to the basic assumptions unde rlin ing  the 
model used. These relate to the specific trea tm ent o f the tax variables 
in  the m odel, the e la s tic ity  o f sub s titu tion  between capita l and 
labour, and also to  the trea tm ent o f in fla tion . These are dealt w ith  
separately in the fo llo w in g .
1.2.1 S p e c if ic a tio n  o f  th e  user cost o f  c a p ita l : The m ajor
deficiency w ith  the Jorgenson fo rm u la tio n  is tha t i t  does not a llo w  fo r  
tax-exhausted firm s to be included in the estimated sample. The 
problem  arises because o f the asym m etrica l in the tax system 
w hereby, under the above fo rm u la tio n  o f the user cost o f cap ita l, the 
effects o f cap ita l allowances and o f the effective corporation  tax 
operate o n ly  fo r  those companies tha t do a c tua lly  end up paying the 
m ainstream  corpora tion tax. I f  the effective corporation tax o f one 
company is negative, meaning that it does not recover f u l ly  its  
allowances, then the denom inator o f the user cost o f capita l (equation 
5.1.3) becomes positive  and greater than u n ity . Th is w o u ld  m is- 
specify the user cost o f cap ita l. S im ila r ly , i f  the effective corporation 
tax is negative, the present value o f allowances w ou ld  be negative and 
the user cost o f capita l w i l l  be higher. There are no, a p rio r i, w ays o f 
m aking ad justm ent fo r  the user cost o f capital to account fo r  such 
effects. I f  a ll tax exhausted companies are assumed to  have zero tax, 
then the op tim a l level o f capita l stock w ou ld  be incorrect and 
companies tha t are h ig h ly  tax exhausted are assumed to behave in the
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same m anner as those that are ju s t tax exhausted, i t  may be possible 
that companies that are jus t lax exhausted may re fra in  fro m  
undertak ing  o n ly  m arginal projects, w h ile , on the o ther hand, 
companies that are h ig h ly  tax exhausted m ay even not be able to  
undertake necessary projects. To trea t a ll the firm s in the same w ay, 
the op tim a l level o f capital stock may be calculated w ith o u t 
incorporating  any tax variab le  in the user cost o f cap ita l. However, 
here again, the desired capital stock w i l l  be incorrect as the a fte r tax 
user cost o f capital is s ign ifican tly  d iffe ren t fro m  the a fte r  tax value.
A no the r problem  w ith  the o rig ina l Jorgenson model is tha t firm s are 
assumed to have sta tic  expectations w ith  respect to tax po licy . They 
are considered to plan th e ir investm ent projects on the basis th a t the 
present tax rules regarding tax rates and capita l allowances w il l  
remain unchanged. Such expectations may lead to  a n tic ip a to ry  
a ttitudes , thus m aking investm ent sub s ta n tia lly  d iffe re n t fro m  the 
long run  desired capital stock. The neoclassical model in  these 
conditions m ay fa il to pred ict f u l ly  the tax im pact. S im ila r problem s 
arise in  the treatm ent o f the cost o f capita l w hich is com puted as the 
average cost o f finance, w h ile  in  investm ent decisions, the m arg ina l 
cost o f capital is more re levant. T h is  assumption m ay be relaxed 
when the C APM  is used to com pute the cost o f eq u ity .
1.2.2 P ro d u c tio n  fu n c t io n  : The Cobb-Douglas production fu n c tio n  
assumes that the lagged response pa tte rn  o f investm ent w ith  respect 
to o u tp u t and re la tive  price changes is constrained to be the same. I t  
is possible, though, tha t firm s may respond more q u ic k ly  to  changes 
in the level o f ou tpu t that to movements in fac to r prices (B ischo lf 
1971). I f  th is  is the case, the coellicienl o f the desired cap ita l stock
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w il l  be biased, and therefore, the se n s it iv ity  o f the f irm ’s desired 
capita l stock to changes in taxation should be estim ated ra ther than 
imposed.
A n  a lte rna tive  representation o f the production  fu n c tio n  w hich 
a llow s  fo r  the e las tic ity  o f subs titu tio n  to be estim ated is a constant 
e la s tic ity  o f subs titu tion  (CES). I f  the p roduction  fu n c tio n  has a 
constant re tu rns to scale and a constant e la s tic ity  o f su b s titu tio n 1 
between capital and labour and i f  capita] is com p le te ly  malleable, 
then the op tim al capital stock (equation 5.1.5) becomes :
P °K * = a o _ j _ Q  (5 .1 .13)
c
W here a  represents the e las tic ity  o f desired capital stock w ith  respect 
to  re la tive  prices.
W hen the CES specification is em ployed, the Jorgenson model becomes 
non linear and thus has to be estimated using a lo g a rith m ic  regression 
equations. Equation (5 .1 .9 ) becomes :
ln / f = H ’ U ) A ln A : ;  +  ln S A V | (5 .1 .14)
There is no however a single estim ation o f a . E isner and N ad iri
(19 68 ) and Coen (1969, 1971) obtained estimates o f a  closer to zero
than to one, thus reducing the neoclassical investm ent equation to the
s im ple  accelerator model where investm ent is o n ly  de term ined by the
1. The marginal productivity equation lo r capital under CL'S production function  
leads the ojujmal desired capital to be ’
K * =  < x ( - * - ) aQ 0 + <'-»>/■' =
C c
W here Zs),. the elasticity of desired capital w ith  respect to relative prices may be
different from Eq =  C J + ( 1 — ( j ) / v .  the elasticity of capital w ith  respect to 
output. It is only when v, the return to scale parameter is equal to 1 and where 
there are constant returns to scale that this elasticity is equal to 1.
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level ol' o u tp u t. Using aggregate UK data, B oa tw righ t and Eaton 
(1972 ) estimated a  to  lie  between 0.4 and 0 .7, Jcnkinson (1981) 
lou n d  a pre ferred va lue o f 0.25, w h ile  Savage (1977), Bean (1981) 
and Bosworth (1984) adopted a value o f h a lf on practical grounds.
The advantage o f the log a rith m ic  approach over the linear 
specification is that i t  a llow s  a ll the e lastic ities o f the desired capital 
stock in respect o f the components o f the user cost o f capital to  be 
estimated. Fcldstein and F lem m ing (1971) found some sign ificant 
e lastic ities o f the components o f the user cost o f capita l. Assum ing a 
zero capita l gains, equation o f the user cost o f capital (5 .1 .3 ) becomes
( - £ - ) +  =  +  S f i  1 - t T H  1 -  .4 (5 .1 .15)
*t H
W here 0, as defined in  chapter 4, is a d iffe re n tia l tax parameter 
reflecting the extent to w h ich  d iv idends are taxed more heav ily  than 
retained earnings2 and i t  measures the eff ects o f in te rn a lly  generated 
funds. I f  j35 is negative then the firm  treats retained earnings as a less 
expensive source o f finance than borrow ings.
When constra in ing the user cost e lastic ities to be equal, the ove ra ll 
e lastic ities o f around 0.2 and 0.5 were obtained. On the o ther hand, 
when th is  constra in t is relaxed, the e la s tic ity  o f the desired capita l 
stock w ith  respect to  the a llowance variab le  is -1.4 but i t  is sm a ll to
2. During the sample period 1954:2 to 1967:4 the imputation rate system was not 
in operation. Corporations were taxed at two separate rates depending on 
whether thev distribute profits. T > or retain them, 7 . Therefore : 
f  — 7 V
0 =  —---------------- 1------------  Where 7 is the standard rate of income tax.
\ + T , ,  ~  T y ~  T„
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the d iffe re n tia l tax parameter, and not s ign ificant w ith  a w rong sign 
to the o ther components o f the user cost o f cap ita l. These results has 
led Feldsle in and F lem m ing to  conclude tha t :
m F irst % higher allowances increased the flow o f internally available funds 
which may have had an independent positive effect on investment. Second, the 
frequent changes o f the allowance rate may have induced firms to try  to 
concentrate investment expenditures on jvriods on which rates were high by 
accelerating investment when allowance rates were raised and postponing 
when they were expxted to rise in the future. The estimates o f approximately 
-1.4 may therefore reflect the tim ing o f government policy; more frequent 
changes, and particularly more decreases might have resulted in even greater 
respmsiveness." Feldstein and Flemming ( 197D p. 427.
Feldstein and F lem m ing argued tha t fo r  these reasons, the resu lts  that 
the coefficients arc greater than 1 do not necessarily mean tha t the 
Cobb-Douglas p roduction  fu n c tio n  is inappropria te . Furtherm ore , the 
CES production  fu n c tio n  has been fra u g h t w ith  theoretical d ifficu ltie s  
(see Eisner and N a d ir i (1968), Coen (1969, 1971), B ischoff (1969) 
and Jorgenson and Stevenson (1969 ) fo r  the debate). M ore recently , 
Feldstein (1982 ) compared the d iff erent specifications o f investm ent 
behaviour, using the US investm ent in equipm ent d u rin g  the period 
1954-1977. He found  tha t, on the basis o f goodness o f fit, the 
Jorgenson specification perform ed the best. Jcnkinson (1981 ) also 
found  the linear specification to  be pre ferred to the log a rith m ic  
equation, and when s im ila r  specification to Feldstein and F lem m ing 
(19 71 ) was estim ated, the resu lts were somewhat perverse w ith  the 
in terest ra le s ign ifica n tly  u n co rrcc tly  signed and the o u tp u t variab le  
is also u n co rrcc tly  signed.
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Savage (1977), on the other hand, assumed tha t the desired capital 
stock may be approxim ated by an add itive , ra ther than a 
m u lt ip lic a tiv e , com bination o f the re la tive  components. The desired 
capita l stock in equation (5 .1 .5 ) becomes:
In th is  specification, the rate o f depreciation, 8, is ignored because i t  is 
assumed to be a constant in the com putation  o f the user cost o f 
cap ita l. Tax im pact is combined in  the te rm  ( l - A ) / ( l - 7 ) ,  the ra tio  o f 
gross to net y ie ld  on a u n it o f capita l expenditure. I t  is in te rpre ted  as 
a measure o f the ove ra ll effect o f the tax incentives and the tax rate 
on the rate o f re tu rn  on cap ita l. Th is  specification, re ferred to as the 
’generalised’ neoclassical model o f investm ent, results in  a change o f 
equation (5 .1 .9 ) in to  :
The estim ation o f equation (5 .1 .17 ) d id  not provide some consistent 
resu lts  on the im pact o f taxation on investm ent behaviour. For the 
sample periods 1959:1 to 1973:4 and 1959:1 to  1976:4, Savage found 
th a t o n ly  the coefficient on the change in o u tp u t and the price ra tio  are 
o f the expected sign and significant d u rin g  both these periods fo r  the 
UK aggregate data. The coefficient o f the tax variab le  is o f the correct 
sign bu t ins ign ificant in  the firs t period. I t  is, however, o f the w rong 
sign and significant in  the second period. S im ila r results were found 
by Levis and Morgan (1985) w ho found  tha t fo r  the w ho le  period 
(1968:4  to 1984:4) the coefficient o f the tax variab le  is negative but 




the w rong sign and significant.
1.2.3 In f la t io n  e ffects  : The in Hal ion fac to r is dealt w ith  d ire c tly  by 
the neoclassical model because a ll the variab les are deflated in to  
constant prices, i t  is also in d ire c tly  incorporated in the user cost o f 
capita l th rough the capita l gain term  in equation (5 .1 .3 ), w hich, when 
unce rta in ty  is p roperly  accounted fo r, is treated as an expectation o f 
the in fla tion  rate. However, because o f the absence o f efficient m arket 
fo r  second hand equipm ent the Arm may not be able to  take fu l l  
replacement cost value fo r  the sale o f its  equipm ent. N icke ll (1978) 
argued, as a consequence, th a t the capita l gain term  in equation 
(5 .1 .3 ) should enter w ith  a coefficient o f less than u n ity . Th is w ou ld  
avoid the com putation o f a negative user cost o f capital in the m id - 
70’s. However, using a g rid  search, Jenkinson (1981) found that the 
best equation was given when the w eigh t fo r  the in fla tion  rate is zero,
i.e. com puting the user cost o f capita l w ith o u t the capital gain term .
In fla tion  may also enter in  the user cost o f capita l through the cost o f 
finance and the depreciation rate used. Hendershott and Hu (1981) 
computed the expected real a fte r tax financing rate by deducting 
expected in fla tion  rate fro m  the cost o f debt capita l. The expected 
in fla tion  rate is assumed to be a d is tr ib u te d  lag on past in fla tion  rates 
w ith  d iffe ren t weights fo r  each o f the 7 quarters. The basic in fla tion  
rate is the adjusted deflator fo r  non-food business products. This 
in fla tion  rate is also used to  com pute the average annual rate o f tax 
depreciation.
As pointed out in chapter 2, the com puta tion  o f the economic 
depreciation is very com plicated (see Green Paper on C orporation Tax
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(1 982 ) fo r  a sum m ary). K ing  and F u lle rton  (1984) on the other 
hand have attem pted to  approxim ate the economic depreciation from  
a s tra igh t line  depreciation m ethod, w h ich  is used by many 
companies3 and by the C entra l S ta tis tica l Office (CSO) in the National 
Accounts. The economic depreciation is rough ly  obtained by d iv id ing  
2 over the l ife  o f the assets, w h ile  the s tra igh t lin e  depreciation rate is 
com puted by d iv id in g  1 by the asset life .
2. A ltern ative  Models o f  In v estm en t:
S im ila r ly  to  the previous model, most o f the fo llo w in g  a lte rna tive  
studies have taken the v iew  th a t p ro fita b ility  is a crucial determ inant 
o f investm en t behaviour. A  large part o f these studies have used 
cross-sectional and tim c-scries data at company level to  test 
e m p ir ic a lly  the investm ent expenditure. They are thus w orth  
analysing as they are in the s p ir it  o f the present s tudy.
2.1 L iquid ity Theory :
An ea rly  s tu d y  by M eyer and K uh  (1957) used an electic Accelerator 
Residual Funds model to analyse the role o f demand and p ro fit in 
exp la in ing  the investm ent behaviour o f a sample o f 15 industries  over 
the period 1946-1950. They found  that w h ile  demand was the m ajor 
de te rm inan t o f investm ent d u rin g  the boom years 1946-1948, in  the 
rem ain ing years cash flow  defined in term s o f p ro fit and depreciation 
appear to be the most s ign ificant. However, in the extension o f th is
3. The Instiiuie of Chartered Accountants (IC A ) (1982) has reported that the 
straight line depreciation method is used widely by the UK companies for all or 
most of their assets.
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model from  1951 to 1954, M eyer and G lauber (1964) found that the 
cash How variab le  perform ed poorly m a in ly  d u rin g  the recession o f 
1954. S im ila r model was tried  more recently  by Meeks (1981) using 
data on 18 UK in d iv id u a l tw o -d ig it indus tries  fo r  the period 1967 to 
1971. He found  tha t o n ly  depreciation va riab le  was in most cases 
s ig n ilica n tly  and p o s itive ly  associated w ith  investm ent spending. The 
l iq u id ity  stock4 was o n ly  significant in 6% o f the cases.
K uh  (1963) also found  l i t t le  significance fo r  the in te rna l fu n d  flow  or 
p ro fit model com paring to  the accelerator sales model. He perform ed 
both cross sectional and tim e  series regressions on 60 companies 
w hich  produce cap ita l goods du ring  the period 1935 to  1955. He used 
three d iffe ren t equations to  compare p ro fits  and capacity u tilisa tio n  
theories o f investm ent behaviour. The flow  o f funds (sum  o f retained 
earnings plus deprecia tion) is on ly  s ign ificant in the cross-sectional 
regressions and when i t  is lagged or deflated by the capital stock.
G ru n fe ld  ( I9 6 0 )  found  l i t t le  significance fo r  the realised p ro fit in 
exp la in ing  investm ent behaviour when p ro fits  were incorporated in to  
a flex ib le  accelerator model, using annual data, 1935-1954, o f 8 
in d iv id u a l US corporations. Profits were found to be h ig h ly  
correlated w ith  other determ inants o f investm ent. He argued tha t 
expectations o f fu tu re  p ro fits  cannot be based sole ly on realised 
p ro fits  since both general business op tim ism  and anticipated changes 
in the supp ly  and demand conditions are re levant. He then specified
4. Liquidity stock is defined as cash and bank balances plus tax reserve certificates 
and marketable securities minus bank overdrafts and loans, dividends interest 
and tax liabilities.
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his investm ent theory in term s o f expected profits, b u t since the la tte r 
are not observable d ire c tly , he assumed that the m arke t value at the 
end o f the year to  be a measurable substitu te . H is theory is referred 
to  as the expected p ro fits  model o f investm ent.
D hrym es and K u rz  (1967 ) used a d iffe ren t m ethod to test the 
re la tionsh ip  between investm ent and p ro fita b ility  o f a sample o f 181 
m anufactu ring , m in ing  and re ta il trade firm s fo r  the period 1951 to 
1960. They critic ised previous studies fo r  fa ilin g  to  account fo r  the 
in te raction  o f financial and investm ent decisions. They developed a 
s im ultaneous model o f d iv idends investm ent and external finance. 
Using cross sectional data and a F u ll In fo rm a tio n  M axim um  
L ike lihood , they found  tha t the coefficient o f the change in the sales 
va riab le  exh ib its  much more s ta b ility  than tha t o f the lagged rate o f 
p ro fit. However, the influence o f the p ro fit on investm ent was not 
restric ted  to  its  coefficient because o f the fact tha t pro fits were a 
s ign ificant de term inant o f d iv idends, and d iv idends were found to 
compete w ith  investm ent funds.
S im ila r investm ent equations have been used to  test fo r  the 
re la tionsh ip  between the financial variables and the investm ent 
expenditure. The independence o f the investm ent and d iv idend  
decisions have been tested e m p ir ica lly  by Fama (1974) w ith  a sample 
o f 298 American companies fo r  the period 1946-1968, by Morgan and 
Saint-P ierre  (1978) w ith  a sample o f 64 Canadian firm s  fo r  the period 
1960-1974 and by M cDonald, Jacqu illa l and Nusscnbaum (1975) fo r  
a sample o f 75 French companies d u rin g  the period 1962-1968. On 
the other hand, s im ila r ly  to D hrym es and K u rz  (1967), McCabe 
(1 979 ) and Peterson and Benesh (1983) have rejected the
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independence hypothesis o f d iv idends and investm ent in a tw o  and 
three-stage least squares cross-sectional studies. These studies found 
d iv idends  to be negative ly correlated to the investm ent expenditure 
because the o u tlays  fo r  investm ent and d iv idends are viewed as 
com petitive . D hrym es and K u rz  find tha t the coefficient o f d iv idends 
in the inves tm en t equation is both negative and sign ificant in 8 o f the 
10 years analysed w h ile  McCabe found  a p roportion  o f 8 out o f 8 
years exam ined.
Peterson and Benesh (1983) used a s lig h tly  d iffe ren t specification fo r  
a sample o f 538 firm s d u rin g  the period 1975 through 1979. They 
fitted  the investm ent, d iv idend  and new debts equations cross- 
sectiona lly  using sim ultaneous equations estim ating techniques o f 
tw o - and three-stage least squares. They also employed the 
seem ingly unre la ted regressions (SUR) estim ation technique. They 
fou n d  th a t the coefficient o f the d iv idend  variab le  in the investm ent 
equation is negative in each o f the 5 years and significant in 4 years.
Jorgenson and Siebert (1968 ) used annual data on 15 US companies 
fo r  the period 1949-1963 to compare the above investm ent theories. 
The d is tr ib u te d  lag fu n c tio n  a> (L )  is lim ite d  to cu rren t and up to tw o  
lagged values o f both the change in desired capita l stock and net 
investm ent, because annual as opposed to q u a rte rly  data was used. 
T h e ir best model is found to  be the neoclassical w ith  capital gains, as 
i t  shows the m in im u m  residual variance subject to the weights o f o>0 
to be positive . The general fo rm  o f the equation used is :
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The dilVercncc in the models compared is in the de fin ition  o f the 
desired capita l stock K * . The fo llo w in g  table summarises the overall 
perform ance o f the d il l ’erent theories and gives the num ber o f times 
each theo ry  obta ins rank 1 (sm allest residual variance) to  rank 6 
(la rgest residual variance) :
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T A B L E  5.1. COM PARISON OP IN V E S T M E N T  MODELS
















NEOCLASSICAL 11 (2) ; 5 4 1 1 4 0 o  !
I
EXPECTED PROFIT (3) 2 1 6 4 2 0 3 !
; c r u d e  a c :c :e le r a to r  (4) i 0 
1 “
2 2 5 1 3 4 I
LIQUIDITY (5) 1 1
i
1 2 2 5 4 5 •
NAIVE (6) 1 o
i
0 2 1 5 7 6
Source : Compiled from Table 3 Jorgenson and Siebcrt (1968)
p »Q'Notes : (1 ) K t =  a c.
Where c ,  =
pti [(1 - V ,  (0, )8+i - ( /> ,, - P k, ,)/Pk, ]
(1 —r )
vt and (ot are tax rate on net income and tax allowance fo r debt 
finance respectively.
In equation (2) the form ula fo r the desired capital stock is the same as 
but the user cost of capital is defined w iihout capital gains. 
r * -  M VS  +  BVD
{3) K‘ ~  GNP
MVS. BVD and GNP are respectively market value of shares, 
book value o f debls and the gross national product.
(4 ) K* = AQt where Q is the level o f output.
(5 ) K* =  77mf where n is the sum of retained profit and depreciation 
deflated by Pk .
( 6 )  I t =  /3() +  3 ,7 /  - i  +  $2^i —2 +  - 3
( 1)
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From the above table, the neoclassical model w ith  capital gains appear 
to have the sm allest residual variance lo r  5 o f the 15 companies in 
the sample and the second sm allest fo r  another 7 firm s, therefore, 
a lready 80% o f the companies f it  the neoclassical model as opposed to 
the naive model where th is  p roportion  has the largest and jus t below 
the largest residual variance. The last co lum n gives the average 
perform ance o f the theories. The w ors t model appear to  be the naive 
specification and the l iq u id i ty  model. Th is  led Jorgenson and Siebert 
to  come to the same conclusion as K uh (1963) tha t financial 
constra in ts p lay  a m ino r ro le  in  exp la in ing investm ent behaviour o f 
in d iv id u a l firm s. Thus the evidence presented in th is  s tudy is 
o ve rw h e lm in g ly  in fa vo u r o f the neoclassical model when time-series 
data is used.
H ow ever, the sample o f firm  is re la tive ly  sm all and cross-sectional 
estimates were not perform ed. E llio t (1973) re-estim ated Jorgenson’s 
and Siebert analysis fo r  a much larger sample o f 184 firm s. When 
tim e-series data is used, there was l i t t le  difference between the 
neoclassical, accelerator and the l iq u id ity  models. On the other hand, 
when cross-sectional data was em ployed, l iq u id ity  model was found 
to pe rfo rm  the best fo llo w e d  by the accelerator, expected p ro fit and 
the neoclassical.
2.2 Effects o f Cash Flow :
There are a num ber o f argum ents tha t have been advanced to  explain 
the relevance o f the a v a ila b ility  o f in te rna l funds in exp la in ing  the
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investm ent behaviour. C hapter 3 o f th is  research has shown how risk  
and the p a rticu la r lax position o f the lin n  may constrain the lin n  
fro m  bo rrow ing . M oreover, the high transaction costs incurred  in an 
issue together w ith  the preference o f debts over e q u ity  because o f tax 
deductions o f in terest paym ents, make e qu ity  issues less a ttrac tive  to 
the f irm 5.
Baumol et al. (1970 ) have presented em pirica l evidence to  show the 
im portance o f retained earnings in  the financing o f low  y ie lds 
projects. I f  a firm  has large am ount o f cash flow  ava ilab le  i t  w ou ld  
re lax any constra in t imposed by external finance upon its  investm ent 
programme. However, there are a num ber o f considerations to take 
in to  account when dealing w ith  the a v a ila b ility  o f in te rna l funds.
There is firs t o f a ll the problem  o f the specification o f the investm ent 
equation. In the above models, l iq u id ity  variables are assumed to be 
lin e a r ly  related to  the investm ent expenditure, and th e ir changes arc 
considered to  influence the long -run  capital stock. However, 
Jorgenson (1971 ) in  su rvey ing  a large num ber o f US econometric 
studies concluded tha t :
"Where internal finance variables appear as significant determinants o f 
desired capital. they represent the level o f output. Where both output and cash 
Jlow' are included as possible determinants . only one is a significant 
determinant. The preponderance o f evidence clearly favours output over cash
5. Other factors that can make new share issue less attractive include the costs of 
providing inform ation on past and expected profit performance to make the 
issue acceptable to the existing and new shareholders, risks of being taken over 
because of such disclosure, possible losses in capital gains to the existing 
shareholders if the price falls  and the possibility that the amount the firm wants 
to raise may not be accepted by the market.
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Jhm'3 p. 1133.
Furtherm ore , N icke ll (1 9 78 ) argued tha t the a v a ila b il ity  o f cash flow 
can o n ly  be related to the desired expansion w h ich , in tu rn  is a 
fu n c tio n  o f the demand. W hen a variab le  o f cash How is included in 
the accelerator type  m odel, the resu lts suffer fro m  the problem  o f 
m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  amongst the exp lana to ry  variables.
A lte rn a t iv e ly , the l iq u id i ty  va riab le  is considered to  influence the 
speed o f ad justm ent ra th e r than the long run  level o f stock. Coen 
(1 971 ) m odified the neoclassical model by m aking the speed o f 
ad jus tm en t a fu n c tio n  o f cash flow . F irm s are l ik e ly  to  accelerate 
th e ir investm ent expend itu re  when the p ro fits  fo r  example, are high. 
In th is  theory, the effects o f a reduction  in the p ro fits  m igh t be to 
de lay but not to  cu t investm ent.
A no the r w ay o f considering the effects o f cash flow  is th rough  the 
user cost o f cap ita l in  the neoclassical model. Feldstein and 
F lem m ing (1971 ) a llow ed  fo r a separate term  in the user cost o f 
cap ita l to  reflect the a v a ila b il ity  o f in te rna l funds, bu t they found  
tha t th is  reduced the re la tive  price effects to insignificance. However, 
since the user cost o f cap ita l a lready includes the cost o f finance, we 
w o u ld  expect l iq u id ity  effects to be incorporated in th is  va riab le , and 
investm ent is expected to be negative ly correlated to  the cost o f 
finance. Since the cost o f in te rna l funds are re la tiv e ly  lo w e r than 
that o f debts, the a v a ila b il ity  o f in te rna l funds w i l l  thus encourage 
investm ent.
H ow ever, previous studies on the re la tionsh ip  between investm ent 
behaviour and the cost o f capita l are ra ther unconclusivc. Using
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aggregate data, most studies, at the exception o f Hines and Cataphores 
(1970) and Bean (1981), d id  not find that the cost o f  capital is an 
im po rta n t de te rm inan t o f investm ent. Savage (1978) concluded from  
the survey o f econometrics studies that
" Ilo rd ly  any 'B ritish  research has been able to show that interest rates are 
an important influence on aggregate business investment."  p. 78.
Furtherm ore, the su rvey o f W a llis  et al. (1984 ) have reported tha t 
most econom etric models in the U K contain o n ly  lim ite d  
representation o f fac to r prices effects, and more em pirica l support is 
given to  l iq u id ity  and cash How. Since these models deal w ith  the 
aggregate data, th is  irre levance o f the cost o f capita l m ay be explained 
by the absence o f a su itab le  aggregate measure fo r  the d iffe re n t costs 
o f finance. Even at com pany level, i t  is o n ly  recently th a t em pirica l 
evidence is found  on the use o f the net present value m ethod in the 
selection o f investm ent. In the 1960s the d iscounting cash How 
method appeared to be practiced by o n ly  a m in o r ity  o f companies 
(W ill ia m  and Scott (1965) and N ie ld  (1961 )). But m ore recently, 
Carsberg and Hope (1976) and Pike (1983) found  an increasing use o f 
d iscounting techniques among large companies, bu t most firm s  were 
found  to combine the d iscounting  cash How w ith  o ther a lte rna tive  
eva luation  methods and the sophisticated methods were found  to be 
used in o n ly  large companies.
The com putation o f the cost o f capita l also presents a num ber o f 
problems. It requires the ca lcu la tion  o f the m arginal costs o f new 
finance as opposed to the average cost o f existing funds. F lem m ing et 
al. (1976) have taken the v iew  tha t the post tax cost o f finance is
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equ iva len t to the im p lic it  rate a t w hich companies expected post-tax 
fu tu re  earnings are discounted by the m arket. They proxied 
unobservable expected real fu tu re  earnings by cu rren t earnings over 
m arke t va lue o f shares. K ing  and F u lle rton  (1984) on the other hand 
have measured the cost o f finance as the weighted average m arginal 
cost o f a ll d iffe ren t sources o f finance, each source w ith  its  re la tive  
tax. The basic assum ption in  th e ir model is tha t shareholder can earn 
the same rate o f re tu rn  w he the r he invests in the company o r invest 
at the m arke t in terest rate. Thus the effects o f risks are not 
incorporated, and it  is o n ly  th rough taxation tha t an investor w ou ld  
choose to  invest in the com pany o r in o ther a lte rna tive  investm ents6.
M ore recently , Poterba and Sum m ers (1983, 1985) have derived from  
an op tim isa tion  model a fo rm u la  fo r  the cost o f capita l. Earnings arc 
s p lit  in to  d iv idends and capita l gains. D iv idends are assumed to 
com m unicate in fo rm a tio n , and the cost o f e q u ity  is a func tion  o f the 
pay-ou t ra tio . Th is  m ethod a llow s both capital gains tax and tax 
price on d iv idends to be incorporated in to  one factor.
3. Q Model o f  In v estm en t:
The m ain a lte rna tive  model to  tha t developed by Jorgenson is the
6. The cost of equitv is thus computed as :
1 — m / 1 ” \ ... rp =  Cl ~  m  )r I hus f) =
] - s r I - s
Where p. r. m and s are respectively the cost of new equity, the market interest 
rale, the marginal income tax rate of shareholder and the imputation rate.
The cost of retained earnings is s im ilarly  defined as :
(  \ — Z )RE  5= ( l — m ) r  
o i- ( l  ~  m )
Thus RE  —
Where RP and /. are the cost of retained finance and the effective capital gains 
tax respectively.
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Tob in  "q" theory o f investm ent (T ob in  1969). S im ila r ly  to the 
neoclassical theory, th is  m odel’s basic approach assumes that the 
ob jective  o f the firm  is to m axim ise the present net w o rth  o f the 
ou ts tand ing  shares. An investm ent is undertaken o n ly  i f  i t  increases 
the m arket va lue o f the firm . The m arket is expected to  assess the 
re la tive  values o f the expected re tu rns  and expected risks  associated 
w ith  the new project. Tobin defined a variab le  "q" equal to  the ra tio  
o f the m arket va lue o f the firm  re la tive  to  the replacement cost o f its  
assets as the key de te rm inan t o f the investm ent expenditure. This 
ra tio  is an ind ica to r o f m a rke t expectations o f fu tu re  p ro fita b ility  o f 
ex is ting  capita l stock. I f  i t  is greater than its  e q u ilib r iu m  value 
(u s u a lly  taken as u n ity ) ,  the va lua tion  ra tio  should s tim u la te  
investm ent a c t iv ity  because the p ro fit stream tha t w il l  be generated 
by the new cap ita l is going to  be greater than the cost o f the extra 
finance needed to  acquire it .
There are, however, a num ber o f d iffe ren t w ays o f com puting  the 
m arke t value o f the firm  and the replacement cost o f cap ita l stock. 
Furtherm ore , when taxes are taken in to  account the e q u ilib r iu m  
va lue  o f "q" need not necessarily be u n ity  as i t  m ay depend on w hich 
m ethod o f finance used to  finance the m arginal project and also on the 
assum ption as to the ro le  o f d iv idends. These specifications have led 
previous studies to find a va rie ty  o f values o f "q" using the same data. 
M oreover, in  spite o f its  m icroeconom ic orig ins, the va lua tion  ra tio  
has m a in ly  been applied to test the investm ent behaviour at the 
aggregate7. The present section a ttem pts to rev iew  previous studies
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tha t have used th is  ra tio  to  analyse investm ent behaviour. Sinee most 
o f these studies have used aggregate ra ther than com pany’s data, the 
concentration is more on the theory than on em p irica l results.
3.1 Theoretical fram ew ork :
The Tob in  ’q r theory o f investm ent leads, under some conditions, to 
the same resu lts  as the neoclassical model (A b e l (1979), H a ll (1977), 
C iccolo and From m  (19 79 ) and Yoshikowa (1 9 80 )). The emphasis 
here is,however, more on the m arke t va lue o f the firm . Th is model 
also deals d ire c t ly  w ith  the financial po licy  o f the firm  as the 
e q u ilib r iu m  va lue o f q is derived from  the level o f d iv idend  
d is tr ib u tio n , debt e q u ity  ra tio  in  add ition  to the tax factors.
The basic assum ption o f th is  model is th a t firm s seek to m axim ise 
th e ir m arket value. T h is  is equ iva len t to m ax im is ing  the present 
va lue o f fu tu re  a fte r  tax net receipts (the  assum ption o f the 
Jorgenson m odel) i f  personal taxes are not taken in to  account. The 
technology o f the firm  is defined in the fo rm  o f tw ice  d iffe ren tiab le  
p roduction  fu n c tio n  w ith  constant re tu rns  to scale. The firm  is 
assumed to be a price take r in a com petitive  m arket, and to  be faced 
w ith  ad jus tm en t costs when it undertakes its  investm ent.
In o rder to de rive  th is  ra tio  w ith  tax effects, we need, firs t, to 
fo rm u la te  the op tim isa tion  problem  faced by the firm . The fo llo w in g
7. In addition to investment equations, this ratio has been used as an indicator of 
the special tax provisions which could be gained if the firm ceases operations 
(Kdwards and keen 1985). as a measure of monopoly rent (I.idenberg and Ross 
1981). as a basis for the decisions on mergers and acquisitions (Chappell Jr. and 
Cheng (1 9 8 4 ) anti Molly and Longbotlom (1 9 8 5 ))  and also as a basis for 
analysis of the stock return regularity (Soli and Slalm an 1985).
-  1 66 -
nota tions arc specified :
I', = m arket value o f the f irm ’s equ ity ;
Vt = one period change in the m arket value o f the firm ;
Dt = d iv idends payments;
I t = Gross investm ent expenditure; 
pt = Price o f new capita l goods;
Vtn = V a lue  o f new share issues;
r t = risk -ad jus ted  nom inal d iscount rate;
it = nom ina l interest rate on corporate debts;
A t = present value o f investm ent incentives per u n it o f new 
investm ent;
Bt = present value o f w r it in g  down allowances on past investm ent; 
bt = debt-cap ita l ra tio ;
The incom e tax variables are (as defined in chapter 4 ) :
m, z and c the m argina l personal income tax rate o f shareholders,
capita l gains tax rate and im pu ta tion  rate respective ly, and
$ = "71—~T* = d iv idend  tax d isc rim ina tio n  variab le.(1 — c' )
In o rder to derive the m arke t va lue o f the lirm  the re tu rn  to 
shareholders are compared under the a lte rna tive  investm ent 
opportun ities . To be in d ilfe re n t between buying  shares in one 
com pany and ho ld ing  other assets w hich y ie ld  the m arke t rate o f 
re tu rn , the re tu rn  fro m  both these opportun ities  should be equal. In 
a m athem atica l fo rm , th is  re la tionsh ip  may be represented as :
e n
( i  -  - ) ° >  ( l  - - -  Xv, +
- + --------------r ~  —  (5 .3 .1 )1 V VV ( V I
The firs t term  o f equation (5 .3 .1 ) is the a fte r tax d iv idend  y ie ld  and
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the second term  is the a fte r  tax capital gains. Rearranging equation 
(5.3.1 ) the m arket value o f the lin n  at tim e t is :
V, =  (1 +  - p r )  \ ~ D t -  V? +  1 / + , )  (5 .3 .2)
T ha t is, the m arke t value o f the firm  at tim e  t is equal to the present 
va lue o f the sum o f d iv idends and capita l gains a fte r tax, discounted 
by the a fte r tax m arke t re tu rn . Equation (5 .3 .2 ) can be solved 
fo rw a rd  subject to  the tra n sve rsa lity  cond ition  w h ich  prevents the 
m arke t value o f the l in n  to  be in f in ity  in  fin ite  tim e, i.e
t r
l i m n d + T T " )  Vt = 0  (5 .3 .3)
* ~ * ° o  /  =  1 1 -
to  y ie ld  the m arket value o f the firm  at tim e  0 as :
oo t r  - i  t)
v o = I  1 1 0  +  T 3 T >  ( 13 7 A  "  V//') (5 .3 .4 )
,-=(>i =  i 1 “  1 -
T h is  equation s im p ly  states tha t the m arket va lue o f the firm  can be 
computed as the present value o f the a fte r-ta x  expected d iv idends 
minus the present value o f new share issues w hich  the shareholders 
w i l l  have to acquire in o rder to keep his ho ld ing  a constant p roportion  
in the f irm ’s d iv idends and profits. The f irm ’s ob jective fu n c tio n  is to 
m axim ise equation (5 .3 .4 ) at any po in t in tim e  subject to a num ber o f 
constra in ts.
The 1948 Companies A c t res tric t share repurchases and firm s  cannot 
pay negative d iv idends, i.e.,
(5 .3 .5 )
D, > 0  (5 .3 .6 )
The How o f funds statem ent requires tha t sources are equal to  uses o f
funds. Th is  is fo rm u la ted  as :
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( ] - t ) { F ( K ,  ,N, ) - ' ! / ( / ,  ,K, ,i, )p, -p ,  i, h, K, ) + l '" + T f l ,
= D, + ( \ - A - b ) p , I ,  (5 .3 .7)
The d iv idend  paym ent is, thus, equal lo  :
D, = (  1 - t ) (F(K,  ,N, ) - V ( l ,  ,K, ,£, )p, -p ,  i, b , K t )
+ V / ‘- (  1 —A  - b  )p, / .  + t B ,  (5 .3 .8 )
where F ( Kt ,A', ) is the production fu n c tio n , net o f wage costs, w ith  
N as the labour in p u t, and ’K / ,  ,Kt ,£, ) is the ad justm ent cost 
func tion , assumed lo  be convex increasing w ith  the am ount o f 
investm ent expenditure  b u t decreasing w ith  the capital stock as large 
firm s may undertake projects at low e r cost. £r is a random e rro r 
term  in the ad justm ent cost func tion .
The cap ita l stock accounting id e n tity  is represented by :
K t = I t + ( 1  —S)ATf (5 .3 .9)
where 5 is the depreciation rate on capita l goods. Jt is assumed tha t no
ad justm ent costs occur when o n ly  replacement investm ent is
undertaken.
To m axim ize equation (5 .3 .4 ) subject to  the constra in ts defined in 
equations (5 .3 .5), (5 .3 .6 ), (5 .3 .8 ) and (5 .3 .9 ), we construct a 
H am ilto rian  fu nc tion  w ith  shadow values fo r  capital goods, A^ 1, 
m arginal values fo r  being able to purchase own shares, kj1, and pay 
negative d iv idends, A^ 3, i.e.,
H, =  ( - p r A  -V 7 1) -  - O - S ) * ,  _ , )  -  v v , "  -  \ , 3za;5.3.10)
S ubs titu ting  equation (5 .3 .7 ) o f cash How constra in t in to  equation 
(5 .3 .10) we obtain :
H, = ( - p T - V i ) ( 1 - t ) ( F ( K ,  ,/V, )—'! '( / ,  ,K, 4 ,  )p, -p ,  i, hK, ) - ( 1  - .4  - b  )p, 1, + t B.
- ( 1  + \ , 2 )l V’-A ,1 ( K, - I ,  - ( 1 -S ) K ,  _ , )  ( 5 .3 .11)
The firs t order cond ition  fo r  investm ent at tim e  t may be derived
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from equation (5.3.11) as :
( 1 - 7 - W / ,  ,A', 4 ,  ) + l - 4 ,  -/>, p,+  A.,1 =  0  (5 .3 .12)
X,1 determ ines the m arginal increase in the f irm ’s value w h ich  w ou ld  
resu lts  fro m  adding one u n it o f capital to the firm . Equation (5 .3.12), 
thus, states tha t, an op tim is ing  firm  w il l  invest u n til the m arginal 
cost o f the new investm ent equals the m argina l benefit fro m  that 
investm ent.
Accord ing to  Tob in  ’q ’ theory, the investm ent decision o f the firm  is 
fu n c tio n  o f the ra tio  o f the m argina l e q u ity  value o f capita l, A^ 1 over 
the price o f cap ita l, pt . In o rder lo  make th is  theory testable, a 
measure o f the shadow price o f capita l A^1 is required. W h ile  in 
theory m argina l m arket value is the de te rm inan t o f investm ent, in 
practice, o n ly  average values are observable. Hayashi (1982 ) argued 
tha t the m arg ina l value o f an asset is equal to  its  average va lue  on ly  
i f  there is homogeneity in  the p roduction  fu n c tio n  and homogeneity 
in the capita l ad justm ent cost fu n c tio n . Poterba and Summers (1983) 
noted tha t, since the new investm ent a c t iv ity  is independent o f the 
present va lue  o f w r it in g  dow n allowances on past investm ent, ( Bt ), 
then the d ifference between the average m arke t value o f the firm  and 
these ou ts tand ing  w r it in g  dow n allowances w i l l  be homogeneous in 
the in it ia l cap ita l stock. M oreover, in te rna l ad justm ent cost to  y ie ld  a 
linear investm ent equation were in troduced by Summers (1981). 
From equation (5 .3 .12) the investm ent func tio n  may be deducted as a 
fu n c tio n  o f the ad justm ent costs as :
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M l ,  ,K, ) =  f t  =
I', -B ,
— 1 +At +bt
(5.3 .13)(1 — r )
It is assumed that the firm  w ou ld  never issue new shares and pay 
d iv idends in the same tim e to reduce its  overa ll lax  b il l .  Thus, in  
case where the firm  issues new share to finance its  m arginal project, 
then the above shadow cost o f new issue, A^ 2, is equal to  zero, and 
k?= (Q /\—z  )— l 8. Therefore, the m arginal va lue o f "Q" is :
Q n „ —
V , - B ,
P ,K ,-1
1 + A t
(5 .3 .14)
(1  — t )
I f ,  on the other hand, the m arginal source o f finance comes from  
retained earnings, then the shadow price o f new7 issue, \ 2, is zero. In 




Vi - B t 
Pi K t - l
1 +At -\~bt
(5 .3 .15)
(1 — r )
The above equations (5 .3 .14) fo r  new issue and (5 .3 .15) fo r  retained 
earnings, have been tested using aggregate in d u s tria l and commercial 
companies data, to lind strong support fo r  both personal and 
corporate taxes in influencing the level o f investm ent expenditure. 
The tra d itio n a l v iew  o f d iv idend  po licy is supported by the results. 
As a consequence, d iv idend  taxes discourage corporate investm ent.
A  num ber o f other specification o f Tobin ’q ’ theory have been used to
8. Prom equation (5.3.11) we deduct the first order conditions for new issue and 
dividend payments as :
( p T T - l  - K 3- K 2)Vtn = 0
and D t Kj** —  0  respectively.
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expla in  the investm ent behaviour. Jenkinson (1981)  defined tax 
adjusted Q as the ra tio  o f the to ta l m arket value o f indus tria l and 
com m ercia l companies in the U .K . over the sum o f capita l stock and 
stock and w o rk  in progress adjusted fo r  present value o f capital 
a llowances and stock re lie f. O u lton  (1981)  derived the e q u ilib r iu m  
va lue o f Q as the ra tio  o f the capitalised values o f d iv idends, interest 
paym ents and ’p ro fit due abroad’ adjusted fo r  income fro m  overseas 
and fro m  financia l assets. The denom inator o f Q is computed as the 
sum o f cap ita l slock and stock and w o rk  in  progress at replacement 
cost, ad justed fo r  the present value o f capita l allowances and stock 
re lie f. The present value o f depreciation allowances on o ld  capital 
stock is com puted assuming a steady state economy, where 
investm ent grow s at constant rate and in fla tion  is stagnant at the 
ex is ting  leve l. The present va lue o f depreciation allowances on old 
cap ita l is deducted fro m  the expected flow  o f allowances fro m  the 
new cap ita l to  approxim ate the m argina l Q. Both these studies provide 
strong support fo r  Tobin ’q ’ theory in exp la in ing aggregate 
investm ent behaviour.
3.2 C riticism  o f  the valuation m od el:
Despite the appealing characteristics o f the va lua tion  model, e ither in 
te rm s o f theo ry  behind it  o r em pirica l evidence, there are a num ber o f 
problem s w h ich  one has to take into consideration when app ly ing  th is 
model to  exp la in  investm ent behaviour.
S im ila r ly  to  the neoclassical model, in the ’O ’ fo rm u la tio n  the effects 
o f tax exhaustion cannot be d ire c tly  analysed. From equations
(5 .3 .14 ) and (5 .3 .15) the effective corporation tax rate has to be
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positive  o r zero. I f  the denom inator is u n ity  then th is ra tio  w il l  be 
equal to  the num era tor. I f ,  on the o ther hand, i t  is low er than zero, 
then the va lua tion  ra tio  w ou ld  be underestim ated. In a sense, th is 
case m ay prevent firm s  fro m  investing, but the extent may be 
overestim ated. As opposed to  the Jorgenson model, the present value 
o f a llowances m ay be negative fo r  th is  ra tio , i f  the firm  is not 
expecting to  recover capita l allowances. H ow ever, the ra tio  m ay be 
underestim ated i f  negative values o f the present va lue  o f allowances 
are inc luded.
Tob in  ’q ’ theory assumes strong re la tionsh ip  between the m arket and 
the behaviour o f the firm . In p a rticu la r, shareholders invest in a 
com pany fo r  the sole reason tha t the company is prosperous and w il l  
have good investm ent oppo rtun ities . The m arket efficiency has been 
w id e ly  accepted in  the financia l lite ra tu re  (see Fama (1976) fo r  a 
sum m ary  o f studies w h ich  support the hypothesis o f m arket 
efficiency fo r  common stock). I t  may, however, be the case th a t share 
price is not determ ined by long term  expectations. I f  the m arket 
cap ita lisa tion  o f the firm  has some speculative content, then the ’q ’ 
theo ry  m ay not be a correct measure fo r  investm ent (M a lin vcaux  
1982). Fu rthe rm ore , some firm s  m ay be underpriced, fo r  instance, 
because th e ir d iv idend  pay-ou t ra tio  is low  (recen tly  N icke ll and 
W adhw ani (1987 ) found  tha t the m arket attaches too high a weight 
to cu rren t d iv idends), o r because o f in fla tion  illu s io n  (M o d ig lia n i and 
Cohn 1979). M oreover, i f  the expected investm ent opportun ities  are 
the main de te rm inan ts  o f the m arket value o f the firm , then one 
w ou ld  expect a re la tive  s ta b ility  in the share prices because the firm  
does not change su b s ta n tia lly  and fre q u e n tly  its  investm ent
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programmes. However, em pirica l evidence supports the overreaction 
hypothesis (De Bondi and Tha ler (1985) and Shi 1 le r (1981a, 1981b))
The theory states tha t investm ent is related to m arginal va lue o f firm , 
i.e., the increase in the m arket value as a resu lt o f an increase in a 
u n it investm ent. In re a lity , however, o n ly  average ’q ’ is observable. 
Theories th a t approxim ate m arginal ’q ’ fo r  average ’q ’ assume either, 
th a t the m arket has already discounted the new investm ent, o r tha t 
the new pro ject is m arginal and w ou ld  not change sub s ta n tia lly  the 
va lue and the r is k  position o f the firm . I f  th is  is the case, then the ’q ’ 
m odel m ay o n ly  be lim ite d  to the analys is o f such investm ent 
projects, w h ich , in  fact the weighted average cost o f capita l does. 
Hayashi (1982), on the other hand, showed tha t i f  the production 
fu n c tio n  and ad justm ent cost functions are homogeneous o f firs t 
degree, then average and m argina l Q are the same.
The theory states th a t investm ent rate is o n ly  related to  cu rren t level 
o f ’q \  w h ile  em p irica l studies have inc luded, in add ition , lagged 
values. I f  the lags were not included, then the D urb in -W atson  
s ta tis tics  becomes ve ry  low  (V on  Furstenberg (1977), O u lton  (1981), 
Abel (1979 ), Abel and Blanchard (1983), and Poterba and Summers
(1 9 8 3 )). In add ition , fo r  the investm ent func tion , i f  both q and 
cu rren t p ro fit rate are incorporated as exp lanatory variables, 
investm ent rate m ay be more correlated to the la tte r than to  the 
va lua tio n  ra tio  (A be l and Blanchard (19 83 )). Th is means tha t 
companies are more inw a rd  looking  in th e ir investm ent decisions than 
regulated by the stock m arket.
Despite these reservations as to  the v a lid ity  o f the va lua tion  ra tio ,
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em pirica l studies have found it to l it  the aggregate data qu ite  w e ll. 
Th is model has not, however, been applied at com pany level in the 
UK. In the US Salinger and Summers (1 9 83 ) found strong 
re la tionsh ip  between investm ent and Q fo r  in d iv id u a l companies on a 
tim e  series basis. Aggregation bias is more pronounced fo r  th is model 
because a ll the determ inants o f ’Q* are s itua tion  specific 
characteristics o f each in d iv id u a l company and cannot be considered 
to be the same. In chapter 7 these issues o f aggregation bias are 
discussed together w ith  an estim ation o f the va lua tion  ra tio  fo r  each 
firm  in the sample.
4. Conclusion:
From th is  review  o f the lite ra tu re  we can conclude tha t there are 
m any econometric models tha t have been applied to  p rov ide  an 
em pirica l analysis o f the investm ent behaviour. A tte n tio n  is focussed 
more on these models th a t have analysed the im pact o f taxation  at the 
aggregate. Models tha t used company data d id  not analyse the im pact 
o f taxation. There is no d irect preference fo r one model as opposed to 
another to analyse tax im pact on investm ent. In add ition  to  these 
specifications reviewed above a num ber o f o ther specifications are 
used by the m acro-econometric models (W a llis  and al. (1984), 
C h ir in k o  and Eisner (1984a, 1984b)). The choice o f a p a rticu la r 
model seems to be determ ined more by w hat is being analysed.
Studies tha t compared the perform ance o f the d iffe ren t m acro­
econometric models appear to be unconclusive. C la rk  (1979 ) using 
US data and Savage (1977 ) using UK data found that ou tp u t is the 
p rim a ry  determ inant o f business fixed investm ent. On the o ther
- 175 -
hand, Fc lds le in  (1982), using US data, found some preference fo r the 
neoclassical model, and Jenkinson (1981) supports the v iew  that 
models w ith  e x p lic it trea tm en t o f p ro fita b ility  influences (neoclassical 
and va lu a tio n  m odels) pe rfo rm  better than the sim ple accelerator 
m odel. Using aggregate U K  In dus tria l and Com m ercial Companies 
data we obtained s im ila r  resu lts fro m  the va lua tion  model and the 
neoclassical.
In  the next tw o  chapters the im pact o f taxation is analysed using both 
the neoclassical model and the va lua tion  ra tio  adjusted fo r  taxa tion . 
In add itio n , the accelerator model w i l l  be tested in  order to  determ ine 
the im pact o f tax exhaustion w h ich  cannot be analysed th rough  the 
neoclassical model o r the Tob in  q.
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CHAPTER VI
EFFECTS OF T A X A T IO N  ON IN V E S TM E N T: N EO C LASSIC AL M ODEL
The theoretica l rev iew  o f the lite ra tu re  has shown tha t most previous 
em pirica l studies o f investm ent behaviour have concentrated on 
aggregate data despite the m icroeconom ic o rig in  o f the model. These 
studies have assumed tha t a ll the firm s in the economy have the ir 
p ro fits  taxed at the standard corporation lax rate and that they are a ll 
able to c la im  cap ita l allowances on th e ir investm ent expenditure. 
Therefore, th e ir  ob jective  in  de te rm in ing  the im pact o f taxation 
through the neoclassical model is more to do w ith  fo rm u la tin g  some 
macro-economic policies. They assume that firm s  w i l l  have 
unanim ous response to  any change in  the corporation tax system. 
However, as dem onstrated in  chapter 2, firm s  are d iffe ren t in the ir 
tax position . There fore, th e ir behaviour cannot be assumed to be 
homogeneous1.
Th is s tu d y  a ttem pts to f i l l  in  th is  gap in the lite ra tu re  by p rov id ing  
an analysis o f the re la tionsh ip  between investm ent expenditure and 
taxation using the neoclassical model fo r  a num ber o f in d iv id u a l 
companies. In th is  chapter the m odified investm ent equation together 
w ith  the em p irica l resu lts  are dealt w ith . The firs t section describes 
the d iffe re n t variab les used to expla in investm ent behaviour and 
comments on the reasons fo r  th e ir inclusion. In section 2 the 
m ethodology em ployed to obta in  the em pirica l results is considered
1. Thomas (1 9 8 5 ) analysed the problems of the aggregation of the production 
function and other like ly  problems of aggregation.
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and the construction  o f the required data is described in section 3. 
Section 4 presents the resu lts obtained together w ith  th e ir analysis 
and the possible exp lanations given to th e ir coefficients.
1. The Investm ent Equations :
The econom etric model applied to test the investm ent behaviour o f 
the sample o f firm  is based on the Jorgenson (1963) model. The 
choice o f th is  specific model is due to  the fact tha t, as seen above, i t  is 
de rived  fro m  an op tim isa tion  fu n c tio n  and a llow s fo r  the tax 
va riab les to  be incorporated as an element in  the de te rm ina tion  o f the 
f i rm ’s desired level o f capita l stock. Furtherm ore, th is  model, as 
opposed to  the va lua tio n  ra tio , avoids the problem s caused by the 
ilu c tu a tio n s  in the va lue o f the firm  due possib ly to some speculative 
reasons. The im pact o f taxa tion  on investm ent behaviour is analysed 
th rough  the user cost o f capita l as i t  is an clem ent in  the desired 
cap ita l stock, w h ich , in  tu rn , expla ins the level o f investm ent 
expend itu re  (H a ll and Jorgenson 1967, 1971).
H ow ever, th is  specification assumes tha t the response o f investm ent 
to  the d iffe re n t components o f the desired capita l stock is the same. 
A lte rn a t iv e ly , the op tim a l cap ita l stock may be s p lit in to  its  d iffe re n t 
components. The use o f a log a rithm ic  specification resu lts  in a 
substan tia l loss o f observations. Instead, the Savage (1977) 
fra m e w o rk , where we assume tha t the desired capital stock is 
approxim ated by an a d d itive  com bination o f its  components, is 
em ployed. In th is  w ay the coefficient o f the tax variab le  m ay be 
obtained. In ad d ition , the accelerator model may be used to  test fo r  
the im pact o f tax exhaustion on the level o f investm ent expenditure.
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1.1 H ypotheses tested :
From the above theoretica l review  o f the lite ra tu re , a num ber o f 
hypotheses that need to be e m p ir ic a lly  tested can be d ra w n  :
1) The em p irica l support o f the neoclassical model in  the previous 
studies im p lies tha t a com bina tion  o f fac to r prices and level o f ou tpu t 
exerts a strong influence on the level o f capita l expenditure. In 
pa rticu la r, th is  chapter w i l l  exam ine the positive re la tionsh ip  between 
investm ent and change in the desired capital stock. I f  th is  
re la tionsh ip  is established, then we can conclude that taxation affects 
investm ent, because, in th is  specification, we constra in t investm ent to 
have the same e la s tic ity  w ith  respect to  a ll o f the components o f the 
re la tive  price term .
2) Capita] a llowances and corpora tion  tax rates have a d irec t 
re la tionsh ip  to the level o f investm ent. The fo rm e r tends to encourage 
investm ent expenditure, because the more the company expects to 
c la im  add itiona l a llowances, the low e r the actual a fte r tax cost o f the 
equipm ent, and as a consequence the more investm ent is undertaken. 
On the other hand, corporate tax rate reduces the a fte r tax net present 
value o f a p a rtic u la r pro ject, therefore, discourages the firm  fro m  
financing some m argina l cap ita l equipm ent. The com bination o f these 
tw o  elements a llow s  one to  test fo r  :
a) w hether corpora tion  tax exerts any effect on investm ent 
expenditure;
b) w hether an increase in allowances an d /o r a reduction in the tax 
rate w ou ld  encourage investm ent expenditure.
3) A firm  is not l ik e ly  to increase its  investm ent expenditure i f  i t  is
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in  a position  where i t  cannot c la im  the capita l allowances, e ither in 
the near fu tu re  o r in the lone-te rm .
In o rder to  test fo r  these hypotheses, the fo llo w in g  set. o f linear 
investm en t equations are constructed :
J a ^  i .1 , 1 , x
— -----------— a o  +  a q A —  + a 2 — ---------  ( 6 . 1 . 1 )
A / , r -  1 A / \ r - l  A  / .i — 1
O Apl,u 0  A(1“ '4 i -' (1 - t u  } Ar, t
— - -------  —  0 O + ---------— — — --------h  0 2 ------------------— ---------------------------------- h  03- r ; -----—
+  0 4 - 7 ^ -  +  0 5 1 ^ -----  (6 ‘ L 2 )
l ^ -  =  y(. +  y .« 7 - f ,  +  y 2T A X , +  y , A - ^ - +  y 4— !—  (6.1.3)
A  / ,f — 1 A / . * ~ l  A / , * - l
W here - ■ '*■—  = "add itions to  o ther tangib le assets" o f firm  i at tim e
A » .t - i
t, deflated by the opening leve l o f stock o f p lan t and m ach inery, at 
1980 prices;
A = change fro m  period t-1 to  t;
1
= the period change in  the desired cap ita l stock; 
the inverse o f the capita l stock o f p lan t and equipm ent
A / ,/ - i
a t the beginning o f the period at constant 1980 prices;
Qi jl = level o f ou tp u t; 
r id = cost o f e q u ity  cap ita l;
A t i = present va lue  o f cap ita l allowances;
7,- f = e ffective  corpora tion tax rate before a llow ing  fo r  the capital 
allowances; 
p  {
* J ' = re la tive  price o f the price o f o u tpu t over the price o f
°k j  j
cap ita l;
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H T , j = a d u m m y variab le  reflecting the fact tha t a company i is 
tax exhausted fo r  more than three consecutive years;
TAXi t -  d u m m y variab le  w h ich  defines tax exhausted companies 
at tim e  1;
The signs o f the exp lana to ry variables are expected to be as fo llo w s  
a ()> 0 ;  a j> 0 ;  a 2> 0 ;
j30> 0 ; /3j > 0 ;  f32< 0 ; j33< 0 ; j34> 0 ; 0 5>O. 
y 0> 0 ;  y i< 0 ;  y 2< 0 ; y 3> 0 ; y 4> 0 ;
1.2 D e f in it io n  o f  th e  V a r ia b le s  :
The exp lana to ry  variables arc defined as :
a) H ypothesis 1 im plies tha t capita l expend iture  d u ring  the period 
acts a t reducing the gap between the op tim a l capita l stocks o f tw o  
successive periods. The desired capita l stock, in tu rn , is determ ined 
by the desired level o f o u tp u t, price o f ou tpu t and the user cost o f 
cap ita l, i.e.
K* — ot—^ -  =  a --------------------^ ------------------   (6 .1 .4 )
<■' Pt ( r  + 8 X 1  - , 4 ) ( 1  - r ) - '
The h igher the value o f o u tp u t, (P  ), the higher the desired capita l 
stock. On the o ther hand, the higher the user cost o f cap ita l, c, the 
low e r the desired level o f capita l stock because the more expensive is 
the acqu is ition  o f capita l equipm ent.
C orpo ra tion  tax facto rs are incorporated through the present value o f 
a llow ances (A )  and the e ffective corporation tax rate ( r ) .  The facto r 
Pk ( \ —A  ) measures the actual cost o f purchasing the equipm ent. I f  
the firm  is able to c la im  the w ho le  cost o f the asset purchased in the 
firs t year against tax, then it  acquired the equipm ent free o f charge.
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A n y  p ro po rtio n  o f A  represent a subsidy to capita l expenditure. The 
user cost o f capita l is also increased by the required rate o f re tu rn  by 
shareholders, r , and by the depreciation rate, 8.
Because o f the re la t iv e ly  sm all num ber o f tim e  series observations 
(12  years), no a ttem p t has been made to  com pute the e las tic ity  o f 
s u b s titu tio n  between capita l and labour. Instead, the Cobb-Douglas 
p roduction  fu n c tio n  is assumed fo r  a ll the companies in the sample, 
thus  constra in ing  the e lastic ities o f the investm ent w ith  respect to  the 
o u tp u t and re la tive  prices to  be equal. M oreover, i t  is assumed tha t 
o u tp u t and the user cost o f capita l affect the desired capital stock in 
the same w ay , in o the r w ords, a percentage change in the present 
va lue o f the allowances w ou ld  afreet the desired cap ita l stock in the 
same w ay as the same change in the cost o f finance or the economic 
deprecia tion. These arc p robab ly  strong assum ptions given that the 
firm s  in the sample are not o n ly  o f d iffe re n t sizes, but spread in to  
d iffe re n t indus tries  as w e ll.
b) W hen the la tte r  assum ption is relaxed the o rig ina l neoclassical 
specification is re fo rm u la te d  in such a w ay as the e las tic ity  o f each 
component o f the desired capita l stock may be estimated 
in d iv id u a lly .  In o rder to s p lit the neoclassical fo rm u la tio n  in to  its  
d iffe re n t components one need to  use the loga rithm ic  specification 
because the user-cost o f capita l is a product ra the r than a sum. 
H ow ever, because o f the re la tiv e ly  large num ber o f negative and zero 
values, th is  specification has resulted in a substantia l loss o f 
observations. Instead, the specification used by Savage (1977) is 
em ployed here. It assumes tha t the op tim a l capita l stock may be 
approxim ated by an a d d itive  com bination o f the re la tive  price o f
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pq
ou tpu t and cap ita l, tax facto r, (1 — A  ) / ( ! — t ),  cost o f capital, r,
Pk
and the level o f o u tp u t, Q. The desired level o f capita l stock becomes 
as fo llo w s :
* Pa (1 —.4 )K = a ,  — + a 2j j ^ y + a 3r  +  a 4 Q (6 . 1 . 5 )
and the investm ent model may be transfo rm ed as:
ns + /3 ,A ^ -  +  p 2A j ^ y  + P3A r  + PaAQ +  H0K
K - ,  K
(6.1.6 )
L± . A ( l ~ ^  >
_  a a a Pk , o ( l —r)  , 0 A/- Q AQ , 0 1
— ft, +   *" 02---p----------- f- 03“P-------  ^ 04“P----- *" 05“p-----A _ J  A  _ ]  A  _ j  A  _ j  - l
(6 .1 .7 ) I f
corporation lax docs not affect the level o f investm ent expenditure, 
then the cocHicicnt o f the tax variab le , j32, w i l l  be ins ign ifican t. On 
the o ther hand, i f  corporate taxa tion  does have an im pact on the level 
o f investm ent, then th is  va riab le  is expected to be negative ly 
correlated to  the investm en t rate.
c) H ypothesis 3 pred icts th a t the p a rticu la r tax position the firm  is in  
may influence the level o f investm ent. Specifica lly, i f  the firm  is not 
l ik e ly  to be able to  c la im  tax rebates on its  investm ents i t  is expected 
to be re fra ined  fro m  unde rtak ing  some projects that are m argina l. 
The basis fo r  such decision is the effective corporation tax rate the 
firm  w i l l  have to  pay before undertak ing  any add itiona l investm ent. 
I f  i t  is in tax exhaustion position then the firm  is expected to  have a 
low e r level o f cap ita l expend itu re.
I f  a company is tax exhausted, it may be in th is  position fo r  ju s t a 
short tim e period, in w h ich  case cu rren t allowances could be carried
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fo rw a rd  and claimed against fu tu re  p ro fits . W hat is more o f interest 
to investm ent decision is w hether the company is not able to claim  
past allowances at a ll. I f  th is  is the case, then the cost o f the asset 
w i l l  be higher, and th is p o ss ib ility  m ay discourage the firm  fro m  
undertak ing  some projects. In order to test fo r  these effects, we define 
tw o  d u m m y variables, one to  measure tax exhaustion in  any 
p a rtic u la r year. The other defines h ig h ly  tax exhausted companies i f  
th is  s itua tion  spreads over more than three years.
I f ,  as argued in chapter 1, corpora tion tax is neu tra l, then we w ou ld  
expect both these du m m y variab les to  be ins ign ifican t, i.e. not to 
influence the level o f investm ent undertaken. On the other hand, i f  
corpora tion tax d is to rts  the level o f investm ent in  p lan t and 
m ach inery, then these variables are expected to  be negative ly 
corre la ted to  the level on investm ent expenditure.
2. M ethodology:
Cross-sectional tests o f the neoclassical model are ve ry  rare. The 
reason given by Jorgenson and Siebert (1968 ) fo r  not using cross- 
sectional data is the d if f ic u lty  in specify ing  the lag s tructu res 
co rrec tly . However, at company leve l, the a v a ila b ility  o f a re la t iv e ly  
ve ry  sm all sample period and the existence o f serial co rre la tion  may 
make estimates o f time-series data biased. Using cross-sectional data 
cou ld , however, lead to some problem s. In p a rticu la r hom ogeneity o f 
the sample is assumed. Eisner and S tro tz  (1963) argue that 
investm ent o f a sm all firm  cannot be compared to the leve l o f 
investm ent o f a large firm , and M eyer and G lauber (1964) overcame 
th is  problem  by c a re fu lly  selecting th e ir sample. F urtherm ore , the
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estimates obtained from  eross-seetional data may not be generalised 
as they re fe r to o n ly  one period o f tim e and they could stem from  
o n ly  an unrepresentative year. But such problem  may be reduced the 
higher the num ber o f consecutive years in the sample period. Kuh 
(1963 ) argued tha t cross-sectional data may be a poor w ay fo r 
analysis when dynam ic disturbances are present and unaccounted fo r  
by the model. In th is  case, the accelerator model w h ich  makes 
investm ent dependent on o n ly  the level o f o u tp u t is superior to  the 
neoclassical model. However, the lik e ly  bias depends on w ha t is 
analysed. K uh was s tudy ing  the determ inants o f investm ent from  
the aspect o f macro dynam ic  model w h ile  Eisner and S tro tz  argue 
that cross-sectional analysis m ay ind icate not the determ inants o f 
aggregate investm ent bu t ra the r by w hich  lirm  investm ent is 
undertaken.
Th is  s tud y  a ttem pts to  exp la in  investm ent behaviour o f a num ber o f 
in d iv id u a l companies by using the neoclassical model as developed by 
Jorgenson. F irs t, a ll the firm s are taken together to fo rm  a pooled 
cross-sectional tim e-scrics estimates. Th is method is efficient o n ly  i f  
the variables have not fluctuated subs tan tia lly  du ring  the sample 
period. G iven the re la tive ly  long sample period (11 years) i t  is 
d if f ic u lt to imagine that the variab les have been stable. Because o f the 
low  level o f the degrees o f freedom , there was no a ttem pt to obtain 
tim e-series estimates. Instead, a set o f cross-sectional estimates are 
com puted fo r  each year fro m  1973 through to 1983. The advantage 
o f cross-sections is tha t, as opposed to tim e series, co llin e a rity  
between the variables may be reduced and it  a llow s fo r  the effects o f 
a w ide  varia tion  in the dependent variab le  to be better explored. For
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instance, a change in the desired capital stock, m igh t indicate the 
lik e ly  consequence o f a movement in the tax rate w hich could not 
easily be predicted fro m  tim e series. Cross-sections estimates are 
expected to approxim ate  long -run  re la tions bu t annual estimates may 
su ffe r fro m  short run  disturbances as a consequence o f incomplete 
a d ju s tm e n t2.
G iven tha t the firm s in the sample are o f d iffe ren t sizes, as measured 
by th e ir  capital stock or sales, using absolute values may lead to  the 
problem  o f hcteroskedastic ity . In o rder to obtain unbiased 
coefficients, a ll the variables tha t are in value term s are deflated by 
the level o f capita l stock. Thus investm ent, fo r  instance, instead o f 
being the actual va lue o f investm ent expenditure, is expressed as a 
p roportion  o f the existing capita l stock, so tha t comparison may be 
made against o ther companies w ith o u t bias o f size.
Using OLS fo r  pooled cross-sectional and tim e scries estimates may 
lead to  tw o  m ain problems. The least squares estim ators o f the 
regression coefficients are unbiased and efficients o n ly  i f  the 
specification o f the model represents a ll w hat is supposed to be 
know n  about the regression equation and the variables invo lved . I f  
the d isturbance in the investm ent fu nc tion  fo r  one equation is 
correlated w ith  the disturbances in the investm ent functions o f other 
equations then the OLS estimates may be biased. I f  fo r instance the 
regression coefficients in  each equation are the same as the regression 
coefficients in any o ther equation, then the w hole data may be treated
2. See Kuh (1963) pp. 173-IMS on such points.
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in a single equation and the observations w ou ld  represent pooled 
cross-section and tim e series data. However, i f  th is  is not the ease, 
then the data is d iv id e d  in to  a system o f M equations know n as the 
seem ingly unrelated regressions (SU R ) equation. The estim ation 
technique is developed by Z e lln e r (1962). Th is method estimates a 
set o f regression equations, thus a llo w s  each u n it to be described by 
one equation fro m  the system . It thus reduces the possible 
co rre la tion  between the d iffe re n t d isturbances o f d iffe re n t companies.
W hen pooled data is used we arc constra in ing the coefficients o f single 
years equations to  be the same fo r  a ll the years. Th is, however, m ay 
not be the case i f  the exp lana to ry  variables and the dependent 
variab les have changed s ig n ifica n tly  du ring  the sample period, and 
th is  m ovem ent may not be in the same d irection . In o rder to  test 
s im u lta neous ly  the v a lid i ty  o f h restric tions, i.e. the hypothesis 
th a t a ll the coefficients o f the exp lana to ry  variables are equal th rough 
the years, we com pute F  d is tr ib u tio n  w ith  (h ,n -k )  degrees o f 
freedom as (K ou tso y ia n n is  (1 977) p. 1 72) :
(SSRr -  SSRtl ) / / i  
F  “  SSRU / ( n - k ) (6 .2 .1 )
W here n -k  re fers to the degrees o f freedom associated w ith  the 
un restric ted  equation;
SSRU = Sum o f squared residua ls obtained when coefficients va ry  
through tim e;
SSRr = Sum o f squared residua ls when coefficients arc restric ted  
to be equal;
n is the sample size;
k is the num ber o f un res tric ted  parameters.
We reject the res tric tions i f  the proportionate  increase in the sum o f 
squared residuals resu lting  from  the ir im position  is su ffic iently  large, 
i.c
F* > F ,
\ .
W here c is the level o f significance chosen.
3. Data Construction :
Most data required to estim ate the neoclassical model is obtained 
fro m  E xta t data bank. Some other data sources are needed to 
com pute such variables as the cost o f capita l and the price deflator. 
In the present section the methods used to estim ate a ll the necessary 
variab les are described together w ith  some reservations as to the 
a v a ila b il ity  o f data and the techniques em ployed.
3.1 Estim ation o f investm ent and capital stock variables :
Investm ent is taken as add itions to  other tangible assets 3, i.e. p lant 
and m ach inery. The neoclassical model specifies that the variables 
tha t are in value term s have to  be taken at constant prices. Because 
o f the u n a v a ila b ility  o f the price index to use to deflate the value o f 
p ro pe rty  w h ich  is at h is to rica l cost additions to property are not 
inc luded. Thus, thereafter, the term  investm ent w i l l  re fe r to 
add itions in p lan t and m achinery o n ly . Th is  is deflated using the 
’Price Index Num bers fo r  C urren t Cost A ccounting ’ (1982) and 
Business M o n ito r (1986) to  obta in  investm ent in  p lan t and m achinery
3. In lixtal tangible assets are classified as property and other tangible assets. The 




From I he E x la l data bank, the fo llo w in g  re la tionsh ip  is found to 
define the evolvem ent o f the capita l stock through the period :
K t = K t +  M PMt -  M Dt (6.3.1.1)
M ovem ents in  p lan t and m achinery (M P M ) inc lude :
a) A dd itions ,
b) Disposals,
c) New subsid ia ry  companies,
d ) S ubsid iary companies disposed ofT,
e) Reevaluation,
f )  C urrency change,
g) O ther.
Movem ents in depreciation (M D ) d u rin g  the period contain :
1) Charge fo r  the year,
2) A d jus tm en t on disposals,
3) New subsid ia ry  company,
4) Subsid ia ry com pany disposed ofT,
5) Reevaluation,
6) C urrency change,
7) O ther.
The depreciation rate is com puted as the ra tio  o f the depreciation 
charge fo r  the period ( DEPt ) over the opening balance o f the capital 
stock ( K t _ ] ) 4, i.e.,
G iven that the denom inator o f th is  ra tio  is valued at h is torica l cost5,
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in lla lio n  m ay affect the ra le obtained6. However, i f  the depreciation 
expense is calculated on the basis o f the capital stock at h istorica l 
cost, then th is  rate may be independent o f the in fla tion  rate. 
M oreover, using th is  m ethod i t  is assumed tha t a ll the capital stock in 
the com pany is homogeneous, depreciates at the same rate and that 
companies use the same method o f depreciation, independently o f the 
age and na tu re  o f the existing  capita l stock. In Theory, in order to 
com pute the depreciation rate, one needs to  know  the length o f l ife  o f 
each cons tituen t o f the capita l stock, then fo r  each year, compute the 
corresponding economic depreciation. However, given tha t the data 
ava ilab le  does not d is tingu ish  between the d iffe re n t components o f 
the cap ita l stock and docs not give the re la tive  asset life  o f each 
clem ent, the average depreciation rate, as com puted above is thought 
to  be the closest ap p ro x im a tion7. The above equation (6 .3 .1 .1) o f the 
capita l stock becomes :
K t =  N M P M t +  (1 -  8)K t _ , (6 .3 .1 .2)
W here N M P M t is the net movements in p lan t and m achinery du ring
the period com puted as the difference between movements in p lan t
4. M ayer (19 82 a ) compared the alternative techniques that can be used to estimate 
depreciation rate from  the published accounts found that the ratio of 
depreciation to gross capital stock to yield the most consistent results.
5.  IC A  (1 9 8 2 ) reported that many companies surveyed use the same asset lifes in 
computing both the historical cost accounts and current cost accounts.
6 . Ilu lle n  and W yko ff (19 81 ) found that inflation does affect the rate of 
depreciation in the sense that companies use higher rate to depreciate more 
quickly  their equipment. The subject of the effects of inflation on depreciation 
has been dealt extensively in the literature. See for instance Baxter (1 9 7 1 ) and 
Auerbach and Jorgenson ( l9 8 0 ) .
7. 'fhe average life  of the assets is found to be approxim ately 10 years (7  to 10 
years in IC A  (1 9 8 2 ) survey). An attem pt has been made to use the Cambridge, 
Departm ent of Applied Hconomics data bank to compute the depreciation using 
the above method, but the differences in the definition of the data made this 
com pulation impossible.
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and m achinery d u rin g  the period and m ovements in depreciation 
w ith o u t the depreciation charge fo r  the year (w h ic h  is incorporated in
s x
In o rder to  convert the h is to rica l cost capital in to  constant prices net 
movements in p lan t and m achinery are deflated in to  1980 prices using 
the re levan t in d u s try  price index fo r  each firm . F irm s are classified 
in to  d iffe re n t indus tries  according to  the Standard In d u s tria l 
C lassification (S IC ). I t  is, however, assumed here th a t a firm  is 
operating o n ly  in  one in d u s try , w h ile  in re a lity  m any o f them m ay be 
d ive rs ified . Furtherm ore , the CSO computes the price index on the 
basis o f p lan t ra th e r than firm . T h is  is, however, considered the best 
data ava ilab le . I t  is expected tha t a large am ount o f investm ent is 
d irected in to  expansion and depreciation in tha t re levant in d u s try . 
The sign ificant co rre la tion  between the price indices o f a ll industries 
m ay not make th is  assum ption ve ry  strong.
The bench-va lue o f capital stock at replacement cost is taken fro m  
the cu rre n t cost accounting published accounts w h ich  is in m ost case 
in 1980. The p rev ious and post- th is  year’s values are com puted by 
cu m u la tin g  the deflated investm ent and by using the ra te o f 
depreciation as com puted above. Some companies have not produced 
th e ir cu rren t cost accounts. T h e ir capital stock at 1980 prices was 
not estim ated.
3.2 Com putation o f  the cost o f  c a p ita l:
The cost o f cap ita l is taken as the cost o f e q u ity . I t  is assumed tha t 
the firm  w ou ld  undertake investm ent projects i f  the re tu rns  
generated by such investm ents increase shareholders’ w ea lth . There
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arc tw o  m ain d iffe re n t w ays o f com puting  the required re tu rn  on 
equ ity  cap ita l : The d iv idend  va lua tion  model and the capital asset 
p ric ing  model (C A P M ).
The firs t one assumes tha t the fu tu re  flow  o f annual d iv idends is 
expected to be in  p e rpe tu ity  and computes the cost o f cap ita l on the 
basis o f the ra tio  o f d iv idends over the m arke t va lue  o f the firm . 
However, i f  the com pany does not pay any d iv id ends  (w h ich  is the 
case o f a num ber o f firm s  in  the sample) then th is  m ethod w o u ld  fa il 
to estim ate co rrec tly  the cost o f cap ita l. F u rthe rm ore , because o f the 
fluctua tions in share prices, due possib ly to  speculative reasons, the 
cost o f cap ita l obtained fro m  th is  m ethod fluctuates s ign ifican tly . 
A lte rn a tiv e ly , we can assume tha t d iv idends increase by a certa in 
am ount every year. Then, instead o f com puting  the cost o f eq u ity  
using o n ly  the ra tio  o f d iv idend  to  price, we add a te rm  reflecting the 
g row th  rate in  d iv idends to  the d iv idend  y ie ld . In th is  case, even i f  
th is  la tte r is zero the cost o f cap ita l w o u ld  s t i l l  be equal to  the 
g row th  rate w h ich  m ay be computed by tak ing  the average past rate 
o f g row th  in d iv idends and assuming tha t th is  rate w i l l  continue 
unchanged in  the fu tu re , o r by using the Gordon model in  w h ich  case 
the d iv idend  g row th  rate is a fu n c tio n  o f the rate o f re tu rn  y ie lded 
by investm ent projects. W h ile  the la tte r  cannot be applied  because it  
e x p lic it ly  assumes an a ll eq u ity  company, the average d iv id e nd  rate 
resulted in some u n rea lis tic  values fo r  the cost o f cap ita l8.
S. The average dividend growth rate over the sample period is computed as the 
average of the ratio of current level of dividend per share over lagged value, 
m inus  1. The values of the growth rale obtained range from -0.6 to 0.7.
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The capita l asset p ric ing  model (C A P M ) is used to  estimate the cost 
ol' equ ity . It states that in m arket e q u ilib r iu m  the expected re tu rn  on 
a security  is the risk  free rate o f interest p lus a risk  prem ium  
determ ined by the level o f m arke t r isk  :
Rs tRm the rates o f re tu rn  on the security  and on the m arket 
respective ly.
The basic idea is a com puta tion  o f j3 w h ich  measures the se n s itiv ity  
o f the share price to the movements in  the m arket ( Rm ). Th is model 
can be used in cap ita l budgeting because the m arket value o f the firm  
is the present value o f its  investm ent schedule. It is, thus, assumed 
tha t pro ject beta is equal to  the average beta o f the firm . T h is  model 
is superio r to the previous ones as it  a llow s  fo r  the risk  clem ent. I t  
is, however, based on some restric ted  assum ptions (Jensen 1972) :
( i )  a ll investors are single period, expected u t i l i t y  o f te rm ina l w ea lth  
m axim isers, w ho chose among a lte rna tive  p o rtfo lio s  on the basis o f 
the mean and variance o f p o r tfo lio  re tu rns;
( i i )  a ll investors can bo rrow  and lend an u n lim ite d  am ount at an 
exogenously given risk  free rate o f in terest;
( i i i )  a ll investors have identica l sub jective  estimates o f the means, 
variances and covariances o f re tu rns  among assets, i.e. investors have 
hom ogeneous ex pectation s;
R, = R ,  + & ( /? „ ,  - R f  )
Where R s = a one period expected re tu rn  on secu rity  s;
(6 .3 .3)
R f  = the r is k  free rate o f re tu rn ; 
Rm = the m arket expected re tu rn ;
the measure o f system atic r is k , w ith
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( iv )  a ll assets arc pe rfec tly  d iv is ib le  and p e rfe c tly  liq u id  w ith  no 
res tric tions  on short sales o f assets;
( v )  There are no transaction costs and no taxes;
( v i )  a ll investors arc price takers;
( v i i )  the quan titie s  o f a ll assets arc given;
and also ( v i i i )  a ll securities in  the m arke t are m arketable (R o ll 1977).
W h ile  some o f these assumptions, such as transaction cost and 
taxa tion , m ay be relaxed, the homogeneity in  expectations o f 
shareholders fo r  instance, has been re fu ted  (B lum e and Friend 1975). 
F urtherm ore , to  have the exact C APM  re la tionsh ip  (equation 6.3.3) 
the m arke t p o r tfo lio  efficiency condition  should hold. In o ther words, 
i f  the 750 actuaries o rd in a ry  share index used to p ro xy  the m arket 
re tu rn  is not on the actual efficient fro n tie r , then the required re tu rn  
by shareholders is not related to  the system atic risk  as the CAPM 
asserts (R o ll 1977). In th is  s tud y , we recognise th is  p o ss ib ility , but 
we use the 750 actuaries o rd in a ry  share index as a p roxy  fo r  the 
m arke t re tu rn .
M ore im p o rta n tly  is the fact that when C APM  approach is related to 
fixed investm ents w hich  are held fo r  a period o f more than one year, 
one is faced w ith  the issues o f w hether and to  w ha t extent project 
beta changes over tim e. E m pirica l studies have found  th a t security  
betas are not s ta tiona ry  (D im son and M arsh 1983). Such fluctuations 
in in d iv id u a l secu rity  betas m ay arise fro m  changes in  the f irm ’s 
capita l s tru c tu re  (Hamada 1972), bu t th is, n o rm a lly , w ou ld  not affect 
s ign ifica n tly  pro ject betas. Gonedes (1973 ) found  tha t, w h ile  such 
betas m ay not be constant th rough tim e, they do not change 
d ra m a tica lly  over 5 to 10 years. E m p ir ic a lly , i t  was found  tha t the
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s ta b ility  o f beta increases the longer the estim ation period (D im son 
and M arsh 1983) and the sm aller the estim ation in te rva ls  
(D iacogiannis 1986).
A no ther problem  w ith  using the CAPM  to p roxy the cost o f equ ity  is 
the poss ib ility  tha t some shares may be subject to th in  trad ing. 
According to Dimson (1979) in frequen t trad ing  resu lts  in a bias 
w hich comes from  the p o ss ib ility  that the prices recorded at the end 
o f a tim e  period may represent the outcome o f a transaction w hich 
occurred earlie r in o r p r io r  to the tim e in  question. To account fo r  
th is  problem , m u lt ip le  regressions o f secu rity  re tu rns  have to be run  
against lagged m atching and leading m arke t term s and consistent 
betas may be obtained by aggregating the slope coefficients from  the 
regression. However, Theobald (1983) argued tha t even i f  th is  
procedure e lim inates the effects o f nontrad ing on parameter 
estim ators, the residuals are s t i l l  affected by the th in  trad ing  
problem s w hich arc s t i l l  present in the re tu rn  variables themselves. 
Instead, longer d ifferencing in te rva ls  m ay be preferable at th is  
specification reduces the problem  o f a llocating  price movements to 
p a rticu la r periods.
A lthough  the above assum ptions m ay not hold in re a lity , th is  model 
appears to be the best ava ilab le  to estimate the cost o f cap ita l. For the 
present s tudy , 3 d iffe re n t specifications have been tried  to estimate 
beta fo r  each company and fo r  each year in the sample period. The 
m o n th ly  log re tu rns extracted fro m  the London Share Price Database 
(LSPD ) are used. The 750 actuaries o rd in a ry  share index is used as 
m arket re tu rn . Betas fo r  calendar years were obtained using 
o rd in a r ily  least squares (O LS )9. Because o f the substantia l loss o f the
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degrees o f freedom , the m o n th ly  is pre ferred to the q u a rte r ly  re turns. 
The independent variab le  is the re tu rn  o f the secu rity  over 5 years 
(th u s  m aking 60 observations) preceding the last m onth  o f the period. 
The D im son ’s approach was firs t fo llo w e d  fo r  a ll companies, 
assuming that i f  the company is not subject lo  th in  trad ing  then the 
coefficients o f the lags w ou ld  be ve ry  sm all and ins ign ifican t. Betas 
were then obtained as the sum o f the 11 coefficients. A n  a lte rna tive  
m ethod was to use o n ly  lags w ith o u t corresponding leads. F in a lly , 
the exp lana to ry  variab le  was defined o n ly  as the corresponding 
m arke t re tu rn  w ith o u t lags o r leads. I t  is im p o rta n t to  concentrate on 
the s ta b ility  o f beta when choosing between the estim ation  methods. 
T h is  is because o f the fac t tha t ou r analysis is based on the pooled 
data and also, even in  cross-sectional, the seem ingly unrelated 
regressions technique takes account o f the changes th rough the years. 
I f  beta is not stable, then the cost o f capital obtained w ou ld  not be 
stable, as a consequence the user cost o f capita l used in the 
neoclassical specification w ou ld  fluctua te  from  one period to  another 
(sec Append ix I fo r  a deta iled comparison between betas obtained 
fro m  these three methods and th e ir consequence on the changes in the 
cost o f cap ita l). In term s o f s ta b ility  o f betas th rough years the last 
m ethod appeared to y ie ld  the most consistent resu lts than the firs t 
tw o  specifications.
9. The OLS technique may not, however, be the best method to estimate beta, but 
the relative differences between this technique and other alternative methods is 
not significant as far as the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity is concerned 
(Theobald 19X0) while the stationarity is corrected by the use of a moving 
series of parameter estimates.
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The cost o f e q u ity  is then a rrived  at by using equation (6 .3 .3). The 
risk  free rate, R f  , is estimated using the m o n th ly  treasury b ill rate 
and the m arket re tu rn  is calculated on the basis o f the London 750 
o rd in a ry  shares index. Based on the idea tha t the m arke t re turns are 
supposed to reflect the expected re tu rns  investors w o u ld  th in k  o f 
getting by investing  in the m arket, and tha t they w ou ld  not expect 
large fluc tua tions  in  the re tu rn  on the m arke t p o rtfo lio , the average 
risk  free rate and m arke t re tu rn  over the w hole sample period (15 
years) are used. These have resulted in  the risk  free rate to  be equal 
to  10.03 per cent and the m arke t re tu rn  to  be set equal to 12.312 per 
cen t10.
3.3 Other explanatory variables :
The desired cap ita l stock is fu n c tio n  o f the va lue o f o u tp u t and o f the 
user cost o f cap ita l. The expected va lue o f o u tp u t is approxim ated by 
cu rren t sales. Change in  the va lue o f stock was not taken in to  
account because a high level o f slock may be due to overproduction 
ra the r than w ha t can be sold in the m arket. To compute the value o f 
o u tp u t at constant 1980 prices, sales were deflated using an average 
stock ’Price Indices fo r  Stocks Held by Specific Indus tries ’ CSO (1982, 
1986). T h is  index is also based on p a rticu la r stock ra the r than on the 
to ta l stock the firm  possesses. G iven the n o n -a v a ila b ility  o f the 
d iffe re n t components o f stocks, th is  index is used as a p roxy, thus 
assuming tha t a ll the stock relates to the centra l a c tiv ity  o f the firm .
10. Weston and llrigham (1 9 7 9 ) used an average over 16 years to compute both the 
m arket return and the risk free rate of return.
To estim ate the user eosl o f capita l we need also the com putation  o f 
the price o f capita l, the depreciation rate and the tax variables. The 
price index fo r  the cu rren t cost accounting as published in  the CSO is 
used to  p ro xy  the price o f cap ita l fo r  each com pany. F o llow ing  K ing  
and F u lle rto n  (1984), the economic depreciation is com puted as being 
tw ice  the s tra igh t line  depreciation.
The tax variables are com puted fro m  the tax model (see chapter 1). 
F irm s are assumed to be d iv ided  in to  3 categories. They m ay, e ither, 
be in  tax paying position i f  th e ir e ffective  corpora tion  tax rate is 
pos itive  o r be tax exhausted in w h ich  case they are not paying tax. 
A lte rn a t iv e ly , they m ay be h ig h ly  tax exhausted i f  th e ir  taxable 
p ro fit is negative o r zero in 3 successive years. D um m y variables are 
defined to capture these effects. For the tax exhausted, a company is 
assigned a value 1 i f  its  taxable p ro fit is zero o r negative and zero 
otherw ise. For the th ird  category, the d u m m y va riab le  is equal to  1 
i f  the firm  is tax exhausted in  3 consecutive years o r m ore11. For th is  
th ird  category, it  is assumed tha t none o f the companies in  the sample 
is tax exhausted in 1971, so tha t to  avoid considering th is  du m m y 
variab le  as m issing in 1973.
F o llow in g  M c lliss  and Richardson (1976), the value o f the incentive  
has been calculated in discounted cash flow  term s. T h is  method 
assumes tha t the lax system w ou ld  not change over the l ife  o f the
11. Firms are norm ally able to claim lax reliefs for a period of up to six years 
(chapter 1). but if all these years were taken into account this variable would  
appear only starting from  1977. For computation purposes it is assumed that a 
firm w ith  negative or zero taxable profit in a period of three years m ay be seen 
as highly lax exhausted.
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asset. The present value o f in it ia l and depreciation allowances are 
computed in such a w ay as to reflect the o p p o rtu n ity  cost to the 
shareholders. The discount rate used then is the cost o f equ ity  as 
computed above. The effective corporation tax, as calculated fo r each 
company, takes already account o f the cap ita l allowances. In order to 
isolate the im pact o f capita l allowances i t  is necessary to  compute the 
effective tax ra te w ith o u t accounting fo r  these allowances. In th is  
w ay  double counting  o f cap ita l allowances are avoided.
For the sample period, incentives fo r  p lan t and m achinery were o f the 
fo rm  o f in it ia l a llowance and depreciation allowance. These 
allowances are set against the taxable p ro fit. For tax purposes, 
depreciation on p lan t and equipm ent is on a reducing balance basis. 
For each u n it o f capital expenditure, the present value o f these 
allowances m ay be computed as :
N P V  =
or
NPV  =
( l + r  )'
(1 + r Y
d O - d - R )  , d ( \ - d ) ( \ - d - R )  ,{R + d  ) +  7 ■ -x +  ---------   —----------- +  • *
(1 + r )  ( l + r ) 2
( R  + d  ) +  d ( - } ; d~  £




Assum ing th a t n tends tow ards in f in ity , then th is  equation becomes :
d ( \ - d - R )NPV  =
(1 +r )'
( R  -\~d ) + (6 .3 .3 .1)( r  + d  )
W here r  is the effective corporate tax rate before deducting  the 
allowances;
R = in it ia l allowance;
d = annual reducing balance w r it in g  down allowance; 
r  = d iscount rate (C A P M );
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1 = lag in lax paym ent assumed to be 1 year and 7 months;
NPV = Net present value per u n it o f capital cost o f an asset l ife  
o f n years.
For in d u s tr ia l bu ild ings, on the o ther hand, depreciation is calculated 
on a s tra igh t line  basis. Using the same notation as above, the 
fo rm u la  fo r  the present value o f allowances is as fo llo w s  :
NPV  =
( l + r  ) '
(R  +c/ ) +  d ( l + r  )A - 1  
r  ( l + r  ) A’
(6 .3 .3.2)
1 —R  dW here N  =  [ ----- —----- ] and d is now  the annual s tra igh t line
a llow ance in  each year, i.e. a fixed percentage o f the o rig ina l capital 
sum.
The present value o f capita l allowances (A )  is computed as a 
weighted average o f equation (6 .3 .3 .1 ) and (6.3 .3 .2) on the basis o f 
the re la tive  p roportion  o f investm ent in  p la n t and m achinery and in 
p roperty .
4. Empirical Results :
A pooled cross-section tim e series analysis together w ith  cross- 
sectional analysis are perfo rm ed. The fo rm e r encompasses the 11 
years and a ll companies in the sam ple12, w h ile  the la tte r deals w ith  
companies’ investm ent fo r  each year separately. Using the Chow test, 
as described in  the m ethodology, i t  is found  tha t the pooled resu lts
12. Because of the number o f missing values the sample is reduced from  109 
observations per year to an average of 84. Furtherm ore, since the SUR method 
computes the regressions in the same time, an equal sample period has to be 
taken, thus reducing further the number of companies to 71 per year.
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may bo biased, the investm ent equation changes sub s tan tia lly  from  
one year to  another. It is, therefore, necessary to concentrate more on 
the cross-sectional results. The fo llo w in g  table reports the resu lts  o f 
estim ating  the o rig ina l neoclassical investm ent fu n c tio n  using* cross- 
sectional and pooled data.
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TABLE 6.1. RESULTS OF POOLED AND CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQUATION: SLR
* a 0  +  < * ] A —i— -
1
K i j t - 1 K i t - 1
1
A / ,t - 1
YEARS C O EFFIC IENTS
Ofo <*\ a 2 Ou ( J r F  3.68
1973 0 .069 0.0025* 851* 0.341 129**
( 1.68 ) (4 .3 0 ) (48 .52 ) 0.882
1974 0 .176* -0 .0003 220* 0.270 7 g g**
(5 .2 8 ) (-0 .3 0 8 ) (4 .902 ) 0.314
1975 0 .09 * - 0.0002 493* 0.196 1.74
(3 .3 9 ) (-0 .4 3 ) (7 .3 9 ) 0.203
1976 0 .078* 0.0006* 398* 0.111 1.98
(5 .5 2 ) (2 .0 4 ) (10 .59 ) 0.116
1977 0 .125* - 0.00002 207* 0 .119 34.27**
(8 .0 7 ) (-0 .0 4 2 ) (5 .7 8 ) 0.184
1978 0 .15 * 0.0007 249* 0.161 33.14**
(7 .4 5 ) (1 .9 49 ) ( 12.66) 0 .253
1979 0 .203* - 0.0002 407* 0.460 1.38
(3 .3 4 ) (-0 .2 0 9 ) (4 .2 9 ) 0.474
1980 0.181 0.0007 212* 0.156 39.06**
(9 .2 2 ) (1 .6 0 ) (10 .59 ) 0.257
1981 0 .156* -0.0002 128* 0.153 159**
(8 .2 7 ) (-0 .5 5 ) (11 .05 ) 0.433
1982 0 .177* 0.00004 193* 0.313 11.41**
(4 .4 6 ) (0 .0 8 ) (6 .078 ) 0.384
1983 0 .182* 0.003* 239* 0.212 22.98**
(6 .5 7 ) (2 .8 3 ) (9 .6 3 ) 0.300
POOLED 0 .083*
( 6 .68 )
0 .0009*
(8 .4 5 )
465*
(23 .36 )
Noles: Trace m atrix  of pooled is 752.62 and for cross-sectional 757.1 
t-statistics in brackets.
* significance at 5% level. t c =  1.960 
** significant at 5% level. F 3 53 — 2.760.
O u and (J r  are the standard error of the cross-sectional and pooled, respectively. 
Num ber o f Observation 71 for cross-sectional and 781 for pooled.
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TABLE 6.2. RESULTS Ol POOLED AND CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQUATION: OLS
/ . A K ' _l. 1— CJc
- i
0 1
YEARS C O EFFIC IENTS
<*<> <*1 OL 2 /? - a
1973 0.059 0.0031* 865* 0.963 0.346
(1 .3 9 8 ) (4 .4 4 ) (41 .7 )
1974 0.178* 0.0004 241* 0.261 0.275
(5 .1 3 1 ) (0 .3 7 ) (4 .3 1 )
1975 0 .063* -0 .0009 602* 0.431 0.197
(2 .1 1 7 ) ( -1 .2 3 ) (7 .2 4 )
1976 0 .081* - 0.0001 322* 0.624 0.111
(5 .4 7 ) (-0 .3 3 5 ) (6 .3 98 )
1977 0 .137* -0 .0008 139* 0.558 0.120
(8 .0 3 4 ) (-1 .1 0 5 ) (2 .5 4 )
1978 0.155* 0.0007 235* 0.589 0.164
(7 .3 9 ) (1 .0 6 6 ) ( 10. 1)
1979 0 .180* -0 .0006 479* 0.129 0.469
(2 .6 1 5 ) ( -0 .3 3 ) (3 .3 5 )
1980 0 .187* 0 .004* 199* 0.478 0.157
(9 .0 8 ) ( 2 .00 ) (8 .0 8 )
1981 0 .158* -0.0002 123* 0.463 0.156
(7 .9 6 ) (-0 .2 4 ) (7 .7 2 )
1982 0 .178* -0.0002 189* 0.168 0.320
(4 .0 6 7 ) (-0 .1 2 3 ) (3 .9 9 )
1983 0.190* 0.0003 223* 0.425 0.216
(6 .3 5 9 ) (1 .9 3 5 ) (7 .2 8 )
POOLED 0.093* 0.0015* 501* 0.576 0.396
( 6 .20 ) (3 .9 1 ) (32 .09 )
74-83 0 .165* 0.0007 209* 0.277 0.250
(1 6 .1 7 ) (0 .2 5 ) (15 .84 )
73-78 0 .06* 0.003* 701* 0.796 0.346
(3 .5 8 ) ( 8 .01 ) (40 .23 )
74-78 0 .134* 0.0003 256* 0.403 0.190
(1 2 .3 7 ) ( 1.01 ) (1 3 .9 )
79-83 0 .187* 0.0007 172* 0.321 0.225
(1 2 .6 9 ) (1 .3 2 ) (11 .65 )
Notex^t-statistics in brackets, * significance at 59c level, l c =  1 .960  
R  “ = coefiicient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
cr = standard error of the estimates.
Num ber of Observation 71 for cross-sectional and 781 for pooled.
- 203 -
Table 6.1 and 6.2 above show tha t the neoclassical model docs not 
o ile r  a good explanation o f the investm ent behaviour o f ind iv id u a l 
companies when cross-sectional data is used. In most cases the 
coefficients o f the change in  the op tim a l capita l stock comes w ith  the 
w rong  sign when the o rd in a r ily  least squares technique is used. 
M oreover, amongst these tha t are positive , o n ly  20 per cent o f them 
are sign ificant. The seemingly unrelated regressions technique offers a 
s lig h tly  be tte r resu lts  in  te rm s o f the significance o f the neoclassical 
te rm . How ever, the num ber o f these coefficients tha t are o f the 
expected sign is s t i l l  ve ry  low  (54 per cent).
The re la t iv e ly  good perform ance o f the neoclassical specification when 
the pooled cross-sectional tim e  series data is used seems to be the 
d irec t resu lt o f 1973. Indeed, any regressions perform ed w ith  the 
exclusion o f th is  year comes w ith o u t the significance o f the coefficient 
o f the change in the op tim a l cap ita l stock. M oreover, the resu lts  arc 
ve ry  sensitive to the tim e  period used as shown by the fluctua tions in 
the coefficients o f the change in op tim a l capita l stock when the tim e 
period is 1974 to  1978, 1980 to 1983 and when the w ho le  sample 
period is taken. On the basis o f the neoclassical assumptions we may 
conclude tha t corporate taxation does not exert any im pact on the 
investm ent decision o f the firm . These resu lts  cannot be d ire c tly  
compared to these obtained by previous studies using aggregate tim e 
series data. Th is  is because the resu lts obtained here are cross- 
sectional estimates, thus supposed to  measure the long-term  response 
o f investm ent to changes in taxa tion , w h ile  tim e series measure the 
sho rt te rm  response. M oreover, the specification is ve ry  d iffe re n t as 
the variab les taken are specific to  the firm s  in the sample, and th a t no
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lags arc sperilled.
The o rig ina l neoclassical model constra in ts investm ent to have the 
same e la s tic ity  w ith  respect to a ll o f the components o f the re la tive  
price te rm . However, i f  th is  assum ption is relaxed, then these results 
do not necessarily mean tha t taxa tion  does not affect investm ent 
expenditure, because the negative re la tionsh ip  between changes in the 
op tim a l capita l stock and investm ent rate m ay be due to  the 
averaging ou t in the o ther components o f the user cost o f capita l. I t  
is, therefore, necessary to redefine the investm ent equation by 
s p litt in g  the desired cap ita l stock in to  its  d iffe re n t components. Since 
the op tim a] capita l stock is in m u lt ip lic a t iv e  term s, the log a rithm ic  
tra ns fo rm a tion  is appropriate. H ow ever, as argued above, th is  has 
resulted in  a substantia l loss o f data because o f the negative and zero 
values. Instead, the Savage (1977 ) specification is em ployed. It 
assumes th a t the desired capita l stock may be approxim ated by an 
a dd itive  com bination o f the re la tive  components. The resu lts o f 
estim ating equation (6 .1 .2 ) arc reported in  the fo llo w in g  tables :
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.  d - / i  > 
4 ( i - , )  ^ A r  B  A Q
+  3
Pk 4- R+  0 ,  K
I ~
1 p->
1 K , - 1
1 ^ 3 „  ^  P 4 r  A t _ i  A f _ 1 k'A j  _ i
YEARS COEFFICIENTS
0 0 0 . 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 ° u  ° r ^ 6 ,6 5
1973 0.044 2239]' 52678* 0.399* 226 1539* 0.260 77.75"
(1.36) (4.93) (2.18) (9.30) ( 0.53) ( 5.68) 0.738
1974 0.142' 1578* 16874 0.06 585 557 0.243 3.219"
(4.57) ( 1.994 ) (1.06) (1.914) (1.79) ( 1.61 ) 0.276
1975 0.075' 1319 2852 0.007 964* 366 0.190 3.609"
(2.92 > < 1.02) (0.11) (0 .3 3 ) (3.79) ( 1.63 > 0.219
1976 0.068' 1211* 9598 0.007 825* 392* 0.102 12.406"
(5.01 ) ( 2.02) (0.76) (1.02) (5.71) ( 3.45) 0.148
1977 0.086* 845 18248 0.02* 667* 349- 0.101 34.686"
(5.98) (0.79) ( 1.83) (3.11 ) (4.64) ( 2.66) 0.206
1978 0.122* 93.02 15628 0.027* 357' 152 0.111 11.164"
(8.14) (0.105) (1.31 ) (10.17) (2.45) ( 1.16) 0.158
1979 0.183' 199 35832 0.032 602 35 0.453 0.966
(2.94) ( 0.09) (1 .5 2 ) (-1.78) (1.61) (0.127) 0.473
1980 0.153* 484 21746* 0.016* 520* 273 0.155 23.797"
(7.14) ( 0.59) (-3.82) (2.75) (2.94) (1 .7 2 ) 0.276
1981 0.144' 490 12424 0.004 11.4 163 0.149 29.619"
(7.61 ) ( 0.59) (1.59) (0.84) ( 0.10) ( 1.66) 0.286
1982 0.122* 3131 19146- 0.005 269 89 0.294 4.418"
(3.12) ( 1.88) (2.87) (0 .5 4 ) ( 1.73) (0.62) 0.348
1983 0.192* 3.24' 2168 0.005 187 367* 0.207 11.595"
(6.61 ) (2.13) ( 0.32) (1.18) (0 .8 9 ) (2.03) 0.296
POOLED 0.085* 1.680 6518’ 0.030* 464* 763*
(4.58) ( 1.18) (2.90) (13.15) ( 7.79) (13.49)
Notes: Trace matrix oT pooled is 695.6 and Tor cross sectional 709.6; 
t statistics in brackets;
* significance at 5'?- level, l c  =  1 . 9 6 0 ;
*" significant at 5*5 level. F ^ ^5 — 2 . 2 5 0 ;
Number of Observation 71 for cross sectional and 7M for pooled.
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TABIJK 6.4. RESULTS OF POOLED AND CROSS SECTIONAL INVESTMENT EQUATION: OLS
h , — R
* ; *
4 - R 4- R
7
1<3
+ 3 A ' 4 - R A Q  1 a  1
K ' j - i
~  P () P i  ISA ,  _]
4- p 2
+  / 3 3 * , -
^  P 4
-1
K  0 5  isA j _ j A r _ j
YEARS
0 0 0 i 0 2
COEFFICIENTS 
0 3  0 4 0 5 R 2 a
1973 0.032 23650* 47560 0.44* 764 1266* 0.978 0.267
(0.93) (4.30) ( 1.56) (8.44) ( 1.46) (3 .8 2 )
1974 0.138* 3221* 33187 0.057 617 805 0.405 0.247
(4.09) (3.01 I (1.52) ( 1.38) (1.41) ( 1.73)
1975 0.071 * 2705 25133 0.00003 1103* 541 0.423 0.198
(2.57) ( 1.55) (0.68) ( 0.001 ) (3.23) ( 1.78)
1976 0.07* 1563 1 1016 0.017 766* 370* 0.666 0.105
(4.64) ( 1.66) (0.55) (1.61 * (3.54) ( 2.19)
1977 0.087* 846 28980* 0.018- 643* 305 0.662 0.105
(5.43) ( 0.58) ( 2.13) (2.14 ) (3.44) (1.79)
1978 0.128* 82.3 38338* 0.034* 156 15.03 0.806 0.113
(7.67) <0.06) (2.14) (8.67) (0.75) ( 0.08)
1979 0.161* 1625 82462 0.012 591 167 0.141 0.466
(2.08) ( 0.38) (1 .7 9 ) ( 0.35) (0.84) (0.33)
1980 0.165* 690 14040 0.013 486 261 0.460 0.160
< 6.62 ) ( 0.52) (1 .5 9 ) (1.46) (1.79) (1 .0 9 )
1981 0.143* 1627 33991* 0.002 239 51.03 0.506 0.150
(6.72) ( 1.20) (2.51 ) ( 0.21 ) (1.28) (0 .3 3 )
1982 0.1 16* 3309 40599* 0.004 212 187 0.282 0.297
(2.51 ) ( 1.06) (3.15) (0.23) (0.79) (0.74)
1983 0.214* 1.72 3951 0.007 505 623* 0.442 0.212
(6.38> (0.75) (0.41 ) (1.14) ( 1.62) (2.33)
POOLED 0.137* 2914* 22100* 0.025* 619* 799- 0.721 0.300
(12.42) (14.29) (5.67) (6.91 ) 1 7.51 ) (10.96)
1973 78 0.089* 2756’ 49554* 0.062* 558* 760* 0.866 0.260
(6.93 > < 10.05) (6.56) ( 10.74) i 5.02) (7.75)
1979 83 0.192- 426 7029 0.009* 62.9 219- 0.210 0.285
( 1 1.89 ) (0.62) (1.36) (2.28) ( 0.53) (2.10)
Notes: 1 statistics in brackets.
’^ significance at 5'V level, t c =  1 . 9 6 0
R  “ coefficient of determination adjusted lor degrees of freedom. 
a  standard error of the estimates.
Number of Observation 71 lor cross sectional and 781 lor pooled.
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The resu lts reported in  Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show tha t the 
modified neoclassical model perfo rm s much better than the orig inal 
model in term s o f the coefficient o f co rre la tion , standard e rro r and 
trace m a tr ix . The coefficient o f the lax  variab le , /32, 1S noT however, 
a lw ays significant. I t  comes o f the expected sign in about 30 per cent 
o f the cases, and out o f these, around 50 per cent are significant. 
M oreover, when the pooled data is used, th is  coefficient is s ign ifican tly  
uncorrec tly  signed. However, the high significance o f the Chow test, 
as measured by the F -s ta tis tics  im plies tha t there are m ajor 
differences between cross-sectional and the pooled regressions, m aking 
the fo rm e r more appropria te  fo r  any analysis. We are, thus, tem pted, 
at f irs t sight, to conclude th a t corporation tax does not exert any 
effect on the investm ent behaviour.
In analysing these results, however, i t  is im po rta n t to  insure  tha t 
none o f the assumptions u n d e rly in g  the regression techniques 
em ployed is vio la ted. In p a rticu la r, the lo w  t-s ta tis tics  o f the tax 
variab les may be due to  the fact tha t th is  va riab le  is correlated w ith  
another one in the model. I f  th is  is the case, then the estimated 
regression coefficients w i l l  tend to  have larger standard e rro rs  than 
they w ou ld  have in the absence o f m u lt ic o llin e a rity . This, in  tu rn , 
im p lies  that the t-ra tio s  are sm a lle r and tha t a pa rticu la r variab le  
th a t m ay appear to be ins ign ifican t could, i f  no m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  was 
present, to be significant.
A corre la tion  m a tr ix  between the variables included in the model is 
obtained fo r  each year. I t  shows tha t the corre la tion  between the 
inverse o f the capital stock -  w h ich  is the intercept o f the equation -
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and the* tax variab le is ve ry  high. For the pooled data, fo r  instance, 
the coefficient ol' co rre la tion  ( R 2) between the inverse o f the capital 
stock and the tax va riab le  deflated by the lagged capita l stock is 
0.981, w h ile  fo r  1974 the Pearson corre la tion  is 0.999. S im ila r results 
were obtained fro m  o the r cross-sectionals, ranging fro m  0.90 to
0.999. The corre la tion  is less pronounced fo r  the o ther exp lanatory 
variab les. The independent effects o f each o f these tw o  correlated 
variab les is, therefore, not captured p ro p e rly  in the above results.
The high m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  between the change in the tax variab le 
deflated by the capita l stock and the inverse o f the cap ita l stock seems 
to  be the d irec t resu lt o f the correction fo r  the heteroscedasticity. 
A tte m p ts  have been made to  t r y  to obta in unbiased estimates. There 
is, however, no single pre fe rab le  technique in econometrics fo r  
overcom ing the problem  o f m u lt ic o llin e a r ity . One possible w ay o f 
reducing the im pact o f m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  between these variables is to  
extend the num ber o f observations. However, due to  the lack o f data, 
th is  m ethod cannot be used. A lte rn a t iv e ly , the regression is run  
w ith o u t the inverse o f cap ita l stock. The inverse o f the cap ita l stock 
is the constant o f the o rig in a l model before we corrected fo r  the 
heteroscedastic ity, i.e. /35 in  equation (6 .1 .6 ). By doing th is, we 
constra in  the o rig ina l investm ent equation to go through the o rig in ,
1.e. j35 =  0 in equation (6 .1 .6 ). However, previous studies have taken 
in to  account the constant in th e ir estim ated equation and in  m any 
cases it  is s ign ificant. Therefore, the investm ent func tio n  w ith o u t the 
inverse o f cap ita l stock could be m is-specified. The em p irica l results 
obtained fro m  th is  specification show that in more than 80 per cent o f 
the cases the tax variab le  is unco rrec tly  signed and h ig h ly  s ign ificant.
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Therefore, tax elfects on investm ent cannot be d ire c tly  analysed 
through the neoclassical model.
To test fo r  a possible im pact o f tax exhaustion on investm ent 
behaviour, tax exhaustion variables are incorporated in to  the 
accelerator model. The accelerator model is preferred to the 
neoclassical model fo r  th is  analysis, because inc lud ing  the tax 
exhaustion dum m ies in the neoclassical model m ay lead to  a m is - 
specification o f the model. M oreover, the effect o f tax exhaustion is 
a lready included in the user cost o f cap ita l. Therefore, the inc lus ion  
o f the tax exhaustion variables in the above specification m ay lead to 
double counting o f the im pact o f taxation . In the fo llo w in g  tables, 
the resu lts  obtained fro m  the accelerator model w hich defines 
investm ent expenditure in  term s o f changes in  the levels o f o u tp u t 
are reported.
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TABLE 6.5. RESULTS OF POOLED AND CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQUATION: SUR




/  3 is"
i yt
^  YA
- 1 K i t - 1
YEARS CO EFFIC IENTS
yo y \ Y l Y3 Ya ° u  ° r ^5 ,66
1973 0 .1 2 2 * 0 . 0 0 -0.199 0.0087 812* 0.381 45.210**
(2.53) ( 0 .0 0 ) (-1 .85) (0.96) (32.2) 0.804
1974 0.176* -0.105 0.045 0 . 0 1 2 323* 0.265 1.802
(5.20) (-1 .62) (0.78) (1.42) (5.36) 0.283
1975 0.085* -0.053 0.060 0 . 0 0 2 540* 0.196 3.495**
(3.08) (-1 .04) (1.14) (0.28) (7.94) 0 . 2 2 1
1976 0.078* 0.042 -0.030 0.005 363* 0.109 3.923**
(5.28) (1.47) (-1 .26) (1.14) (11.78) 0.125
1977 0.013* 0.013 -0.008 - 0 . 0 0 1 2 0 0 * 0.118 6.902**
(7.38) (0.46) ( - 0 .0 2 ) (-0 .18) (5.98) 0.156
1978 0.113* 0.060* -0.065* 0.023* 289* 0.117 17.364**
(7.43) (2.46) (-2 .49) (9.32) (19.35) 0.178
1979 0.185* 0.028 - 0 . 0 2 0 - 0 . 0 2 0 446* 0.461 0.867
(2.93) (0.47) ( - 0 .2 0 ) (-1 .78) (4.66) 0.476
1980 0.164* 0.041 0.029 -0.005 2 1 0 * 0.155 28.904**
(7.84) (1.32) (0.73) ( - 1 .0 2 ) (10.09) 0.277
1981 0.154* -0.007 -0.004 0.0009 140* 0.154 44.995**
(7.88) (-0 .204) (-0 .14) (0.193) (8.44) 0.323
1982 0.170* -0.006 -0.058 0 . 0 0 1 2 2 2 1 * 0.313 4.839**
(4.24) (-0 .13) (-0 .92) (0.127) (6.74) 0.366
1983 0.194* 0.158* -0.260* 0.009* 241* 0 . 2 0 1 13.219**
(7.13) (3.07) (-5 .03) (1.995) (10.31) 0.284
POOLED 0.975* 0.019 -0.037* 0.033* 437*
(6.62) (1.026) (-2 .17) (16.37) (26.76)
Notes: Trace Matrix for pooled is 696.2 and for cross-sectional is 739.4; 
l-statistics in brackets. * significant at 5% level. t c = 1.960;
** significance at 5% level, critical value is 2.370;
Number of observations: 71 for cross-sectional and 781 for pooled.
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TABLE 6.6. RESULTS Ol POOLED AND CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQUATION: OLS
...... V iH T ia +  y 2 TAX 1 ,t +  73 A •*,£ ~ +  V
1
— 7() _l" +  74
K u - t
YEARS COEFFICIENTS
To 7 i 72 7 3 74 R 2 (J
1973 0.109* 0 . 0 0 -0.133 0 . 0 1 1 814* 0.951 0.394
( 2 . 1 2 ) ( 0 .0 0 ) (-0 .98 ) (0 .95) (24.42)
1974 0.177* -0.137 0.080 0.0196 351* 0.266 0.274
(4.73) (-1 .19) (0 .78) (1 .32) (3 .70)
1975 0.069* -0.003 0.008 -0.013 564* 0.410 0 . 2 0 0
(2.23) (-0 .03 ) (0.095) ( - 1 . 1 1 ) (6 .94 )
1976 0.084* 0.017 -0.026 0 . 0 0 2 338* 0.615 0.113
(5.01) (0.36) (-0 .63 ) (0 .26) (7 .91)
1977 0 . 1 2 1 * 0 . 0 1 2 0.035 0.0014 2 0 2 * 0.543 0 . 1 2 1
(6 .17) (0.29) (0 .73) (0.18) (4 .38)
1978 0.109* 0.051 -0.050 0.029* 281* 0.789 0.118
(6.43) (1 .27) (-1 .13 ) (7 .21) (15.31)
1979 0.161* 0.036 0.108 0 . 0 0 2 486* 0.109 0.474
(2.08) (0.259) (0 .46) (0 .074) (3 .42)
1980 0.163* 0.070 0.023 -0.009 190* 0.464 0.159
(6.93) (1.46) (0 .37) (-1 .18 ) (7 .22)
1981 0.163* - 0 . 0 2 0 -0.013 -0.003 1 2 0 * 0.448 0.158
(7.26) (-0 .28 ) (-0 .23 ) (-0 .28 ) (4.46)
1982 0.192* -0.050 -0.027 0.018 193* 0.155 0.322
(4.04) (-0 .38) (-0 .16 ) (0 .74) (4.00)
1983 0.215* 0 . 1 1 2 -0.279* 0 . 0 1 0 214* 0.475 0.206
(6.89) (1.31) (-3 .15 ) (1.41) (7.34)
POOLED 0.105* -0.0009 -0.046 0.051* 492* 0.658 0.356
(7.06) ( - 0 .0 2 ) (-1 .13 ) (14.27) (36.55)
( 1 ) 0.099* - - 0.051* 491* 0.658 0.356
(7.30) (14.37) (36.57)
( 2 ) 0.105* - -0.046 0.051 * 492* 0.658 0.356
(7.29) (-1 .25 ) (14.28) (36.60)
1973-78 0.076* -0.036 -0.007 0.049* 637* 0.827 0.293
(5.15) ( - 0 .8 6 ) (-0 .19 ) (14.72) (46.32)
1979-83 0.188* 0.062 -0.076 0.009 193 0 . 2 0 1 0.285
(11.37) (1 .58) (-1 .58 ) ( 1 .8 8 ) (10.33)
Notes: t-statistics in brackets:
Significance at 5% level. t c =  1.960:
R = coefficient of determination adjusted for d.f.: 
cr = standard error of the regression:
Number of Observations 71 for cross-sectional and 7M  for pooled.
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The im pact o f tax exhaustion is not found  to  exert any strong im pact 
on investm ent expenditure. S im ila r resu lts were obtained when on ly  
one variab le  o f tax exhaustion is inc luded. M oreover, th is  
insignificance does not seem to  change over tim e  as there are o n ly  tw o  
exceptional years in  w h ich  tax exhaustion is s ign ificant and co rrec tly  
signed when the seem ingly unrela ted regressions technique is 
em ployed. Even when the sample period is d iv ided  in to  tw o  sub- 
periods, 1973-78 and 1979-83, the resu lts  are ve ry  s im ila r. Indeed, 
when o n ly  these tw o  dum m ies are used as independent variables, 
there was no significance at a ll. Therefore, firm s  do not seem to  take 
account o f th e ir tax position in  decid ing on w hether to  undertake a 
p a rticu la r project o r not.
The econometric problem s faced w ith  in th is  analysis m ay prevent us 
fro m  re la ting  d ire c tly  the resu lts  obtained here to those obtained by 
studies tha t used in te rv ie w s  a n d /o r postal surveys to  find  tha t m any 
companies do not seem to consider tax in  th e ir p ro ject appraisal 
(L e v is  and Morgan 1985, Hodgkinson 1987).
5. Conclusion :
A n  a ttem pt has been made in  th is  chapter to  analyse the im pact o f 
taxa tion  on investm ent behaviour using the neoclassical model. A  
num ber o f em pirica l tests have been carried out in o rder to  t r y  to  
relate the tax position o f the firm  and the capita l a llowances to  the 
investm ent decision. The o rig ina l neoclassical model was firs t tested. 
The coefficient o f the change in the op tim a l capital stock, th rough  
w h ich  lax elfect m ay be analysed, is o f the w rong sign in  m any cases 
and its  degree o f significance is su b s ta n tia lly  low . Therefore, on the
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basis o f the assumptions unde rly ing  the neoclassical model, we can 
say that taxation does not exert any im pact on investm ent decisions 
o f the firm .
The o rig ina l neoclassical model d id  not p rov ide  sa tis facto ry  
o p p o rtu n ity  to a llo w  any im pact o f taxation to  be assessed. In  order 
to  overcome th is  problem , the desired capital stock, is s p lit  in to  its  
d iffe re n t components by assuming than the op tim a l capita l stock can 
be approxim ated by add itive , ra ther than m u ltip lic a tiv e , com bination 
o f the re la tive  components. Th is specification also ind icated tha t 
taxa tion  docs not seem to exert any im pact on the investm ent 
decisions o f the firm . However, the spurious high m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  
between the tax va riab le  and the inverse o f the capita l stock in h ib its  
one to  d raw  any sound conclusions on the im pact o f taxa tion  on 
investm ent behaviour using th is  model.
An a lte rna tive  w ay o f testing fo r  the im pact o f taxa tion  on 
investm ent expenditure  is to take the v iew  tha t tax exhaustion may 
re fra in  firm s fro m  undertak ing  some projects, because they m ay not 
be able to  c la im  the capital allowances. Using the accelerator model 
w ith  a com bination o f tax exhaustion variables, we fin d  tha t 
companies do not seem to consider tax in th e ir investm ent decisions, 
thus jo in ing  the resu lts obtained from  previous specifications.
It  is un fo rtu n a te  to  conclude th is  chapter by saying th a t the tax 
im pact on investm ent cannot be p roperly  analysed th rough  the 
transfo rm ed neoclassical model. Consequently, the ca ll fo r  fu r th e r  
more research on th is  topic cannot be avoided. This may generate 
some suspicions as to the w o rth  o f a ll the e ffo rts  spent to estim ate  the
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complex components o f the desired capital stock. However, g iv ing up 
the idea that the im pact o f taxation cannot be estimated using the 
neoclassical equation is not a step to be taken l ig h t ly  as i t  is obv ious ly  
open to  the charge tha t i t  is o n ly  the s tru c tu re  o f the data tha t does 
not a llo w  us to  d ra w  strong conclusions on the coefficient o f the tax 
variab le.
It  is also im p o rta n t to  bear in  m ind  tha t the investm ent decision is 
ve ry  cruc ia l to  the s u rv iv a l o f the firm . Therefore, one w ou ld  not 
expect th is  k in d  o f decision to  be so le ly determ ined by the variables 
inc luded in the neoclassical model, or in the accelerator model (w h ich  
is used here to  analyse the im pact o f tax exhaustion). F inancing and 
d iv idend  decisions together w ith  m arket va lua tion  m ay also p lay  an 
im p o rta n t ro le  in de te rm in ing  investm ent programmes. External 
factors, such as u n ce rta in ty  in  the m arkets, m ay discourage the firm  
fro m  investing . These elements are not included d ire c t ly  in the 
specifications tested in  th is  chapter.
In  in te rp re tin g  the resu lts  obtained above, a tten tion  is d raw n  to the 
fac t tha t cap ita l is assumed to be homogeneous and tha t firm s  were 
considered to  invest in  o n ly  the in d u s try  they are in . I f  the 
homogeneity o f capita l stock assum ption is relaxed, then i t  m ay be 
possible to construct the neoclassical model fo r  each type o f assets 
and to use appropria te  tax variables, price index, depreciation rates 
and possibly the corresponding cost o f capita l according ly. I t  may, 
therefore, be possible to determ ine the im pact o f taxation on each 
type  o f investm ent expenditure.
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CHAPTER V II
EFFECTS OF TAXATIO N ON INVESTMENT: VALUATION MODEL
From  the rev iew  o f the lite ra tu re  we lind  tha t there are tw o  main 
econom etric models tha t can be used to analyse the im pact o f taxation 
on investm ent behaviour. Both these models are found  to lead to the 
same resu lts when applied to  the aggregate data. However, i t  is 
necessary to  test th is  model at in d iv id u a l company level because 
w h ile  the neoclassical model tests fo r  the changes in the tax variable, 
the va lua tion  ra tio  relates investm ent to the levels o f the com bination 
o f the tax va riab le  and the va lua tion  ra tio . M arkets  are assumed to 
be efficient and tha t investm ent rate is d ire c tly  related to  the ra tio  o f 
the m arket va lue o f the firm  to  its  existing  capita l stock.
In th is  chapter we present em p irica l estim ation o f the ’Q ’ investm ent 
m odel. The firs t section is concerned w ith  the hypotheses tested 
th rough the model. In the second section, variables used arc defined. 
The th ird  section deals w ith  the data construction . The methodology 
fo llo w e d  in using th is  model at disaggregated level level is described 
in section fo u r. Section five reports investm ent equations estimated 
under d iffe re n t assumptions as to the de fin ition  o f the variables and 
the econometric specification, and provides some possible explanations 
fo r  the resu lts  obtained. The conclud ing section summarises the 
find ings and discusses w ays o f dealing w ith  taxation on corporations.
1. H ypotheses Tested :
Previous em pirica l studies w h ich  used the va lua tion  ra tio  support the 
hypothesis tha t taxation exerts strong impact on the level o f
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investm ent expenditure. However, since they have used aggregate 
data, they assumed tha t a ll lirm s  pay p ro fit tax at the standard ra te1. 
T h is  is not the case, as we explained in chapter 1. I t  is, thus, necessary 
to  use th is  model to  analyse the d iffe ren t w ays in w h ich  taxation may 
influence the level o f investm ent o f each company.
The fo rm u la tio n  o f the tax adjusted ’Q \ as derived in chapter 5, 
contains not o n ly  the m arke t cap ita lisation  o f the firm , bu t also the 
level o f debt e q u ity  ra tio , the present value o f capital allowances and 
the effective corpora tion  tax. The model is set in such a w ay as the 
fo llo w in g  hypotheses m ay be tested :
(1 )  Investm ent ra te  is p o s itive ly  related to  the level o f the va lua tion  
ra tio , fo r  each com pany and fo r  each year in the sample period;
(2 ) I f  hypothesis (1 )  is verified , then the fo llo w in g  hypothesis m ay be 
v a lid  :
(a ) the level o f investm en t expenditure  m ay be increased by ris ing  
the m arket value o f the f irm ;
(b )  The f irm ’s cap ita l investm ent may be increased th rough  a rise 
in the present va lue  o f capita l allowances, o r a decrease in  the 
effective corpora tion  tax rate;
(c ) Investm ent is p o s itive ly  related to the level o f debt-cap ita l 
ra tio , and therefore, any variab les tha t may prevent the firm  fro m  
increasing its  gearing ra tio  affect in d ire c tly  the level o f investm ent;
(3 ) I f  taxation does have a significant im pact on investm ent
1. Poterba and Summers (1 9 8 3 ) constrained the tax variables to be zero, i.e 
7 — A —B  = 0 . for the post-1972 period, to account for tax exhausted 
companies. They found that the explanatory power of the equation is reduced.
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expenditure  then we w ou ld  expect the investm ent behaviour to be 
much be lte r explained by the tax adjusted Q ra ther th a t by Tobin q.
In order to  tesl these hypotheses, the fo llo w in g  investm ent equation 
is fo rm u la ted  :
A 1=  a  +  /3,-rr—  + j32Q, (7.1.1)
* i , . ,
2. Definition o f  the Variables :
Investm ent expend itu re  is defined as the to ta l add itions to  p rope rty  
and other tang ib le  assets at cu rre n t prices. Investm ent is assumed to 
be undertaken evenly d u r in g  the accounting year. A t  the end o f the 
year, i t  is necessary to com pute the level o f investm ent on the same 
basis, i.e. tak ing  in to  account the level o f in fla tion  th a t prevailed 
d u rin g  the period.
There are tw o  main exp lana to ry  variables. F irs t, the investm ent 
decision o f the firm  is assumed to be based on the existing  level o f 
capita l stock. The h igher the to ta l fixed assets at the beginning o f the 
period, the m ore l ik e ly  the firm  w i l l  have to increase its  gross 
investm ent to account fo r  the depreciation.
Second, investm ent is assumed to be a fu n c tio n  o f a com bination o f 
the m arket value o f the firm , investm ent incentives, debt capital ra tio  
and the effective corporation tax, i.e.,
Qi, =
V i -  B .t
— -----------'— l + A t  + b i1/ »/
(7 .2 .1)
1 ~  Ti,
The higher the m arket va lue  o f the firm  i at tim e t (V i%t ) re la tive  to 
the existing level o f cap ita l stock (A,- , _ ] )  the more investm ent is 
undertaken. Tobin ’q ’ theo ry  asserts that, i f  th is  ra tio  is higher than
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u n ity  then, the m arke t is w il l in g  to pay more fo r  the existing level o f 
capita l stock o f the lin n . However, when taxation is introduced, th is 
ra tio  need not be u n ity  because o f the capita l allowances, the firm  is 
able to deduct fro m  its  fu tu re  cash flow s and set against tax. To 
make the m arket va lue homogeneous in  the level o f existing capital 
stock, the present va lue o f capita l allowances on past investm ent 
expend iture  are deducted. However, as fa r  as th is  s tudy is concerned, 
d u rin g  the sample period, firm s  were assumed to c la im  d u rin g  the 
f irs t year the in it ia l a llow ance o f 100 per cent. Furtherm ore, there 
are less than 10 per cent o f the to ta l num ber o f observations fo r  
w h ich  add itions to assets are low e r than disposals. Therefore, the 
pooled o f rem ain ing depreciation allowances is zero. Thus Bit is 
assumed to  be zero.
As fo rm u la ted  in equation (7 .2 .1 ), the tax adjusted Q is a fu n c tio n  o f 
the the level o f debt c a p ita l-ra tio  o f the firm  and o f the tax variables. 
Th is  ra tio  increases w ith  a rise in the present value o f allowances and 
decreases w ith  an increase in the lax rate. Therefore, i f  the tax 
adjusted Q is p o s itive ly  correlated to  the investm ent rate, then an 
increase in the present va lue o f allowances w ou ld  d ire c tly  resu lt in a 
rise in the investm ent expenditure, assuming eve ry th ing  being equal.
3. M ethodology :
The above hypotheses are tested on pooled and cross-sectional data. 
The aim  is, firs t, to  find the im pact o f taxation on investm ent 
behaviour w ith o u t tak ing  tim e  effect in to  account and, second, to 
analyse th is  im pact fo r  each in d iv id u a l year fo r  a sample o f 
companies. In th is  sense, it is possible to find the long -run
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re la tionsh ip  between investm ent, "Q '\ tax variables and other lik e ly  
de te rm inan ts  o f investm ent behaviour. T im e series estimates are not 
obtained because o f the re la tiv e ly  sm all sample period fo r  each firm .
Previous em p irica l studies w hich  used Tob in  ’q ’ model o f investm ent 
have concentrated on tim e  series data at the aggregate. There are tw o  
main problem s w ith  these specifications. F irs t, tim e  series estimates 
w o u ld  o n ly  p rov ide  w ith  the short term  effects o f taxation. This 
w ou ld  depend c r it ic a lly  on the sample period o f the analysis. The 
im pact o f taxation may o n ly  be analysed i f  there is a m a jo r change in 
the system d u rin g  the sample period. Secondly, aggregation problems 
o f the variab les and o f the re la tionsh ip  between the dependent and 
the exp lana to ry  variables has been the m ajor d if f ic u lty  o f previous 
em p irica l studies. The main disadvantages o f aggregating data are 
discussed in the estim ation o f the neoclassical m odel. There are, 
however, some specific problem s o f aggregation when the va lua tion  
model is used.
O u lton  (1981) considered the issue tha t aggregate investm ent 
equations do not take in to  account the fact tha t most investm ent is 
irreve rs ib le . A t the m icro  level investm ent func tion  treats influences 
tending to cause an increase in investm ent expenditure 
a sym m etrica lly  fro m  influences tending to cause a fa l l,  because once 
investm ent is placed, it  cannot be sold easily in the second hand 
m arke t place. The m arket value o f in d iv id u a l com pany is also 
affected by m any special factors, w hich may be considered as 
m u lt ip lic a tiv e  random  shocks. Therefore, f irm ’s "q" ra tio  is log 
n o rm a lly  d is tr ib u te d  around the average level o f MqM. When O u lton  
corrected fo r these facts, using aggregate data, the resu lts  obtained
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were d isappo in ting .
T h is  s tudy  a ttem pts to overcome some o f these problem s by looking 
at the investm ent behaviour o f in d iv id u a l company. S im ila r ly  to the 
previous em p irica l chapters, tw o  econometric specifications are used 
lo r  both pooled and cross-sectional data. The coefficients obtained 
fro m  the o rd in a r ily  least squares technique m ay be biased i f  the e rro r 
te rm  o f one linear equation is correlated w ith  th a t o f another 
regression model. In o rder to  correct fo r  th is  possible e rro r in  the 
d istu rbance te rm , the seemingly unrelated regressions technique 
(S U R ) is also perform ed fo r  the pooled and cross-sectional data. 
O the r assum ptions o f the OLS are also tested accord ing ly. Both 
resu lts  are presented fo r  comparison and fo r  analysis. The Chow 
test, as defined by equation (6 .2 .1 ), is used to test fo r  the tim e effect 
when cross-sectional regressions are perform ed.
A no th e r problem  tha t m ay bias the significance o f the coefficients 
obtained fro m  the regressions is the lik e ly  existence o f 
he tcroskedastic ity , w h ich  resu lts  fro m  the fac t tha t companies in  the 
sample are not a ll o f the same size. However, th is  model, as opposed 
to the neoclassical equation, specifies a ll the the variables in  ra tio  
term s, thus correcting fo r  any possible hetcroskedastic ity bias.
4. Data construction :
The m ain data requirem ents fo r  the estim ation o f the "Q" model are 
tim e  series and cross-sectional values fo r the tax adjusted "Q", gross 
investm ent rate and capita l stock at replacement cost. Th is  section 
describes the construction o f an annual tim e series fo r  these variables 
fo r  a sample o f 109 non financial domestic companies fo r  the period
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1973-1983.
4.1 Gross investm ent rate :
The dependent va riab le  in  the estim ated equation is the ra tio  o f gross 
investm ent in p rope rty  and o ther tangib le assets to the net capital 
stock. Data on book va lue o f add itions to  fixed assets is extracted 
fro m  E X T A T  data bank2. How ever, to  ftnd the re la tionsh ip  between 
these add itions to existing assets and the level o f the va lua tion  ra tio , 
i t  is necessary to convert the book values in to  replacement costs. 
T h is  stems fro m  the fac t that investm ent could have been undertaken 
in the beginning o f the period, and by the end o f the accounting 
period prices may have increased and also that the level o f capital 
stock at h is to rica l costs m ay not have any re la tion  to  its  replacement 
value. It is assumed, fo r  the add itions to p lan t and m achinery, that 
investm ent is taken even ly  d u rin g  the accounting period. In order to 
correct fo r  these in fla tio n a ry  effects, firm s  in  the sample are classified 
in to  d iffe re n t industries according to th e ir SIC num ber and then Pr ice 
Indices fo r  Current Cost Accounting3 are applied. These are, 
however, based on p lan t ra the r than firm . Thus, by using them fo r 
each firm , i t  is assumed that a ll the assets in the firm  are related to 
the in d u s try  in w hich  it  is classified. The la tte r  assumption m ay not 
d is to rt the results because o f the high co rre la tion  between the price 
indices o f each in d u s try . A no the r ad jus tm ent relates to the fact tha t 
not a ll companies report th e ir accounts at the same tim e. F irm s in
2. In I : \T A T  data bank a d d i t io n s  to  p ro p e r ly  (C C 3 ) are published separately from  
a d d i t io n s  to  o th e r  tang ib le  assets (C C 11).
3. The necessary data is provided, as explained in the previous chapter, by Central 
Statistical Office (19X2) and Business M onitor (19X6).
the sample are d iv ided  in to  groups according to  the quarte r in which 
they publish  th e ir  accounts. The corresponding price index is then 
applied.
C ap ita l stock at replacem ent cost is computed in the same w ay as in 
the previous chapter. The reported cu rren t cost value fo r  assets is the 
basis fo r  pre- and post-1980 levels o f capita l stock. ICA (1982) 
fo und  tha t cu rre n t professional va lua tion  is the means most 
fre q u e n tly  adopted to  value p rope rty  and tha t more than 80 per cent 
o f companies surveyed revalue th e ir p rope rty . On the other hand, 
indices to  book values is the means a lm ost u n ive rsa lly  adopted fo r  
p lan t and m ach inery. The com putation o f the capital stock, here, is 
based on these resu lts . G iven tha t there is no price index fo r 
p rope rty , Property reevaluation and reevaluation o f depreciation o f 
property are d is tr ib u te d  even ly  over the period. The sum o f the 
fo rm e r and the additions to pt'operly resu lt in  investm ent in p roperty  
at cu rre n t prices, w h ile  the sum o f the la tte r  and the depreciation 
charge is taken as the to ta l depreciation used to  compute depreciation 
rate. Investm ent in  o ther tangib le assets, on the other hand, is 
com puted using the corresponding price index fo r  cu rren t cost 
accounting. A fte r  ca lcu la ting  the depreciation rate, 8, as the ra tio  o f 
depreciation charge over the capita l stock, the fo llo w in g  fo rm u la  is 
used to  com pute the capita l stock at cu rren t prices fo r  lirm  i at tim e  t
+ ( 1 - S , ) K ,  ,
4.2 Tax adjusted Q :
The p rinc ipa l data required to  compute th is  variab le are the m arket 
va lue o f each firm  in the sample from  1973 through to 1983. The
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main problem  in re la ting  the m arket value o f the firm  to its  
investm ent decision is tha t the fo rm e r lluc tua lcs  s ign ifican tly  over a 
short period, w h ile , investm ent plans, on the other hand, arc usua lly  
fixed. In o rder to overcome th is  problem , the m arket price o f 
o rd in a ry  shares are taken as the average o f the highest and lowest 
prices d u rin g  the calendar year, ra ther than the share prices at the 
tim e when the company reports its  accounts. M u lt ip ly in g  th is  mean 
by the num ber o f shares, adjusted fro m  scrip t and r ig h t issues, the 
average m arket value o f the firm  is obtained. Data is obtained fro m  
Ex tel Cards4. Data on the m arke t value o f preference shares is 
unava ilab le  fo r  a ll companies. W hen book values were inc luded, the 
resu lts  d id  not change s ign ifican tly , because o f the low  level 
p roportion  o f preference shares in re la tion  to capita l stock5. The 
present va lue o f outstand ing  w r it in g  dow n allowances are, as 
m entioned above, equal to  zero because o f the assumptions in  the 
com putation o f the effective corporation  tax rates.
The value o f capital stock at replacement cost is computed as above. 
However, it  is also necessary to take in to  consideration the va lue  o f 
stock and w o rk  in progress, (S W IP ). These may be treated in  tw o  
d iffe ren t ways : e ither as liq u id  assets, in w h ich  case the ir va lue  is 
added to the m arket va lue o f the firm , o r as physical assets, thus 
adding them to the capita l stock. Results obtained under both
4. The average for the accounting year, rather than for the calendar year, would  
have been used if data was available.
5. In relation to the book value of ordinary shares, preference shares, on average 
represent less than 5% for the companies in the sample. On market value basis 
and for all the industrial and commercial companies, this proportion is less than 
().()()17< (Hank of I'ngland data, or Polerba and Summers (1983 ) p. 165).
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a lte rna tives  arc ve ry  s im ila r. The la tte r specification is reported here. 
To com pute the replacem ent cost o f slock and w o rk  in progress, it  is 
assumed that a ll firm s  use the FIFO m ethod o f va lua tion  o f stocks 
(see IC A  (19 82 )). To determ ine the last date o f the purchase o f the 
existing  stock, a stock tu rn o v e r ra tio  is com puted. The SWIP at 
replacement cost is com puted by m u lt ip ly in g  the book values by the 
average increase in price index d u rin g  the ho ld ing  period (i.e. 
tu rn o ve r ra tio ). I f ,  fo r  instance, the tu rn o ve r ra tio  is tw o  m onths 
and the firm  reports its  accounts in march, then the ra tio  o f the price  
index in  march to  th a t in  janu a ry  reflects the rise in  in fla tion  in  
stocks. The m o n th ly  price  indices are provided by the C entra l 
S ta tis tica l Office (1 9 82 ), Business M o n ito r (1986 ) fo r  each in d u s try . 
These indices are produced to  com pute the stock re lie f, thus no data 
was ava ilab le  before 1974. Instead the W holesale Price Index is used 
fo r  1973.
The debt capital ra tios are com puted in  chapter 36, and the present 
va lue o f capital a llow ances and the effective corporation tax rates are 
as calculated in chapter 5 and 2 respective ly.
The fo llo w in g  graphs show the average trends in the investm ent rate, 
Tob in  Mq M and the tax ad justed "Q".
6 . Polerba and Summers (1 9 8 3 ) computed this variable as the ratio of long term  
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Figure 7.1. Investment rate
_______Investment rate = additions to fixed assets over
capilal stock at replacement cost.
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Figure 7.2. f ax adjv:.'. 1 *Q’ vs. Tobin ’q’
No1es : lax  adjusted "Q" as computed from equation (7.2.1);
_______ Tobin q \ market value of shares over capital stock
at replacement cost.
From the above two graph, one can see the relatively similar
movements in investment rate and the valuation ratio. The low
levels in early seventies are due to a combination of the sharp decline
in the market values. Poterba and Summers (1983), using all
industrial and commercial companies, found, for instance, tax
adjusted "Q" of -0.213 and "q" of 0.1 1 in 1975. The low level of debts,
as seen in chapter 3, has also contributed to the negative values of
this ratio. However, the most important factor that lead to the
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decline o f the va lua tion  ra tio  in the 1970s is the corporation lax. 
C om paring the tax adjusted MQ" and Tobin ’q ’ we can see tha t a 
substan tia l gap is created by the low  allowances claimed by 
companies.
5. Empirical r e su lts :
Equation (7 .1 .1 ) is estim ated using both cross-sectional and pooled 
data. Since the seem ingly unrelated regressions techniques perfo rm s 
the regressions in  a set o f a ll equations (i.e. 11), the num ber o f 
observations has to  be restricted to  be the same fo r  each cross- 
sectional. Therefore, instead o f inc lud ing  a ll the 109 firm s  in  the 
sample we could o n ly  have 67 firm s fo r  each year, resu lting  in  737 
observations fo r  the pooled regressions.
- 227 -
TABLE 7.1. RESULTS () I: POOLED A M ) CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQUATION: SUR
/ , 1
* / . - !
=  a  +  p ,
, - i
- +  & l Q i
YEARS COEEE1CIENTS
Oi 0 , 02 Q Q F  3,64
1973 0 .034* 211* 0 .022* 0 .032 10.69**
(6 .2 3 ) (6 .5 5 ) (3 .4 3 ) 0 .040
1974 0 .060* 286* 0 .051* 0 .040 5.00**
(4 .9 1 ) (5 .1 2 ) (3 .1 7 ) 0.044
1975 0 .053* 219* 0 .034* 0.039 3.17**
(6 .4 5 ) (4 .5 4 ) (3 .1 7 ) 0.041
1976 0 .049* 114* 0 .028* 0.028 12.08**
(7 .6 7 ) (2 .6 1 ) (3 .1 8 ) 0.036
1977 0 .065* 168* 0 .033* 0.043 0.70
(7 .3 2 ) (3 .1 7 ) (2 .4 3 ) 0.044
1978 0 .071* 242* 0 .036* 0.043 2 .69**
(9 .4 4 ) ( 6 .01 ) (3 .2 1 ) 0.046
1979 0 .082* 322* 0 .032 0.082 3.13**
(6 .4 4 ) (4 .6 0 ) (1 .7 8 ) 0.088
1980 0 .072* 409* -0 .014 0.080 6 .35**
(5 .6 7 ) (5 .5 9 ) (-1 .0 7 ) 0.091
1981 0 .070* 192* 0.012 0.054 2.20
(8 .5 5 ) (4 .2 7 ) (1 .3 4 ) 0.057
1982 0 .075* 261* 0 .0008 0.072 3.19**
(7 .0 8 ) (4 .6 3 ) (0 .0 8 7 ) 0.077
1983 0 .094* 333* 0.019 0.110 4.91**
(6 .0 6 ) (4 .5 6 ) (1 .4 9 ) 0.122
POOLED 0 .053* 246* 0 .018*
(1 2 .4 6 ) (1 0 .6 2 ) (4 .7 4 )
Notes : t-statistics in brackets:
* Significant at 5% level: t c = 1.960;
** Significant a t 5% level: F v = 2.329:
Trace m atrix o f cross-sectional is 711 and 716 for pooled;
G u O r  = standard error of the estimates for cross-sectional and pooled; 
Num ber of observations = 67 for cross-sectional and 737 for pooled.
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TABLE 7.2. RESULTS OE POOLED AND CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQUATION: OLS
A
=  a  +  /Sj 1 +  02 Qi
* / . - 1 * / . - !
YEARS C O EFFIC IEN TS
a 01 02 R 2 cr
1973 0 .036* 217* 0 .029* 0.518 0.033
(5 .9 8 ) (5 .7 4 ) (3 .8 4 )
1974 0.093* 234* 0.101* 0.463 0.039
(6 .4 4 ) (3 .5 9 ) (5 .1 9 )
1975 0.069* 226* 0 .067* 0.326 0.038
(6 .5 3 ) (3 .4 9 ) (4 .3 2 )
1976 0 .061* 62.04 0 .046* 0.211 0.028
(8 .0 3 ) (1 .1 9 ) (4 .0 9 )
1977 0.064* 147* 0.027 0.086 0.044
(6 .1 4 ) (2 .2 5 ) (1 .5 1 )
1978 0.078* 188* 0 .040* 0.275 0.044
(8 .7 7 ) (3 .7 4 ) (2 .5 6 )
1979 0 .096* 191* 0.043 0.083 0.083
(6 .4 1 ) (2 .0 6 ) (1 .5 9 )
1980 0 .080* 331* -0 .016 0.172 0.081
(5 .5 9 ) (3 .7 1 ) ( -0 .9 )
1981 0 .075* 144* 0 .017 0.174 0.055
( 8 .66 ) (2 .8 5 ) (1 .5 6 )
1982 0.080* 217* 0.001 0.165 0.073
(7 .1 7 ) (3 .4 5 ) (0.12)
1983 0.098* 304* 0.018 0.200 0.112
(5 .9 9 ) (3 .71 ) (1 .0 6 )
POOLED 0.075* 156* 0 .042* 0.212 0.073
(24 .35 ) (9 .5 1 ) (1 1 .3 7 )
1973-78 0 .072* 140* 0 .060* 0.248 0.057
(17 .62 ) (6 .5 4 ) (1 0 .5 3 )
1979-83 0.091* 152* 0 .024* 0.136 0.085
(17 .99 ) (6 .3 1 ) (4 .5 5 )
Notes : t-statislics in brackets:
* significant at 57c level. t c =1.960.
R “  coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom.
O’ standard error of the estimates.
Num ber of observations = 67 for cross-sectional and 737 for pooled.
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The resu lts reported in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 do support the "Q" 
model o f investm ent fo r  the ea rlie r years o f the sample period. 
A lthough  the coefficient o f the tax adjusted Q is nearly  a lw ays o f the 
expected sign, the significance seems to d rop  a fte r  1979. Th is  is also 
reflected in the pooled when the sample is d iv ided  in to  tw o  sub­
periods. The t-s ta tis tics  o f the coefficient o f Q fo r  1973-78 period is 
much higher than tha t o f 1979-837.
These re la tiv e ly  poor resu lts d u rin g  the second sub-period are 
p robab ly  due to the re fo rm  in  personal income taxation d u rin g  1979 
(as explained in chapter 4 ). The resu lts obtained fro m  pooled cross- 
sectional tim e  series data p o in t to a strong influence o f the tax 
adjusted Q on investm ent behaviour. They are, thus, s im ila r to  these 
obtained by Poterba (1982), Poterba and Summers (1983, 1985) and 
Summers (1981) using aggregate data, a lthough these studies have 
obtained o n ly  tim e scries estimates. The aggregate results, however, 
show a re la tiv e ly  strong responsiveness o f investm ent to  ’Q \ as 
measured by R 2, than those found  in th is  s tud y . Th is is probab ly 
due to  the fac t tha t aggregation may reduce some o f the noise o f 
in d iv id u a l f irm ’s ’Q’. H ow ever, the h ig h ly  significant Chow test 
im p lies  tha t there are m a jo r differences between cross-sectional and 
pooled regressions. Therefore, the cross-sectional results are more 
appropria te  lo r  ou r analysis. D irec t conclusion cannot be d raw n  from
7. These results are in line w ith  these obtained when this model is applied to the 
aggregate industrial and commercial companies. We found that the coefficient of 
Q drops from  highly significant fo r the 1967-78 period to nearly insignificance 
fo r 1979-84.
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cross-sectional results as to the significance o f the tax adjusted Q 
because, in nearly hall' the sample period the coefficient o f Q is not 
s ign ificant. Moreover, the lo w  R 2 values indicate th a t m uch o f w ha t 
alfects investm ent behaviour is not captured by the exp lanatory 
variables used in th is  model. Salinger and Summers (19 83 ) estimated 
the ’O ’ equation fo r  each o f the th ir ty  Dow  Jones companies. They 
obtained tim e series estimates fo r  each company. The R 2 obtained 
has fluctuated fro m  as low  as 0.01 to  0.79 and the tax adjusted Q is 
o n ly  s ign ificant in  about 50 per cent o f the cases.
In  o rder to  measure the im portance o f tax ad justm ents in  the 
va lua tion  model, Salinger and Summers (1983) contrasted the 
re la tive  exp lanatory power o f Tobin q and the tax adjusted Q by 
using both o f them in  the same regression. They argued tha t, i f  
investm ent ra le  is determ ined b y  the tax adjusted *Q\ then we w ou ld  
expect the coefficient o f Q to  be sign ificant and positive w h ile  tha t o f q 
to  be insign ificant. The reason being tha t, since the m arke t is ve ry  
v o la tile  and capital is not homogeneous, then the stock m arke t 
element o f q is expected to be a ve ry  noisy signal o f the m argina l 
re tu rn  on incremental investm ent. On the other hand, the tax 
ad justm ent components o f the Q series are much less subject to  e rro r. 
Therefore, th e ir effect m ay be expected to be greater than tha t o f the 
stock m arket. Because o f th is , the coefficient o f q may be negative. 
The tax adjusted Q was found  to  be positive  and sign ificant in m ost o f 
the cases, w h ile  q is negative and ins ign ifican t. It is there fore  
im p o rta n t to make ad justm ents fo r  tax when s tu d y ing  the 
re la tionsh ip  between investm ent and q.
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The* relative* exp lana to ry  power o f the tax adjusted ’Q ’ and the Te>bin 
’c]’ are contrasted and the results obtained using the o rd in a r ily  least 
squares and the seem ingly unrelated regressions technique are 
reportc'd in the fo llo w in g  tables.
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TABLE 7.3. RESULTS OF POOLED AND CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQ U A TIO N : SLR
/ , — a + qt +  (32Qi
- l
YEARS C O EFFIC IENTS
a 01 02 au a r F  3.64
1973 0.056* -0.002 0.037* 0.040 7.68**
(7 .5 6 ) (-0 .1 5 ) (5 .24 ). 0.046
1974 0.095* - 0.001 0.068* 0.044 5.36**
(7 .8 1 ) (-0 .7 2 ) (4 .1 9 ) 0.049
1975 0.085* -0 .003* 0.044* 0.041 3.76**
(9 .2 5 ) (-2 .5 1 ) (4 .0 1 ) 0.044
1976 0.062* - 0.001 0.028* 0.028 7.87**
(9 .2 2 ) (-0 .9 9 ) (3 .1 1 ) 0.033
1977 0 .082* -0.0003 0.038* 0.045 0.05
( 8 .86) ( -0 .20) (2 .6 1 ) 0.045
1978 0 .094* 0.0013 0.051* 0.047 5.66**
(11 .13 ) (1 .0 7 ) (4 .3 6 ) 0.052
1979 0.108* 0.001 0.042* 0.084 4.30**
(7 .8 6 ) (0 .5 4 ) (2 .3 7 ) 0.092
1980 0.129* -0.003 0.005 0.087 5 .83**
(7 .2 4 ) ( - 0 .86) (0 .4 3 ) 0.098
1981 0.080* 0.002 0.019* 0.056 2.65
(7 .8 7 ) (1 .4 1 ) (2 .2 9 ) 0.060
1982 0.097* 0.001 0.010 0.078 2.94**
(6 .8 5 ) (0 .54 ) (1 .1 7 ) 0.083
1983 0.175* -0 .103* 0.027* 0.113 7.95**




(-1 .2 3 )
0 .026*
(6 .3 8 )
Notes : l-stalistics in brackets:
* Significant at 5% level; t c -  1.960:
** Significant at 5% level; F c =2.760;
Trace m atrix: pooled = 700. cross-sectional = 711;
O u O r  = standard error of the estimates for cross-sectional and pooled; 
Num ber of observations = 67 for cross-sectional and 737 for pooled.
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TABLE 7.4. RESULTS OF POOLED AND CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQUATION: OLS
a  +  ft? ,- +  f*2 Qi




f t  R 2 cr CORR
1973 0.063* -0.002 0.044* 0.280 0.040 0.79
(7 .4 0 ) (-0 .9 4 ) (5 .0 5 )
1974 0.126* -0.001 0.124* 0.356 0.042 0.64
(8 .5 0 ) (-0 .2 4 ) (6 .1 7 )
1975 0 .103* -0 .003 0.073* 0.242 0.041 0.32
(7 .9 8 ) (-1 .9 3 ) (4 .4 2 )
1976 0.071* -0.001 0.046* 0.207 0.028 0.52
(8 .9 1 ) (-1 .0 3 ) (4 .0 7 )
1977 0.081* -0 .0007 0.030 0.015 0.046 0.61
(7 .2 8 ) (-0 .3 4 ) (1 .6 6 )
1978 0.088* 0.003 0.051* 0.143 0.048 0.69
(7 .7 0 ) (1 .3 9 ) (3 .1 0 )
1979 0.113* 0.0005 0.052 0.022 0.086 0.69
(5 .8 4 ) (0 .1 4 ) (1 .8 7 )
1980 0.132* -0 .003 0.020 0.002 0.089 0.68
(5 .9 0 ) (-0 .7 2 ) (1 .2 3 )
1981 0.074* 0.004 0 .028* 0.105 0.057 0.79
(6 .0 1 ) (1 .6 0 ) (2 .6 9 )
1982 0.093* 0.002 0.018 0.015 0.080 0.88
(5 .0 5 ) (0 .6 1 ) (1 .6 3 )
1983 0.192* -0 .140* 0.030 0.152 0.115 0.92
(7 .4 3 ) (-3 .0 8 ) (1 .7 5 )
POOLED 0.061* 0 .064* 0 .018* 0.169 0.075 0.82
(9 .9 8 ) (5 .8 4 ) (2 .8 1 )
1973-78 0.051* 0.083* 0.033* 0.244 0.057 0.68
(7 .4 2 ) (6 .3 2 ) (4 .1 9 )
1979-83 0.087* 0.041* 0.010 0.069 0.089 0.84
(8 .5 0 ) (2 .3 9 ) (0 .9 9 )
Notes : t-statistics in brackets:
* significant at 5% level, t c =1.960:
R “ coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom: 
cr standard error of the estimates:
CORR = Pearson product moment correlation between q and Q: 
Num ber of observations = 67 for cross-sectional and 737 for pooled.
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The results shown in Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 are in line  w ith  these 
obtained by Salinger and Summers fo r  tim e  series regressions. N early 
a ll the coefficients o f q are negative and ins ign ifican t, w h ile  the 
coefficients o f the tax adjusted Q arc in a ll cases positive  and, out o f 
these 82 per cent are s ign ificant when the SUR method is used and 54 
per cent using the o rd in a r ily  least squares. These results, therefore, 
could stress the im portance o f m aking  tax ad justm ents in  re la ting 
investm ent to  the va lua tio n  ra tio .
H owever, since Tob in  q is a component o f the tax adjusted Q, i t  is 
possible tha t the tw o  variab les are h ig h ly  correlated. Salinger and 
Summers d id  not p rov ide  any test fo r  m u lt ic o llin e a r ity . The Pearson 
product mom ent co rre la tion  between Tob in  q and the tax adjusted Q 
is perform ed fo r  the pooled and cross-sectional, the resu lts o f w hich 
arc reported in  the last co lum n o f Table 7.4. The re la tive  difference 
between tax adjusted Q and Tob in  q in  th e ir corre la tion  coefficient is 
re la tiv e ly  low  in  1975 and 1976 b u t it  is q u ite  high in  the rem ain ing 
years. I t  seems tha t the high m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  is in  the last three 
years o f the sample period.
A n a lte rna tive  w ay o f analysing the possible im pact o f taxation  on 
investm ent th rough the tax adjusted Q is to  find w hich  o f q or tax 
adjusted Q expla ins more the investm en t rate. The same regressions 
arc perfo rm ed by tak ing  "q" ra the r than "QM as an independent 
variab le . The results, reported in  Table 7.5 and Table 7.6, p o in t to  a 
s ligh t su p e rio rity  o f the tax adjusted "Q" (as reported in Table 7.1 and 
7.2). H ow ever, in general, the sign and the significance o f Q and q is 
nearly  the same in cross-sectional regressions. The insignificance o f q
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is also concentrated in the post 1979 period.
T A B L E  7.5. RESULTS OF POOLED A N D  CROSS-SECTIONAL IN V E S T M E N T
E Q U A TIO N : SUR
/ / —  n  1
+  02?;
* / . - !
V'
-1
YEARS C O EFFIC IEN TS
Oi 01 02 F  3,64
1973 0.030* 229* 0 .010* 0.034 8.16**
(5 .5 4 ) (6 .9 8 ) (2 .5 1 ) 0.040
1974 0.053* 300* 0 .037* 0.041 3.59**
(4 .5 5 ) (5 .4 0 ) (2 .7 1 ) 0.044
1975 0.050* 227* 0 .028* 0 .039 2.64
(6 .6 0 ) (4 .8 1 ) (3 .2 9 ) 0.041
1976 0 .047* 123* 0 .022* 0 .029 11.22**
(7 .5 0 ) (2 .8 0 ) (2 .9 9 ) 0.036
1977 0.064* 178* 0 .031* 0.043 0.64
(7 .4 9 ) (3 .3 9 ) (2 .5 8 ) 0.044
1978 0 .071* 245* 0 .034* 0.043 2.52
(9 .3 2 ) (6 .0 6 ) (3 .0 5 ) 0.046
1979 0.083* 312* 0.033 0.082 3.15**
(6 .5 5 ) (4 .4 9 ) (1 .8 2 ) 0.088
1980 0.071* 419* -0 .017 0.080 6 .10**
(5 .5 5 ) (5 .7 9 ) ( - 1.20 ) 0 .090
1981 0.070* 193* 0.011 0.054 2.17
(8 .5 7 ) (4 .3 2 ) (1 .3 1 ) 0.057
1982 0.074* 268* 0.0001 0.072 2.91**
(7 .0 3 ) (4 .8 0 ) ( 0 . 12) 0.077
1983 0.093* 345* 0.02 0.110 4.87**






(5 .1 6 )
Notes : t-staiistics in brackets; * Significant at 5°A level: t c = 1.960:
** Significant at 5% level; F c =2.76;
Trace m atrix: pooled = 715. cross-sectional = 713;
O u O r  = standard error of the estimates for cross-sectional and pooled; 
Num ber of observations = 67 for cross-sectional and 737 for pooled.
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TABLE 7.6. RESULTS OF POOLED AND CROSS-SECTIONAL INVESTMENT
EQUATION: OLS
/ /
=  at +  j3]
1
+  02 <li
* / , - ! K t . - i
YEARS C O EFFIC IENTS
Oi 01 02 R 2 cr
1973 0.032* 233* 0 .014* 0.476 0.034
(5 .2 8 ) (5 .9 6 ) (2 .9 0 )
1974 0.086* 242* 0.081* 0.441 0.040
(6 .11) (3 .6 4 ) (4 .8 2 )
1975 0.064* 228* 0 .052* 0.309 0.039
(6 .3 7 ) (3 .4 6 ) (4 .0 7 )
1976 0.058* 62.5 0.036* 0.188 0.029
(7 .8 4 ) (1 .1 8 ) (3 .8 0 )
1977 0.063* 153* 0.024 0.087 0.044
(6 .2 9 ) (2 .3 5 ) (1 .5 3 )
1978 0.077* 191* 0.037* 0.269 0.044
(8 .6 4 ) (3 .8 1 ) (2 .4 4 )
1979 0.095* 195* 0.041 0.078 0.083
(6 .3 4 ) ( 2. 10) (1 .4 9 )
1980 0.080* 333* -0 .018 0.174 0.081
(5 .5 5 ) (3 .7 6 ) (-0 .9 6 )
1981 0.075* 145* 0.017 0.174 0.055
( 8.66 ) ( 2.88) (1 .5 6 )
1982 0.080* 217* 0.016 0.165 0.073
(7 .1 9 ) (3 .4 6 ) (0 .1 4 )
1983 0.098* 305* 0.019 0.200 0.112
(5 .9 9 ) (3 .7 2 ) (1 .0 6 )
POOLED 0.039* 132* 0.073* 0.211 0.073
(11 .19 ) (7 .8 0 ) (11 .29 )
1973-78 0 .022* 95.8* 0.104* 0.245 0.057
(5 .9 6 ) (4 .2 2 ) (10 .39 )
1979-83 0.070* 142* 0.041* 0.133 0.086
(10 .40 ) (5 .7 5 ) (4 .3 6 )
Notes : t-statistics in brackets;
* significant at 5%  level, t c =1.960.
R “ coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
cr standard error of the estimates.
Num ber of observations = 67 for cross-sectional and 737 for pooled.
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From the above results we may conclude th a t corporate taxation does 
not influence su b s ta n tia lly  the level o f investm en t undertaken by the 
firm . I f  there was any sign ificant d ifference between the results 
obtained fro m  the firs t regressions (T ab le  7.1 and 7.2) and when 
investm ent rate is related to  the Tobin q we could have concluded fo r  
an im pact o f taxation. H ow ever, the resu lts  obtained using the tax 
adjusted Q are not s ign ifica n tly  affected by tax ad justm ent, because 
s im ila r  resu lts  are obtained w ith o u t any ad justm ent. I t  may, 
however, be the case th a t these resu lts  are o n ly  due to  the fac t tha t 
m any companies in  the sample are tax exhausted, therefore, the ra tio  
o f allowances over the effective corporation tax rate is equal to  one. 
However, figure 7.2 shows c le a rly  tha t there is a sign ificant difference 
between the tw o  values. Therefore, we can o n ly  say tha t taxation 
docs not exert any im pact.
6. Conclusion :
T h is  chapter has a ttem pted to  find some re la tionsh ip  between 
corporation  tax and the rate o f investm ent using the va lua tion  model. 
Data is computed fo r  each firm  in d iv id u a lly .  As opposed to  the 
neoclassical model o f investm ent, the resu lts  obtained fro m  th is  
equation po in t to a strong influence o f the va lua tion  ra tio  on 
investm ent expenditure. H ow ever the re la t iv e ly  high exp lanatory 
power o f th is  specification is found  to be lim ite d  to the period before 
1979. W hen the tax adjusted Q is contrasted w ith  the Tob in  q by 
using both Ihese variables in  the same equation the resu lts  supported 
s tron g ly  the tax adjusted Q, ind ica ting , there fore , tha t tax has some 
im pact on investm ent rate. However, the high m u lt ic o llin e a r ity
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between these tw o  variables does not a llo w  us to d ra w  any consistent 
conclusions as to the possible im pact o f taxa tion . Instead, regressions 
were perfo rm ed  using Tob in  q as an exp lana to ry  variab le . The results 
obtained were ve ry  s im ila r to  the previous ones. In  other w ords 
w hether one recognises the tax effects o r not, the resu lts are s t i l l  the 
same. I t  was, therefore, concluded tha t taxa tion  does not exert any 
im pact on investm en t decisions.
W h ile  these resu lts  p rov ide  some fu r th e r  evidence tha t companies do 
not seem to  take account o f th e ir  tax position in th e ir investm ent 
behaviour, a great deal needs to  be done before any generalisation 
m ay be made. The sample o f firm s  may be increased to  take account 
o f in te rna tion a l companies. These are l ik e ly  to  be larger than the 
dom estic ones considered here, thus, as p rev ious studies have found, 
m ay use m ore sophisticated m ethods o f selecting th e ir  projects and 
m ay take account o f th e ir tax position  in  th e ir  investm ent decisions. 
T im e series estim ates m ay p rov ide  some in fo rm a tio n  concerning the 
differences in  the responsiveness o f in d iv id u a l f irm ’s investm ent to 
changes in the tax system. F u rthe r, the re laxation o f the assumption 
o f the hom ogeneity o f capita l m ay require  a com putation o f MQH fo r 
each class o f assets, w ith  th e ir specific depreciation rate, price index, 




The im po rta n t question th is  thesis has attem pted to address is 
w he ther taxation  exerts any im pact on the financing, d iv idend  and 
investm ent decisions o f the firm . There is no d ire c t reason fo r  tax ing 
corporations as d is tin c t fro m  th e ir owners. H ow ever, since taxation 
cou ld  d is to rt the financia l behaviour o f the firm s, i t  is w o rth  
analysing. The question o f sh iftin g  corporation tax is le f t  aside, and 
i t  is assumed, th roughou t th is  thesis, tha t the burden o f taxa tion  rests 
upon the owners o f the firm .
The im p lica tions  o f m any studies in the modern financial theory  that 
taxa tion  changes the behaviour o f firm s  have resulted in  an 
im p lem enta tion  o f some fiscal policies designed to  a lte r p a rticu la r 
financing decision o f the firm  a n d /o r to  encourage capital fo rm a tio n . 
Managers, being ra tiona l, are expected to adapt to  th is  p o licy  in  order 
to m axim ise th e ir shareholders w ea lth . The models tested in  th is  
s tudy  are based on these assum ptions and we have taken the v iew  
th a t capita l m arkets are efficient so tha t, fo r  instance, the investm ent 
rate could be related to  the ra tio  o f the m arket value o f the firm  to  its  
ex is ting  capita l stock.
These broad assum ptions have lead us to assume tha t companies were 
able to forecast th e ir  tax position and to  ad just th e ir financia l 
behaviour accord ing ly. F o llow in g  the theory and under these 
assum ptions we w ou ld  expect com pany’s financing decision to  be 
based on its  tax position. In p a rticu la r, i f  it  pays tax, then by having 
a low  debt-cap ita l ra tio  i t  incurs an o p p o rtu n ity  cost equal to the tax
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shields w hich resu lts from  the deduction o f interest paym ents fro m  
taxable p ro fit. Furtherm ore, since the paym ent o f d iv idends resu lt in 
an increase in shareholders’ personal income tax, a cu t in d iv idends 
w ou ld  resu lt in  the p o ss ib ility  o f financing a p a rticu la r pro ject w ith  a 
low e r overa ll tax b il l as, in  th is  case, the com pany w ou ld  not have to  
issue new shares. Furtherm ore , a firm  is expected to  respond 
p o s itive ly  to any increase in the tax allowances o r to  a decrease in  the 
corporate tax rate because th is  w ou ld  re su lt in a low e r cost o f cap ita l, 
by increasing its  investm ent expenditure. The three financia l 
decisions - financing, d iv idend  and investm ent -  are assumed to  be 
in te r-re la ted  and tha t any tax po licy  w h ich  aim s at a lte ring  one o f 
these decisions w i l l  have an in d ire c t clTect on the o ther tw o .
The b u lk  o f the em pirica l w o rk  reported in  th is  thesis is concerned 
w ith  the various tests to  determ ine the exten t to  w hich  both personal 
and corporate taxa tion  determ ine the financia l po licy  o f the firm . As 
has been argued, much o f these tests are based on some m acro­
econometric models w h ich  assume tha t firm s in the economy are 
homogeneous in th e ir  position tow ards taxation and in o ther 
exp lana to ry variables. We argued that, a t in d iv id u a l f irm ’s leve l, 
these variables are specific s itua tion  characteristics o f each in d iv id u a l 
com pany, and tha t, w ith o u t v io la tin g  any o f the above assum ptions, 
the behaviour o f one com pany could be d iffe re n t fro m  another. We 
have, firs t, analysed how and w h y  ou r sample o f companies is 
d iffe re n t fro m  the aggregate data, as fa r  as taxation is concerned, 
before considering the im pact o f taxation  on the firm s ’ financia l 
po licy .
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Chapter 2 has discussed the m ain issues re la ting  to taxing 
corporations. These relate to the con troversy as to w h y  companies 
are taxed d if fe re n tly  fro m  th e ir  owners, and to the in fla tiona ry  
im pact on the tax base. The d iffe re n t w ays o f tax ing corporations to 
e lim ina te  some o f these problem s are presented, the u n d e rly in g  tax 
system fo r  o u r analysis is described and the effective corporation tax 
rates fo r  a sample o f dom estic companies are com puted. I t  was found 
th a t the d is to rtio n  o f taxa tion  is reduced by the fact th a t nom inal 
interests are deducted fro m  pro fits  before tax, and th a t the tax 
system provides some allowances and re lie fs  to counter the im pact o f 
in fla tion . However, when these deductions are accounted fo r, 
business income taxation tu rn s  in to  a subsidy as a large num ber o f 
companies had negative taxable p ro fit d u rin g  the sample period. The 
rem ain ing chapters have used these resu lts  to  test fo r  the eff ects o f 
taxa tion  on the financing, d iv id e n d  and investm ent decisions o f the 
firm s.
C hapter 3 presents an em p irica l evidence on the im pact o f taxation  on 
debt-cap ita l ra tio . F irm s in the sample were found  to  finance most o f 
th e ir investm ent pro ject using e ither retained earnings o r new issues 
o f shares. T h is  chapter has attem pted to  find the reasons w h y  the all 
debts finance theory does not w o rk  in  practice. The hypothesis tha t 
the desired level o f debts is a func tio n  o f bankrup tcy  r is k  and o f the 
tax shields is tested. I f  the firm  is not in a position to  c la im  tax on 
in terest, an increase in debts w ou ld  o n ly  resu lt in  a rise in the 
p rem ium  fo r  risk  as required  by shareholders and lenders. The 
em p irica l resu lts  support the v iew  tha t a target debt-cap ita l ra tio  is a 
fu n c tio n  o f the tax exhaustion position, required rate o f re tu rn  by
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shareholders and the level o f interest rate. It appears fro m  these 
results tha t, i f  a com pany is tax exhausted i t  cannot lake advantage 
o f the tax shields, and, as a consequence, it  prefers to finance its  
investm ent projects using new issues o r retained earnings. Th is 
con form s w ith  the ra tiona l behaviour assum ption.
The im pact o f taxation on d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  has been the area o f 
concentration o f chapter 4. Leaving the d if f ic u lty  o f find ing  any 
p lausib le  theoretical exp lanation o f d iv id e nd  behaviour aside, the 
analysis is carried ou t on the basis o f L in tn e r ’s pa rtia l ad justm ent 
model w h ich  a llo w s  fo r  tax d isc rim ina tio n  between d iv idends and 
retained earnings. The m ain problem  th a t was encountered in  try in g  
to ap p ly  th is  model at the in d iv id u a l f irm s ’ level was in  measuring 
the m argina l income tax rate o f shareholders o f each com pany. 
Because o f the u n a v a ila b ility  o f detailed com position o f the categories 
o f shareholders and th e ir  re la tive  tax brackets, the com putation  o f 
the tax d isc rim ina tion  va riab le  was done on the basis o f a weighted 
average o f the interests o f d irectors, w h ich  were assumed to be in  the 
highest tax bracket, and o f the aggregate average income tax rate. The 
em p irica l results obtained using the pooled data are s im ila r to  those 
obtained on aggregate data in tha t they p rov ide  some evidence tax 
d isc rim ina tio n  affects d iv id end  po licy . M oreover, firm s appear to  take 
account o f th e ir tax position in th e ir d iv idend  decision. Specifica lly, 
i f  the firm  is not l ik e ly  to recover the advanced corporation tax, i t  
pays low e r d iv idends. However, some fu r th e r  w o rk  is needed on th is  
issue to isolate the im pact o f p ro fita b il ity . The cross-sectional 
resu lts , on the other hand, do not appear to  y ie ld  d irec t conclusions 
on such im pact because o f the m a jo r changes in the tax system d u rin g
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the sample period, but the coefficients o f the tax variab le  do not seem 
to va ry  s ign ifican tly  from  one period to another. A lthough  the 
resu lts  are not found to  be sensitive to a lte rn a tive  de fin itions o f th is  
tax d isc rim ina tion  variab le , a more accurate ca lcu la tion  o f 0 is s t i l l  
needed to  take account o f a ll the d iffe re n t categories o f shareholders 
fo r  each in d iv id u a l com pany. Th is  area together w ith  a theory 
behind d iv idend  d is tr ib u tio n  are c lea rly  w ays in w h ich  some fu r th e r  
research could u s e fu lly  be done.
The m a jo r theme tha t has in itia te d  th is  research was the question o f 
how  investm ent m ay be encouraged through changes in taxa tion . The 
m a jo r macro-economics m odel, i f  they consider the im pact o f 
taxa tion , use aggregate data. E m p irica l evidence at com pany level is 
ve ry  rare despite the m icro-econom ic o rig ins  o f the investm ent 
models. The reason fo r  using aggregate data is p robab ly  due to  the 
d if f ic u lty  in  com puting e ffective corpora tion  tax and o ther specific 
variab les fo r  each com pany, w h ile  a t the aggregate s ta tu to ry  rales arc 
easily available. Chapter 5, thus, has dealt w ith  the main issues tha t 
surrounded previous em p irica l studies on investm ent behaviour. I t  
was necessary to rev iew  both sets o f lite ra tu re  in  order to  p ick  up a ll 
the d iffe re n t variables tha t exert some influence on investm ent 
decision. These are defined and constructed in chapter 6 fo r  the 
neoclassical model and in  chapter 7 fo r  the va lua tion  model.
The resu lts  obtained fro m  both these m ain econometric models lead to 
the conclusion tha t taxation docs not appear to exert any influence on 
investm ent behaviour. The pooled cross-sectional tim e  series 
regressions are also perfo rm ed, but it  was found  tha t there are 
s ign ificant differences between the in d iv id u a l cross-sectional, thus,
m aking the pooled resu lts biased. The o rig ina l neoclassical model d id  
not p ro v ide  consistent resu lts  as the coellic ient o f the change in the 
op tim a l cap ita l stock is in most cases ins ign ifican t and w ith  a w rong 
sign. Therefore, since th is  model assumes tha t the e las tic ity  o f 
inves tm en t w ith  respect to  the d iffe re n t components o f the desired 
cap ita l s lock is equal to  u n ity , we conclude tha t taxa tion  does not 
affect the investm ent decision o f the firm . W hen th is  assumption is 
relaxed, the coefficient o f the tax va riab le  is, in  m ost cases not 
s ign ificant, a lthough i t  is o f the expected sign. However, the spurious 
m u lt ic o llin e a r ity  between th is  variab le  and the inverse o f capita l 
stock m ay have biased these resu lts. Nevertheless, tax exhaustion is 
fou nd  not to  exert any im pact on investm en t expenditure, therefore 
co n firm ing  the previous conclusions.
The va lu a tio n  ra tio  has also re fu ted  any im pact o f taxation  on 
inves tm en t behaviour. The coefficient o f the tax adjusted Q is found 
to  be s ign ificant in o n ly  about 50 per cent o f the cases. S im ila r results 
were obtained when the va lua tion  ra tio  is defined w ith o u t ad justing  
fo r  taxa tion . However, econom etric problem s have prevented us 
fro m  d ra w in g  any conclusion on the tax im pact, when the re la tive  
perform ance o f the tax adjusted Q is contrasted to tha t o f the Tob in
q-
The econom etric resu lts obtained in  th is  research appear to im p ly  tha t 
companies in the sample are d iffe re n t in  th e ir  behaviour depending on 
the type  o f financial p o licy . F irm s are foun d  to consider th e ir tax 
position in decid ing on how  to finance th e ir  project. M oreover, the 
pooled resu lts  im p ly  tha t these companies are influenced by th e ir  tax 
position  and th e ir shareholders personal income taxation in decid ing
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on th e ir d iv id e nd  po licy . They seem to go up to the po in t where they 
w ant to  ’buy back’ d iv idends in  order to reduce th e ir shareholders 
personal income taxa tion . Th is  behaviour supports our ra tiona l 
assum ption, not in the sense tha t companies pay d iv idends, bu t ra ther 
on th e ir behaviour tow ards  tax. H ow ever, concluding, as im p lied  by 
the resu lts , tha t companies do not act at m axim is ing th e ir 
shareholders w ea lth  by not responding p o s itive ly  to  the tax incentives 
and tha t cap ita l a llowances are not an efficient ins trum en t fo r  
encouraging cap ita l fo rm a tio n , is not o bv io us ly  a step to be taken 
l ig h t ly  as o u r resu lts  are open to  the charge tha t the lack o f 
re la tionsh ip  between corporate investm ent and taxation m ay be due 
to  the m a jo r econometric problem s encountered. Consequently, i t  is 
hard to  avo id  ending th is  s tud y  w ith o u t a ca ll fo r  fu r th e r  research on 
the topic. One possible w ay  o f reducing the im pact o f the problem s 
created by the data is by  concentrating the analysis on a more 
homogeneous sample o f companies, o r a lte rn a tiv e ly , obtain data fo r  a 
longer sample period and analyse sh o rt-te rm  effects o f taxation.
In the above analysis the im pact o f leasing was not taken in to  
account. Taxation  could be im p o rta n t in the decision on w hether to  
acquire o r to  lease the asset. I f  the company is in  a tax exhaustion 
position then i t  m ay be more p ro fitab le  to rent ra ther than to buy the 
equipm ent. The lessor, being in tax paying position w i l l  be able to  
c la im  investm ent allowances on the purchases o f capital equipm ent 
and w il l  be able to  reduce the renta l rate to the lessee w ho is tax 
exhausted. Leased equipm ent is not taken in to  account in  th is  
ana lys is  because o f the lack o f data. Th is  provides c lea rly  a d irec tion  
fo r  fu r th e r  research.
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The general lim ita tio n s  o f the s tudy  are tha t the sample period has 
been characterised by ve ry  high rates o f in lla tion  and high interest 
rates. I f  tim e  has not been the m a jo r constra in t, the im pact o f each o f 
the elements cou ld  have been analysed separately, in add ition  to the 
extent to  w h ich  firm s  have invested in p la n t and m achinery fo r  
p u re ly  fiscal reasons, the t im in g  o f investm ent, tim e  series effects and 
o ther de te rm inants, such as p ro fita b ility . Nonetheless, the resu lts o f 
th is  research have prov ided  a beginning fo r  the s tu d y  o f th is  area.
As fo r  the student, he has ended up w ith  more questions than 
answers on the im pact o f taxa tion  on the firm s ’ behaviour and th is  
has resu lted in  an eagerness fo r  m ore research on the subject.
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APPEN DIX I : C O M P U TA TIO N  OF COST OF C A P IT A L
The cost o f cap ita l used in  the neoclassical model is estim ated using 
the Capita l Asset P ric ing Model (C A P M ). In th is  appendix we 
present the differences in  the estim ation o f th is  va riab le  using three 
d iffe ren t methods. The firs t relates the re tu rns on a secu rity  at tim e  t 
to  the re tu rn  on the m arke t at tim e t, i.e. w ith o u t any lags or leads. 
Th is method has been critic ised  in the lite ra tu re  as being unable to 
account fo r  the th in  trad ing  tha t m ay occur i f  a p a rtic u la r security  
has not been trad ing  d u rin g  th is  period. In order to  correct fo r  th is  
p o ss ib ility , D im  son (1 9 79 ) argued tha t tak ing  account o f the leads 
and lags w i l l  g ive unbiased results. He suggested five leads and five 
corresponding lags, and the estimated beta w i l l  be the sum o f a ll the 
eleven coefficients obtained fro m  the regression. A lte rn a t iv e ly , i f  the 
security  has not been traded in the previous three m on ths1, then 
using the lagged m a rke t re tu rn  fo r  three previous m onths and 
obta in ing beta as the sum o f the fo u r  coefficients obtained m ay reduce 
th is  biase. In  the fo llo w in g  tables we compare the resu lts  obtained 
using these three m ethods in  term s o f the ir s ta b ility  and also compute 
the cost o f cap ita l using these three d iffe ren t a lte rnatives.
Since ou r resu lts  are based on the pooled cross-sectional tim e  series 
data, and also the seem ingly unrelated regressions technique takes 
account o f the changes th rough  d iffe re n t years, i t  is im p o rta n t to 
concentrate on the s ta b ili ty  o f the cost o f capital in  choosing the
1. A number of other lags have been tried but the specification with three lags 
appears to give more stable results.
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estim ation  m ethod. Companies selected fo r  comparison are chosen in 
such a w ay as to inc lude also sm all companies. We present the 
com parison o f o n ly  five  companies, bu t in the next table a ll the 
estim ated betas and C APM  used are reported.
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TABLE 1.1. Cost of capital of Hrm 1.
j Y H A R S 0 1 0 2 0 3 CAPM , CAPM 2 CAPM 3  1i
I 1 9 7 2 1 . 5 4 1 8 3 . 1 2 8 2 2 . 0 1 1 1 0 . 1 3 5 5 0 . 1 7 1 7 0 . 1 4 6 2
1 9 7 3 1 . 7 6 7 1 3 . 1 6 8 9 2 . 1 9 6 5 0 . 1 4 0 6 0 . 1 7 2 6 0 . 1 5 0 4  j
! 1 9 7 4 1 . 7 7 8 4 2 . 2 3 9 6 1 . 5 1 9 0 0 . 1 4 0 9 0 . 1 5 1 4 0 . 1 3 5 0
| 1 9 7 5 1 . 8 0 7 2 2 . 2 1 4 2 1 . 7 4 4 2 0 . 1 4 1 5 0 . 1 5 0 8 0 . 1 4 0 1  |
! 1 9 7 6 1 . 8 5 6 8 1 . 8 8 6 8 1 . 6 7 7 4 0 . 1 4 2 7 0 . 1 4 3 4 0 . 1 3 8 6  j
I 1 9 7 7 1 . 9 4 2 1 1 . 5 6 3 9 1 . 5 8 7 9 0 . 1 4 4 6 0 . 1 3 6 0 0 . 1 3 6 5  1
1 9 7 8 2 . 0 0 6 9 1 . 5 4 1 1 1 . 6 3 8 1 0 . 1 4 6 1 0 . 1 3 5 5 0 . 1 3 7 7  |
1 9 7 9 2 . 1 2 5 8 1 . 9 1 4 3 2 . 3 4 8 4 0 . 1 4 8 8 0 . 1 4 4 0 0 . 1 5 3 9
1 1 9 8 0 2 . 2 2 0 6 1 . 3 4 6 1 1 . 6 6 4 9 0 . 1 5 1 0 0 . 1 3 1 2 0 . 1 3 8 3  1
j 1 9 8 1 1 . 8 6 3 0 0 . 4 3 0 1 0 . 9 1 8 7 0 . 1 4 3 0 0 . 1 1 0 1 0 . 1 2 1 3  i1
1 9 8 2 1 . 6 6 1 2 0 . 2 5 8 5 0 . 7 0 8 6 0 . 1 3 8 2 0 . 1 0 6 2 0 . 1 1 6 5  j
| 1 9 8 3 1 . 4 9 1 1 - 0 . 5 0 9 8 0 . 3 4 1 2 0 . 1 3 4 3 0 . 0 8 8 7 0 . 1 0 8 1
! MeanI 1 . 8 3 8 5 1 . 5 9 8 0 1 . 5 3 0 0 0 . 1 4 2 2 0 . 1 3 6 8
I
0 . 1 3 5 2
I
I ° 0 . 2 1 7 1 1 . 1 0 6 0 0 . 5 9 6 0 0 . 0 0 4 9 0 . 0 2 5 2 0 . 0 1 3 6
Notes: is obtained from RT =  a T +  RmT +  V j
^  11 A- ^
j32 is obtained from R r — a T +  £  s,,^s +  VT
i -  1
O- 4 A . ^
j33 is obtained from Rr =  a 7 +  £  & it  Rm'rt 3, +  v t
i = 1
CAPM  j =  0.1003 +  jSj* (0 .1 2 31 2 -0 .1 0 03 )
C A P M 2 =  0.1003 +  /3j* (0 .1 2 3 1 2 -0 .1 0 0 3 )
CAPM  2 =  0.1003 +  0-,* (0 .1 2 3 1 2 -0 .1003)
Where T  is the interval length = 60 months;
<t.
R T is the observed return in period T of this firm:
n -
Rmj = observed return on 750 actuaries ordinary share index;
•v^
vt is the stochastic disturbance term.
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TA BLE 12. Cost of Capital Firm 2.
|YEARS 01 02 03 CAPM  j CAPM  2 CAPM  3
I 1972 0.8494 0.5942 0.4600 0.1197 0.1139 0.1108 |
j 1973 0.8980 0.5845 0.5779 0.1208 0.1136 0.1135
1974 0.9956 1.0744 0.9073 0.1230 0.1248 0.1210
| 1975 1.1225 1.0578 0.9833 0.1259 0.1244 0.1227 |
1976 1.2294 1.0795 1.0110 1.2835 0.1243 0.1233 j
! 1977l 1.2707 1.1625 1.1046 0.1293 0.1268 0.1255 1
| 1978 1.2587 1.2112 1.0825 0.1290 0.1279 0.1250 |
1979 1.3635 1.2403 1.0362 0.1314 0.1286 0.1239
j 1980 1.4079 1.1108 1.0632 0.1324 0.1256 0.1246 !
1981 1.4033 1.2330 0.9197 0.1323 0.1284 0.1213 j
j 1982 1.3300 0.8073 1.1843 • 0.1307 0.1187 0.1273 |
**5oc 1.3132 0.5693 1.2336 0.1303 0.1133 0.1285 |
1 Mean 1.2035 0.9771 0.9636 0.1278 0.1226 0.1223 1
a 0.1936 0.2636 0.2298 0.0044 0.0060 0.0052 |
Notes: jSj is obtained from R r =  OiT +  &T RmT +  vT
* _  11 ^
02 is obtained from R r  =  a 7 +  £  Prr Rmi\ SJ^ S +
/ = i
yy.
p 3 is obtained from  /c j  =  oty- +  ]T Rm'r, 3,  +  V T
i = l
C A P M X =  0.1003 +  /3,* (0 .1 2 3 1 2 -0 .1 0 0 3 )
CAPM  2 =  0.1003 +  0 2* (0 .1 2 3 1 2 -0 .1 0 0 3 )
CAPM  3 =  0.1003 +  /33* (0 .1 2 3 1 2 -0 .1 0 0 3 )
Where T is the interval length = 60 months;
Rt is the observed return in period T of this firm ;
n,
R mI =  observed return on 750 actuaries ordinary share index;
vt is the stochastic disturbance term.
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TABLE 13. Cost of Capital Firm 3.
; YEARS 01 02 03 CAPM  j CAPM  2 CAPM  3 j
|
i
j 1973 0.7594 0.8293 0.6866 0.1178 0.1192
1
0.1159 j
1974 0.8560 1.0134 0.8809 0.1198 0.1234 0.1204
! 1975| 0.7812 0.9678 0.5939 0.1181 0.1224 0.1138
1975 0.7267 1.0676 0.6121 0.1169 0.1247 0.1143 |
1976 0.7259 0.9479 0.5401 0.1169 0.1219 0.1126
| 1977 0.7626 1.1675 0.6805 0.1177 0.1267 0.1158 1
1978 0.7063 1.0933 0.6464 0.1164 0.1252 0.1150
1979 0.7379 1.4480 0.7894 0.1171 0.1333 0.1183
1 1980 0.7373 1.2056 1.2689 0.1171 0.1278 0.1292 ;
j 1981 0.6234 0.8098 0.7312 0.1145 0.1188 0.1170
j 1982 0.5232 -0.0149 0.4641 0.1122 0.1000 0.1109 ;
| 1983
(
0.5750 -0.8628 -0.0413 0.1134 0.0806 0.0994 !
!
i
| Mean 0.7096 0.8060 0.6544 0.1165 0.1187 0.1152 '1
o 0.0926 0.6330 0.3005 0.0021 0.0144 0.0069 |
Notes: j3j is obtained from R T =  ocT +  {3y R mT +  Vt
~  11 —  _
0 2 is obtained from R y  =  ocy +  £  ($iT PmTt ^SjLJ[^ s +
f = i ' *
^  4 n ~ ~0 3 is obtained from R y  =  oty +  £  (3iT R myt +  V j
i = 1
CAPM  ] =  0.1003 +  j3j* (0 .12312—0.1003)
CAPM  2 =  0.1003 +  j32* (0 .12312—0.1003)
C A P M  3 =  0.1003 +  0 3* (0 .1 2 3 1 2 -0 .1 0 0 3 )
Where T is the interval length = 60 months;
P j  is the observed return in period 7' of this firm;
/**
RmT = observed return on 750 actuaries ordinary share index;
vt is the stochastic disturbance term.
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'FABLE 14. Cos1 of Capital Firm 4.
YEARS
1j
0 i 02 03 CAPM  , C A P M 2 CAPM  3
1
I 1972 0.8515 -0.1092 0.5897 0.1197 0.0978 0.1137 |
j 1973 0.6799 0.0285 0.4088 0.1158 0.1009 0.1096 j
1 1974 0.6895 0.2483 0.5572 0.1160 0.1059 0.1130
| 1975 0.8144 0.5026 0.6313 0.1189 0.1118 0.1147 |
j 1976 0.8480 0.7767 0.7683 0.1196 0.1180 0.1178 J
1 1977 0.8594 0.8737 0.8611 0.1199 0.1202 0.1199 1
1978 0.9314 0.8292 0.9321 0.1215 0.1192 0.1212 |
1979 0.8865 1.0265 0.8567 0.1205 0.1237 0.1198
1980 0.6678 1.0742 1.0968 0.1155 0.1248 0.1253 1
I 1981 0.8140 1.1185 1.3373 0.1189 0.1258 0.1308 |
1982 0.8078 0.8881 1.0489 0.1187 0.1206 0.1242 j
j 1983
1




0.8057 0.6470 0.8277 0.1187 0.1151 0.1192 1
1
1 ° 0.0841 0.4110 0.2596 0.0019 0.0094 0.0059 j
Notes: 0 ]
-i
is obtained from  RT =  OLj +  0 I’^mT +  VT
-V. 11 V
02 is obtained from RT = a J +  Z  0/7’ RmT,
/ = 1
0 3  is obtained from Rj = otT +  JT 0<T^m7'f ^  ^
1=1 *
CAPM  x = 0.1003 +  jSj* (0 .12312—0.1003)
C A P M , = 0.1003 +  0 2* (0 .12312—0.1003)
CAPM  3 =  0.1003 +  0 3* (0 .1 2 3 1 2 -0 .1 0 03 )
Where T is the interval length = 60 months;
Hy is the observed return in period T o f this firm ;
/V
Rm7 = observed return on 750 actuaries ordinary share index;
vt is the stochastic disturbance term.
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TABLE 15. Cost of Capital Firm 5.
YEARS
j
01 02 03 C A P M , CAPM  2 CAPM  3
|!
1972 0.1228 0.0199 0.2970 0.1031 0.1008 0.1071 !
1973 0.4914 0.2996 0.3959 0.1115 0.1071 0.1093
1974 0.4731 0.2968 0.6149 0.1111 0.1071 0.1143 1
I 1975 0.3708 0.5603 1.0091 0.1088 0.1131
1
0.1233 j
1976 0.5581 0.7943 1.0856 0.1130 0.1184 0.1251
1977 0.5394 0.7838 1.0062 0.1126 0.1182 0.1233 i
1978 0.4838 0.8312 1.0035 0.1113 0.1193 0.1232 j
J  1979 0.2569 0.4710 1.1747 0.1062 0.1110 0.1271 j
I 1980 0.5379 0.0811 0.4748 0.1126 0.1021 0.1111 I
1981 0.2595 0.5592 0.3708 0.1062 0.1131 0.1088
1982 0.3271 0.8584 1.4281 0.1078 0.1199 0.1329 |
1983 0.6429 2.8392 2.3117 0.1150 0.1651 0.1530 j
Mean 0.4220 0.7000 0.9310 0.1099 0.1163
i
0.1215 I|
! 0.1539 0.7320 0.5690 0.0035 0.0167 0.0130
Notes: /32 is obtained from  Rj = ocT +  ($T RmT +  vT
^  1 1 " V  ^
/32 is obtained from  Rr  =  a y +  £  0 |T RmTt-Um  +  VT
i = 1
/ » -  4  *-V. —v .
j33 is obtained from Rj =  +  £  fiiT RmTt . 3J +  VJ
/ = i
C A P M !  =  0 . 1 0 0 3  +  j 3 j *  ( 0 . 1 2 3 1 2 — 0 . 1 0 0 3 )
C A P M  2 =  0 . 1 0 0 3  +  (32 *  ( 0 . 1 2 3 1 2 - 0 . 1 0 0 3 )
C A P M  ^  =  0 . 1 0 0 3  +  /3 3 *  ( 0 . 1 2 3 1 2 - 0 . 1 0 0 3 )
Where T is the interval length = 60 months;
R j  is the observed return in period T of this firm;
Rmi' -  observed return on 750 actuaries ordinary share index; 
vt is the stochastic disturbance term.
From  these tables we can see tha t, in term s o f s ta b ility  beta com puted
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from  the firs t method w hich does not take in to  account the leads o r 
lags in the m arket re tu rn  provides more consistent results. There is a 
po ss ib ility  tha t th in  trad ing  m ay underestim ate beta obtained using 
th is  method. H ow ever the cost o f capita l com puted fro m  C A P M  does 
not change su b s ta n tia lly  fro m  one method to  another.
TABLE 16. Average Firms’ Beta and Cost of Capital over Sample Period.
irm s’ Beta Standard Deviation of Bela CAPMi °  CAPM i
1.4203 0.1493 0.1327 0.0034
1.8385 0.2171 0.1422 0.0049
1.2035 0.1936 0.1278 0.0044
0.8906 0.1519 0.1206 0.0035
0.9973 0.0852 0.1231 0.0019
1.2669 0.1861 0.1292 0.0042
1.0941 0.1806 0.1253 0.0041
0.9898 0.3186 0.1229 0.0073
0.7678 0.1474 0.1178 0.0034
1.0797 0.1678 0.1249 0.0038
0.9560 0.3590 0.1221 0.0082
1.0195 0.0806 0.1236 0.0018
0.7415 0.1276 0.1172 0.0029
1.3249 0.2336 0.1305 0.0053
0.4706 0.1073 0.1110 0.0024
0.7096 0.0926 0.1165 0.0021
1.0876 0.2627 0.1251 0.0060
1.3507 0.2698 0.1311 0.0062
1.5600 0.2885 0.1359 0.0066
1.3016 0.2183 0.1300 0.0050
1.6140 0.4160 0.1371 0.0095
1.0060 0.4760 0.1233 0.1087
0.8990 0.1597 0.1208 0.0036
0.8624 0.3157 0.1200 0.0072
1.3044 0.1278 0.1301 0.0029
- 2.55 -
0.9738 0.2112 0.1225 0.0048
0.3151 0.0422 0.1075 0.0010
1.0244 0.1184 0.1237 0.0027
0.0083 0.2401 0.1142 0.0056
0.8000 0.5040 0.1199 0.0115
0.5400 0.2911 0.1126 0.0066
0.5928 0.1163 0.1138 0.0026
0.8332 0.2694 0.1193 0.0062
1.2594 0.0775 0.1290 0.0018
1.4303 0.2561 0.1331 0.0059
0.5005 0.0339 0.1117 0.0008
1.1337 0.2410 0.1262 0.0055
0.8056 0.0841 0.1187 0.0019
1.3704 0.1798 0.1317 0.0041
1.0135 0.0955 0.1234 0.0022
1.1480 0.3284 0.1265 0.0075
1.0813 0.1999 0.1387 0.0046
1.4500 0.2166 0.1335 0.0049
1.3233 0.1918 0.1305 0.0044
0.0854 0.2823 0.1159 0.0064
1.2633 0.3369 0.1291 0.0077
1.2238 0.2508 0.1282 0.0057
0.8410 0.4380 0.1195 0.0100
1.0737 0.2963 0.1385 0.0068
1.2020 0.3690 0.1291 0.0084
1.4807 0.1594 0.1342 0.0036
1.2372 0.1972 0.1285 0.0045
1.2494 0.2545 0.1288 0.0058
1.3155 0.3339 0.1303 0.0076
1.0700 0.2429 0.1247 0.0055
1.2053 0.2052 0.1278 0.0047
1.0551 0.0534 0.1244 0.0012
1.2311 0.2173 0.1284 0.0050
1.0975 0.2119 0.1253 0.0048
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1.3407 0.1015 0.1309 0.0023
0.4220 0.1539 0.1099 0.0035
0.9960 0.4870 0.1230 0.0111
1.8629 0.2790 0.1428 0.0064
0.9854 0.1773 0.1228 0.0040
1.0152 0.1075 0.1235 0.0024
0.7000 0.3560 0.1163 0.0081
1.0937 0.2142 0.1253 0.0049
0.7559 0.1255 0.1175 0.0029
1.3045 0.3340 0.1301 0.0076
1.3055 0.2261 0.1301 0.0052
1.1475 0.2096 0.1265 0.0048
0.5178 0.1253 0.1121 0.0029
1.1098 0.2675 0.1256 0.0061
0.9643 0.2819 0.1223 0.0064
1.8290 0.1224 0.1420 0.0028
1.3765 0.0661 0.1317 0.0015
1.7187 0.1086 0.1395 0.0025
1.0902 0.1417 0.1252 0.0032
1.0288 0.1227 0.1238 0.0028
0.6836 0.1770 0.1159 0.0040
0.9646 0.1862 0.1223 0.0042
0.9834 0.1217 0.1227 0.0028
1.1310 0.3480 0.1261 0.0079
1.0238 0.2544 0.1237 0.0058
1.1308 0.1997 0.1261 0.0046
1.7521 0.3103 0.1403 0.0071
0.8564 0.1200 0.1198 0.0027
1.3915 0.1810 0.1321 0.0041
1.1830 0.4010 0.1273 0.0091
1.1964 0.1166 0.1276 0.0027
1.1311 0.0995 0.1261 0.0023
0.7947 0.0761 0.1184 0.0017
1.3484 0.1724 0.1311 0.0039
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1.5677 0.2161 0.1361 0.0049
1.2102 0.2840 0.1279 0.0065
0.8860 0.1986 0.1205 0.0045
0.9683 0.2162 0.1224 0.0049
1.7926 0.1671 0.1412 0.0038
1.0449 0.1836 0.1241 0.0042
0.9906 0.2974 0.1229 0.0068
1.3879 0.1283 0.1320 0.0029
1.1882 0.1130 0.1274 0.0026
1.4916 0.0804 0.1343 0.0018
1.0994 0.1971 0.1254 0.0045
1.1720 0.1482 0.1270 0.0034
1.0474 0.1883 0.1242 0.0043
1.3285 0.1926 0.1306 0.0044
1.1480 0.2152 0.1265 0.0049
1.1357 0.1634 0.1262 0.0037
Notes: f t  is obtained from : Rt T =  +  f t  RmT +  v iT ;
CAPM; r =  0.1003 +  f t  * (0 .12312--0 .1003);
® C AP M i Standard of deviation o f CAPM over 12 years period; 
There were 23 companies which did not have the m onthly returns 
started only in 1970, therefore, we could not compute beta fo r the 
earlier years. Instead, we assumed the average fo r the next three 
years to approximate beta fo r 1972-1974 fo r these companies.
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A P PEN D IX  II:  SAM PLE OF C O M PA N IES
T A B L E  II.7 . L IST  OF F IR M S  
C O M P A N Y  N A M E  IN D U S T R Y  PU B LIC A TIO N  D A TE
AARO NSON BROS. PLC 17 30 /09
A L L IE D  T E X T IL E  C O M PA N IES PLC 61 30 /09
A PPLEYA R D  GROUP PLC 42 31/12
ARM STRO NG E Q U IP M E N T  PLC 41 0 2 /0 7
ASSOCIATED FISHERIES PLC 49 30 /09
ASSOCIATED PAPER IN D U STR IES 54 02/10
A V O N  RUBBER PLC 41 02/10
B A ILEY  (C . I I . )  PLC 29 2 6 /03
BARKER A N D  DOBSON GROUP PLC 58 31/12
B A R R A TT D E V ELO PM EN TS PLC 18 30/06
BARROW  HEPBURN GROUP PLC 73 31/12
BASS PLC 45 3 0 /09
B A TH  &  PO R TLA N D  GROUP PLC 11 3 1 /1 0
BEATSON C LA R K  PLC 54 31/12
BEMROSE CORPO RATIO N PLC 54 31 /12
BEN FORD CO NCRETE M A C H IN E R Y  PLC 22 3 1 /12
BODD1NGTON BREWERIES PLC 45 31/12
BOLTON T E X T IL E  M IL L  CO. PLC (T H E ) 59 30 /04
B O U LTO N  (W IL L IA M )  GROUP 22 30 /06
BRITISH D R EDG ING  PLC 14 31/12
BRITISH M O H A IR  H O LD IN G S PLC 61 31/12
BRITISH SYPHON IN D U STR IES PLC 27 31/12
BROW N (M A T T H E W ) PLC . 45 01/10
B R Y A N T  H O LD IN G S PLC 18 31/05
CARR (JOI IN K  D O N C ASTER ) PLC 17 30 /0 9
C L A Y  (R IC H A R D ) PLC 53 31 /12
CO HEN ( A . ) &  CO. PLC 32 31 /12
C O N C EN TR IC  PLC 27 3 0 /0 9
-  2 5 9  -
C O W  IE ( I . )  PLC 42 30 /09
CREST N IC H O LSO N  PLC 73 3 1 /1 0
C R O W TH E R  (JO H N ) GROUP PLC 61 31/12
D A V E N P O R T S ’ BREW ERY (H O LD IN G S ) PLC 45 01/10
D ESO U TTER  BROTHERS (H O L D IN G S ) PLC 28 3 1 /12
D E V E N IS H  (J .A .) PLC 45 30 /0 9
D O W D IN G  &  M IL L  PLC 19 3 0 /06
D U B IL IE R  PLC 35 02/10
EIS GROUP PLC 27 31/12
E.R.F. (H O L D IN G S ) PLC 43 31 /03
EAST LA N C A S H IR E  PAPER GROUP PLC 54 31 /12
ELECO  H O LD IN G S PLC 11 30 /06
EL E C T R O N IC  M A C H IN E  CO PLC 35 30 /09
E R IT H  PLC 13 31/12
E X P A M E T  IN T E R N A T IO N A L  PLC 14 31/12
FISHER (JA M E S ) &  SONS PLC 71 31/12
FOLKES (JO H N ) IIE F O  PLC 27 31/12
E O TH E R G ILL  &  H A R V E Y  PLC 11 31 /12
GLEESON (M .J .)  GROUP PLC 18 30 /06
G O M M E  H O LD IN G S PLC 38 2 9 /0 7
G R A IG  SHIPPING  PLC 71 31 /03
G R A M P IA N  H O LD IN G S PLC 73 31/12
G R A N A D A  GROUP PLC 36 01/10
G R E E N A L L  W H IT L E Y  PLC 45 30 /0 9
GROUP LO TU S CAR C O M P A N IE S  PLC 43 30/12
H A R D Y S  &  H A NSO N  PLC 45 30 /0 9
HA R R ISO N  (T .C .)  PLC 42 31 /12
IIIG S O N  BREW ERY PLC 45 30 /0 9
LD .C . GROUP PLC 18 3 1 /1 0
JACKSO N (J. &  1I.B.) PLC 34 3 0 /0 9
JONES STR O U D  (H O L D IN G S ) PLC 19 31 /03
KELSEY IN D U STR IES  PLC 73 30 /0 9
L A K E  &  E L L IO T  PLC 21 30 /0 9
LHC R EFR IG ER A TIO N  PLC 39 31/12
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LISTER &  CO. PLC 62 26 /0 3
LO N D O N  &  N O R TM LR N  GROUP PLC 73 31 /12
M A C A R T1IY S  P H A R M A C E U T IC A L S  PLC 67 3 0 /04
M A N C H ESTE R  SHIP C A N A L  CO. (T H E ) 72 3 1 /12
M A N G A N E S E  BRONZE H O LD IN G S PLC 32 31 /0 7
M E T A M E C  JE N TIQ U E  PLC 38 3 0 /06
M IL L E R  (S T A N L E Y ) HO LD IN G S PLC 18 31 /12
M O R L A N D  &  CO. PLC 45 3 0 /0 9
M U IR H E A D  PLC 19 3 0 /0 9
NEEPSEND PLC 27 31 /0 3
N E W M A N  IN D U STR IES  PLC 11 31 /12
N O T T IN G H A M  M A N U F G . CO. PLC (T H E ) 59 31 /1 2
N U -S W IF T  IN D U S TR IE S  PLC 76 31 /12
NURD1N &  PEACOCK PLC 51 3 1 /12
O FFIC E &  E L I:C TR O N IC  M A C H IN E S  PLC 69 31 /12
PARKER K N O L L  PLC 38 31 /0 7
PEARCE (C .H .) &  SONS PLC 18 31 /05
P L A X T O N  S (G B ) PLC 43 02/10
P R A 'IT  (F .)  EN G IN E E R IN G  CORPN PLC 27 3 1 /1 0
R EARDO N S M IT H  L IN E  PLC 71 31 /0 3
R ED FEA R N  N A T IO N A L  GLASS PLC 54 02/10
ROBERTS, A D L A R D  PLC 13 31 /1 2
S A M U ELSO N  GROUP PLC 48 3 1 /0 3
SCHOLES (GEORGE H .) PLC 19 30 /0 6
SC O TT &  ROBERTSON PLC 54 31 /1 2
SHARPE &  FISHER PLC 13 31 /1 2
S ID L A W  GROUP PLC 73 3 0 /0 9
SIMPSON (S .) PLC 59 3 1 /0 7
SO U N D  D IF FU S IO N  PLC 19 31 /1 2
S T E W A R T  PLASTICS PLC 66 30 /0 4
STO TH E R T &  P IT T  PLC 23 3 0 /0 6
S U N L IG H T  SER VIC E GROUP PLC 74 31 /1 2
TE LE FU S IO N  PLC 36 3 0 /04
T IL B U R Y  GROUP PLC 18 31 /1 2
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T R A V IS  &  A R N O LD  PLC 13 31/12
ULSTLR T L L L V IS IO N  L T D 48 31 /07
U N IT E D  NEW SPAPERS PLC 52 31/12
V A U X  BREWERIES PLC 45 01/10
W A D K IN  PLC 28 31/12
W A G O N  IN D U S T R IA L  H O LD IN G S PLC 23 31/03
W A TS O N  &  P H IL IP  PLC 51 2 8 /1 0
W E S T L A N D  PLC 27 3 0 /09
W ILS O N  (C O N N O L L Y ) H O LD IN G S PLC 18 31 /12
W O L S E L E Y -H U G IIE S  PLC 13 31 /07
W O LS TE N H O LM E  R IN K  PLC 68 31 /12
W O L V E R H A M P T O N  &  D U D L E Y  BREW ERIES PLC 45 30 /0 9
W O O D  (S .W .) GROUP PLC 32 31 /03
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